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The Prince

Description of the Methods Adopted by The Duke Valentino (Cesare Borgia) When Murdering Vitellozzo Vitelli..

The Life of Castruccio Castrani of Lucca

Machiavelli and his political philosophy

The Art of War

THE PRINCE

by Nicolo Machiavelli

Written c. 1505, published 1515

by Nicolo Machiavelli

Translated by W. K. Marriott

DEDICATION

To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De' Medici:

Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are
accustomed to come before him with such things as they hold most
precious, or in which they see him take most delight; whence one
often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and
similar ornaments presented to princes, worthy of their greatness.

Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with
some testimony of my devotion towards you, I have not found among
my possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so
much as, the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by
long experience in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of
antiquity; which, having reflected upon it with great and
prolonged diligence, I now send, digested into a little volume, to
your Magnificence.

And although I may consider this work unworthy of your
countenance, nevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it
may be acceptable, seeing that it is not possible for me to make a
better gift than to offer you the opportunity of understanding in
the shortest time all that I have learnt in so many years, and
with so many troubles and dangers; which work I have not
embellished with swelling or magnificent words, nor stuffed with
rounded periods, nor with any extrinsic allurements or adornments
whatever, with which so many are accustomed to embellish their
works; for I have wished either that no honour should be given it,
or else that the truth of the matter and the weightiness of the
theme shall make it acceptable.

Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man
of low and humble condition dare to discuss and settle the
concerns of princes; because, just as those who draw landscapes
place themselves below in the plain to contemplate the nature of
the mountains and of lofty places, and in order to contemplate the
plains place themselves upon high mountains, even so to understand
the nature of the people it needs to be a prince, and to
understand that if princes it needs to be of the people.

Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in
which I send it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered
by you, you will learn my extreme desire that you should attain
that greatness which fortune and your other attributes promise.
And if your Magnificence from the summit of your greatness will
sometimes turn your eyes to these lower regions, you will see how
unmeritedly I suffer a great and continued malignity of fortune.

THE PRINCE

CHAPTER I

HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE,
AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED

All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have
been and are either republics or principalities.

Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been
long established; or they are new.

The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or
they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the
prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of
the King of Spain.

Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a
prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of
the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.

CHAPTER II

CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES

I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another
place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only
to principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated
above, and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and
preserved.

I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary
states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than
new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of
his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise,
for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state,
unless he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force;
and if he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister
happens to the usurper, he will regain it.

We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have
withstood the attacks of the Venetians in '84, nor those of Pope
Julius in '10, unless he had been long established in his dominions.
For the hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend;
hence it happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary
vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his
subjects will be naturally well disposed towards him; and in the
antiquity and duration of his rule the memories and motives that make
for change are lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for
another.

CHAPTER III

CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES

But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it
be not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which,
taken collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly
from an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities;
for men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves,
and this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules:
wherein they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience
they have gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural
and common necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those
who have submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other
hardships which he must put upon his new acquisition.

In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in
seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends
who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in
the way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against
them, feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in
armed forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the
goodwill of the natives.

For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied
Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it
only needed Lodovico's own forces; because those who had opened the
gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future
benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is
very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time,
they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with
little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish
the delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself
in the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first
time it was enough for the Duke Lodovico[*] to raise insurrections on
the borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was
necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that his armies
should be defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the
causes above mentioned.

[*] Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who
married Beatrice d'Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500,
and died in 1510.

Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second
time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it
remains to name those for the second, and to see what resources he
had, and what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining
himself more securely in his acquisition than did the King of France.

Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an
ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country
and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold
them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self-
government; and to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed
the family of the prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples,
preserving in other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in
customs, will live quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany,
Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been bound to France for
so long a time: and, although there may be some difference in
language, nevertheless the customs are alike, and the people will
easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He who has annexed them,
if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind two
considerations: the one, that the family of their former lord is
extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes are
altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one
body with the old principality.

But when states are acquired in a country differing in language,
customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great
energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real
helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside
there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has
made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other
measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled
there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the
spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy
them; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are
great, and then one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the
country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied
by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have
more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He
who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost
caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested
from him with the greatest difficulty.

The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places,
which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do
this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A
prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense
he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority
only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them
to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and
scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being
uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not
to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have
been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not
costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as
has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one
has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed,
because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more
serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a
man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of
revenge.

But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends
much more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the
state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are
exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting
of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and
all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their
own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such
guards are as useless as a colony is useful.

Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects
ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful
neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care
that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a
footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be
introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of
ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were
brought into Greece by the Aetolians; and in every other country where
they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And
the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner
enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by
the hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in
respect to those subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain
them over to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state
which he has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not
get hold of too much power and too much authority, and then with his
own forces, and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more
powerful of them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And
he who does not properly manage this business will soon lose what he
has acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will have endless
difficulties and troubles.

The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely
these measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations
with[*] the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept
down the greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain
authority. Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The
Achaeans and Aetolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of
Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the
Achaeans and Aetolians never secured for them permission to increase
their power, nor did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans
to be his friends without first humbling him, nor did the influence of
Antiochus make them agree that he should retain any lordship over the
country. Because the Romans did in these instances what all prudent
princes ought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but
also future ones, for which they must prepare with every energy,
because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them; but if you wait
until they approach, the medicine is no longer in time because the
malady has become incurable; for it happens in this, as the physicians
say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the malady it
is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time,
not having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it
becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure. This it happens in
affairs of state, for when the evils that arise have been foreseen
(which it is only given to a wise man to see), they can be quickly
redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen, they have been
permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them, there is no
longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt
with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come
to a head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only to
be put off to the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight
with Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in
Italy; they could have avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor
did that ever please them which is for ever in the mouths of the wise
ones of our time:--Let us enjoy the benefits of the time--but rather
the benefits of their own valour and prudence, for time drives
everything before it, and is able to bring with it good as well as
evil, and evil as well as good.

[*] See remark in the introduction on the word "intrattenere."

But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the
things mentioned. I will speak of Louis[*] (and not of Charles[+]) as
the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held
possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he
has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain
a state composed of divers elements.

[*] Louis XII, King of France, "The Father of the People," born 1462,
died 1515.

[+] Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498.

King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians,
who desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention.
I will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get
a foothold in Italy, and having no friends there--seeing rather that
every door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles--he was
forced to accept those friendships which he could get, and he would
have succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had
not made some mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy,
regained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded;
the Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke
of Ferrara, the Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of
Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans,
the Sienese--everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then
could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them,
which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made
the king master of two-thirds of Italy.

Let any one now consider with that little difficulty the king could
have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above
laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although
they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the
Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been
forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have
made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no
sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander
to occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he
was weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who
had thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church
by adding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater
authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to
follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of
Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was
himself forced to come into Italy.

And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and
deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of
Naples, divides it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime
arbiter in Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that
country and the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to
shelter; and whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own
pensioner as king, he drove him out, to put one there who was able to
drive him, Louis, out in turn.

The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men
always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not
blamed; but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means,
then there is folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have
attacked Naples with her own forces she ought to have done so; if she
could not, then she ought not to have divided it. And if the partition
which she made with the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the
excuse that by it she got a foothold in Italy, this other partition
merited blame, for it had not the excuse of that necessity.

Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers,
he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he
brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did
not send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to
injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from
the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought
Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to
humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to
have consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always
have kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians
would never have consented except to become masters themselves there;
also because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in
order to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they
would not have had the courage.

And if any one should say: "King Louis yielded the Romagna to
Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war, I answer for the
reasons given above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to
avoid war, because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to
your disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the
king had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise,
in exchange for the dissolution of his marriage[*] and for the cap to
Rouen,[+] to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the
faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept.

[*] Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and
married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order
to retain the Duchy of Brittany for the crown.

[+] The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d'Amboise, created a
cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510.

Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the
conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries
and wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much
that is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at
Nantes with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope
Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal
Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I
replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning
that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such
greatness. And in fact is has been seen that the greatness of the
Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin
may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which
never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming
powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about
either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him
who has been raised to power.

CHAPTER IV

WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL
AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH

Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly
acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great
became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was
scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole
empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained
themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose
among themselves from their own ambitions.

I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to
be governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of
servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his
favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that
dignity by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such
barons have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords
and hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by
a prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration,
because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as
superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as
to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular
affection.

The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the
King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one
lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into
sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and
changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the
midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects,
and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the
king take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers
both of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the
state of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding
it. The causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk
are that the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the
kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt
of those whom the lord has around him. This arises from the reasons
given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only
be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can expect little
advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot
carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who
attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him united, and
he will have to rely more on his own strength than on the revolt of
others; but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed in the
field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies, there is
nothing to fear but the family of this prince, and, this being
exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the others having no
credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them
before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it.

The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because
one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom,
for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such
men, for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render
the victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with
infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from
those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated
the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make
themselves the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are
unable either to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost
whenever time brings the opportunity.

Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of
Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and
therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him
in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which
victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander,
for the above reasons. And if his successors had been united they
would have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no
tumults raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves.

But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted
like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the
Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities
there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them
endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the
power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed
away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting
afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself
his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had
assumed there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated,
none other than the Romans were acknowledged.

When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with
which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which
others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more;
this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the
conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state.

CHAPTER V

CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH
LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED

Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been
accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are
three courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin
them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit
them to live under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing
within it an oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because
such a government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot
stand without his friendship and interest, and does it utmost to
support him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to
freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than
in any other way.

There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held
Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy, nevertheless they
lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia,
dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as
the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did
not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many
cities in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain
them otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a
city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be
destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of
liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither
time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may
do or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges
unless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they
immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had
been held in bondage by the Florentines.

But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince,
and his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed
to obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree
in making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to
govern themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms,
and a prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more
easily. But in republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and
more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the
memory of their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to
destroy them or to reside there.

CHAPTER VI

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED
BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY

Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities
as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of
state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others,
and following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep
entirely to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they
imitate. A wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great
men, and to imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his
ability does not equal theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him
act like the clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet
appears too far distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength
of their bow attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach
by their strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with
the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach.

I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is
a new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them,
accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired
the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private
station presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or
other of these things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties.
Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the
strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no
other state, is compelled to reside there in person.

But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through
fortune, have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus,
Theseus, and such like are the most excellent examples. And although
one may not discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will
of God, yet he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made
him worthy to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who
have acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if
their particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not
be found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great a
preceptor. And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see
that they owed anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought
them the material to mould into the form which seemed best to them.
Without that opportunity their powers of mind would have been
extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity would have come
in vain.

It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people
of Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order
that they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out
of bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba,
and that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should
become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary
that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the government
of the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long
peace. Theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the
Athenians dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men
fortunate, and their high ability enabled them to recognize the
opportunity whereby their country was ennobled and made famous.

Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a
principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The
difficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules
and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their
government and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there
is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct,
or more uncertain in its success, then to take the lead in the
introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for
enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and
lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This
coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws
on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not
readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of
them. Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the
opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others
defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along
with them.

It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter
thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves
or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate
their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In
the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass
anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then
they are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have
conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the
reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it
is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that
persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when
they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by
force.

If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not
have enforced their constitutions for long--as happened in our time to
Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things
immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no
means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the
unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great
difficulties in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers
are in the ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when
these are overcome, and those who envied them their success are
exterminated, they will begin to be respected, and they will continue
afterwards powerful, secure, honoured, and happy.

To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears
some resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a
like kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan.[*] This man rose from a private
station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to
fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose
him for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their
prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that
one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a
king. This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up
old alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and
allies, on such foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus,
whilst he had endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in
keeping.

[*] Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C.

CHAPTER VII

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER
BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE

Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being private
citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they
have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they
have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some
state is given either for money or by the favour of him who bestows
it; as happened to many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the
Hellespont, where princes were made by Darius, in order that they
might hold the cities both for his security and his glory; as also
were those emperors who, by the corruption of the soldiers, from being
citizens came to empire. Such stand simply elevated upon the goodwill
and the fortune of him who has elevated them--two most inconstant and
unstable things. Neither have they the knowledge requisite for the
position; because, unless they are men of great worth and ability, it
is not reasonable to expect that they should know how to command,
having always lived in a private condition; besides, they cannot hold
it because they have not forces which they can keep friendly and
faithful.

States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature
which are born and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and
correspondencies[*] fixed in such a way that the first storm will not
overthrow them; unless, as is said, those who unexpectedly become
princes are men of so much ability that they know they have to be
prepared at once to hold that which fortune has thrown into their
laps, and that those foundations, which others have laid BEFORE they
became princes, they must lay AFTERWARDS.

[*] "Le radici e corrispondenze," their roots (i.e. foundations) and
correspondencies or relations with other states--a common meaning
of "correspondence" and "correspondency" in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries.

Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or
fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection,
and these are Francesco Sforza[*] and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by
proper means and with great ability, from being a private person rose
to be Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired with a thousand
anxieties he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare
Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during
the ascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lost it,
notwithstanding that he had taken every measure and done all that
ought to be done by a wise and able man to fix firmly his roots in the
states which the arms and fortunes of others had bestowed on him.

[*] Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria
Visconti, a natural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of
Milan, on whose death he procured his own elevation to the duchy.
Machiavelli was the accredited agent of the Florentine Republic to
Cesare Borgia (1478-1507) during the transactions which led up to
the assassinations of the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, and
along with his letters to his chiefs in Florence he has left an
account, written ten years before "The Prince," of the proceedings
of the duke in his "Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino
nello ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli," etc., a translation of which
is appended to the present work.

Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations
may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will
be laid with trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If,
therefore, all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be
seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not
consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what
better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions;
and if his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but
the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune.

Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had
many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see
his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the
Church; and if he was willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke
of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and
Rimini were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides
this, he saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might
have been assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the
Pope, namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi and their following. It
behoved him, therefore, to upset this state of affairs and embroil the
powers, so as to make himself securely master of part of their states.
This was easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by
other reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy; he would
not only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy by
dissolving the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came
into Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of
Alexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from
him for the attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the
reputation of the king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the
Romagna and beaten the Colonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to
advance further, was hindered by two things: the one, his forces did
not appear loyal to him, the other, the goodwill of France: that is to
say, he feared that the forces of the Orsini, which he was using,
would not stand to him, that not only might they hinder him from
winning more, but might themselves seize what he had won, and that the
king might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a warning when,
after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go very
unwillingly to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind
when he himself, after taking the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany,
and the king made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke
decided to depend no more upon the arms and the luck of others.

For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in
Rome, by gaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen,
making them his gentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to
their rank, honouring them with office and command in such a way that
in a few months all attachment to the factions was destroyed and
turned entirely to the duke. After this he awaited an opportunity to
crush the Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the Colonna house.
This came to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini, perceiving
at length that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin
to them, called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung
the rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless
dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the
French. Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by
trusting either to the French or other outside forces, he had recourse
to his wiles, and he knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the
mediation of Signor Pagolo--whom the duke did not fail to secure with
all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses--the
Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his
power at Sinigalia.[*] Having exterminated the leaders, and turned
their partisans into his friends, the duke laid sufficiently good
foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the Duchy of
Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate their prosperity,
he gained them all over to himself. And as this point is worthy of
notice, and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it
out.

[*] Sinigalia, 31st December 1502.

When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak
masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave
them more cause for disunion than for union, so that the country was
full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence; and so, wishing
to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it
necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon he promoted Messer
Ramiro d'Orco,[*] a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest
power. This man in a short time restored peace and unity with the
greatest success. Afterwards the duke considered that it was not
advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but
that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment in the
country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had
their advocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused
some hatred against himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the
people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if
any cruelty had been practised, it had not originated with him, but in
the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took
Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the
piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The
barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied
and dismayed.

[*] Ramiro d'Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua.

But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding
himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate
dangers by having armed himself in his own way, and having in a great
measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if
he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France,
for he knew that the king, who too late was aware of his mistake,
would not support him. And from this time he began to seek new
alliances and to temporize with France in the expedition which she was
making towards the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were
besieging Gaeta. It was his intention to secure himself against them,
and this he would have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived.

Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the
future he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the
Church might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him
that which Alexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways.
Firstly, by exterminating the families of those lords whom he had
despoiled, so as to take away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by
winning to himself all the gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb
the Pope with their aid, as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting
the college more to himself. Fourthly, by acquiring so much power
before the Pope should die that he could by his own measures resist
the first shock. Of these four things, at the death of Alexander, he
had accomplished three. For he had killed as many of the dispossessed
lords as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over
the Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous party in the
college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master
of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa
was under his protection. And as he had no longer to study France (for
the French were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the
Spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill),
he pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at
once, partly through hatred and partly through fear of the
Florentines; and the Florentines would have had no remedy had he
continued to prosper, as he was prospering the year that Alexander
died, for he had acquired so much power and reputation that he would
have stood by himself, and no longer have depended on the luck and the
forces of others, but solely on his own power and ability.

But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He
left the duke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the
rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick
unto death. Yet there were in the duke such boldness and ability, and
he knew so well how men are to be won or lost, and so firm were the
foundations which in so short a time he had laid, that if he had not
had those armies on his back, or if he had been in good health, he
would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his
foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a
month. In Rome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and
whilst the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome,
they could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made
Pope him whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would
not have been elected. But if he had been in sound health at the death
of Alexander,[*] everything would have been different to him. On the
day that Julius the Second[+] was elected, he told me that he had
thought of everything that might occur at the death of his father, and
had provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated
that, when the death did happen, he himself would be on the point to
die.

[*] Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503.

[+] Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad
Vincula, born 1443, died 1513.

When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to
blame him, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought
to offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the
arms of others, are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty
spirit and far-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct
otherwise, and only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own
sickness frustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it
necessary to secure himself in his new principality, to win friends,
to overcome either by force or fraud, to make himself beloved and
feared by the people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to
exterminate those who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the
old order of things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous
and liberal, to destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to
maintain friendship with kings and princes in such a way that they
must help him with zeal and offend with caution, cannot find a more
lively example than the actions of this man.

Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom
he made a bad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a
Pope to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being
elected Pope; and he ought never to have consented to the election of
any cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they
became pontiffs. For men injure either from fear or hatred. Those whom
he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna,
San Giorgio, and Ascanio.[*] The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear
him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted; the latter from their
relationship and obligations, the former from his influence, the
kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above
everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and,
failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad
Vincula. He who believes that new benefits will cause great personages
to forget old injuries is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his
choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.

[*] San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS

Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither
of which can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is
manifest to me that I must not be silent on them, although one could
be more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are
when, either by some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the
principality, or when by the favour of his fellow-citizens a private
person becomes the prince of his country. And speaking of the first
method, it will be illustrated by two examples--one ancient, the other
modern--and without entering further into the subject, I consider
these two examples will suffice those who may be compelled to follow
them.

Agathocles, the Sicilian,[*] became King of Syracuse not only from a
private but from a low and abject position. This man, the son of a
potter, through all the changes in his fortunes always led an infamous
life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability
of mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military
profession, he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being
established in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make
himself prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others,
that which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an
understanding for this purpose with Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who,
with his army, was fighting in Sicily. One morning he assembled the
people and the senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them
things relating to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers
killed all the senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he
seized and held the princedom of that city without any civil
commotion. And although he was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and
ultimately besieged, yet not only was he able to defend his city, but
leaving part of his men for its defence, with the others he attacked
Africa, and in a short time raised the siege of Syracuse. The
Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were compelled to come to
terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to him, had to be content
with the possession of Africa.

[*] Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C.

Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man
will see nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune,
inasmuch as he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the
favour of any one, but step by step in the military profession, which
steps were gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were
afterwards boldly held by him with many hazardous dangers. Yet it
cannot be called talent to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends,
to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; such methods may
gain empire, but not glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in
entering into and extricating himself from dangers be considered,
together with his greatness of mind in enduring and overcoming
hardships, it cannot be seen why he should be esteemed less than the
most notable captain. Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and
inhumanity with infinite wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated
among the most excellent men. What he achieved cannot be attributed
either to fortune or genius.

In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da
Fermo, having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by
his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his
youth sent to fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under
his discipline, he might attain some high position in the military
profession. After Pagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo,
and in a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body
and mind, he became the first man in his profession. But it appearing
a paltry thing to serve under others, he resolved, with the aid of
some citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was
dearer than its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelleschi, to
seize Fermo. So he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani that, having been away
from home for many years, he wished to visit him and his city, and in
some measure to look upon his patrimony; and although he had not
laboured to acquire anything except honour, yet, in order that the
citizens should see he had not spent his time in vain, he desired to
come honourably, so would be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his
friends and retainers; and he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he
should be received honourably by the Fermians, all of which would be
not only to his honour, but also to that of Giovanni himself, who had
brought him up.

Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew,
and he caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he
lodged him in his own house, where, having passed some days, and
having arranged what was necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto
gave a solemn banquet to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the
chiefs of Fermo. When the viands and all the other entertainments that
are usual in such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began
certain grave discourses, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander
and his son Cesare, and of their enterprises, to which discourse
Giovanni and others answered; but he rose at once, saying that such
matters ought to be discussed in a more private place, and he betook
himself to a chamber, whither Giovanni and the rest of the citizens
went in after him. No sooner were they seated than soldiers issued
from secret places and slaughtered Giovanni and the rest. After these
murders Oliverotto, mounted on horseback, rode up and down the town
and besieged the chief magistrate in the palace, so that in fear the
people were forced to obey him, and to form a government, of which he
made himself the prince. He killed all the malcontents who were able
to injure him, and strengthened himself with new civil and military
ordinances, in such a way that, in the year during which he held the
principality, not only was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had
become formidable to all his neighbours. And his destruction would
have been as difficult as that of Agathocles if he had not allowed
himself to be overreached by Cesare Borgia, who took him with the
Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigalia, as was stated above. Thus one year
after he had committed this parricide, he was strangled, together with
Vitellozzo, whom he had made his leader in valour and wickedness.

Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after
infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his
country, and defend himself from external enemies, and never be
conspired against by his own citizens; seeing that many others, by
means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold
the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that
this follows from severities[*] being badly or properly used. Those
may be called properly used, if of evil it is possible to speak well,
that are applied at one blow and are necessary to one's security, and
that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the
advantage of the subjects. The badly employed are those which,
notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement, multiply with
time rather than decrease. Those who practise the first system are
able, by aid of God or man, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as
Agathocles did. It is impossible for those who follow the other to
maintain themselves.

[*] Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern
equivalent of Machiavelli's thought when he speaks of "crudelta"
than the more obvious "cruelties."

Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought
to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for
him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to
repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to
reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does
otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to
keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor
can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and
repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so
that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given
little by little, so that the flavour of them may last longer.

And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in
such a way that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil,
shall make him change; because if the necessity for this comes in
troubled times, you are too late for harsh measures; and mild ones
will not help you, for they will be considered as forced from you, and
no one will be under any obligation to you for them.

CHAPTER IX

CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY

But coming to the other point--where a leading citizen becomes the
prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence,
but by the favour of his fellow citizens--this may be called a civil
principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain
to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a
principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the
favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties
are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be
ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and
oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there arises
in cities one of three results, either a principality, self-
government, or anarchy.

A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles,
accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the
nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the
reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that
under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people,
finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of
one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his
authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles
maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the
aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around
him who consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can
neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches
sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has none around
him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him.

Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to
others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their
object is more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing
to oppress, while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to
be added also that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile
people, because of their being too many, whilst from the nobles he can
secure himself, as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may
expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from
hostile nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they
will rise against him; for they, being in these affairs more far-
seeing and astute, always come forward in time to save themselves, and
to obtain favours from him whom they expect to prevail. Further, the
prince is compelled to live always with the same people, but he can do
well without the same nobles, being able to make and unmake them
daily, and to give or wake away authority when it pleases him.

Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to
be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape
their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or
they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious,
ought to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may
be dealt with in two ways; they may fail to do this through
pusillanimity and a natural want of courage, in which case you ought
to make use of them, especially of those who are of good counsel; and
thus, whilst in prosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not
have to fear them. But when for their own ambitious ends they shun
binding themselves, it is a token that they are giving more thought to
themselves than to you, and a prince out to guard against such, and to
fear them as if they were open enemies, because in adversity they
always help to ruin him.

Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people
ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they
only ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the
people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above
everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may
easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when
they receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound
more closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more
devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their
favours; and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as
these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules,
so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have
the people friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity.

Nabis,[*] Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece,
and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his
country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it
was only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but
this would not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. And
do not let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that
"He who builds on the people, builds on the mud," for this is true
when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades himself
that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or
by the magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived,
as happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali[+] in
Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above,
who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who
does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by his resolution and
energy, keeps the whole people encouraged--such a one will never find
himself deceived in them, and it will be shown that he has laid his
foundations well.

[*] Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus
in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C.

[+] Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli's
"Florentine History," Book III.

These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from
the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either
rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their
government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on
the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and
who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with
great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has
not the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because
the citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from
magistrates, are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and
there will always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can
trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet
times, when citizens have need of the state, because then every one
agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far distant they
all wish to die for him; but in troubled times, when the state has
need of its citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the more is
this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once.
Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens
will always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the
state and of him, and then he will always find them faithful.

CHAPTER X

CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES
OUGHT TO BE MEASURED

It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character
of these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power
that, in case of need, he can support himself with his own resources,
or whether he has always need of the assistance of others. And to make
this quite clear I say that I consider those who are able to support
themselves by their own resources who can, either by abundance of men
or money, raise a sufficient army to join battle against any one who
comes to attack them; and I consider those always to have need of
others who cannot show themselves against the enemy in the field, but
are forced to defend themselves by sheltering behind walls. The first
case has been discussed, but we will speak of it again should it
recur. In the second case one can say nothing except to encourage such
princes to provision and fortify their towns, and not on any account
to defend the country. And whoever shall fortify his town well, and
shall have managed the other concerns of his subjects in the way
stated above, and to be often repeated, will never be attacked without
great caution, for men are always adverse to enterprises where
difficulties can be seen, and it will be seen not to be an easy thing
to attack one who has his town well fortified, and is not hated by his
people.

The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country
around them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits
them, nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near
them, because they are fortified in such a way that every one thinks
the taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing
they have proper ditches and walls, they have sufficient artillery,
and they always keep in public depots enough for one year's eating,
drinking, and firing. And beyond this, to keep the people quiet and
without loss to the state, they always have the means of giving work
to the community in those labours that are the life and strength of
the city, and on the pursuit of which the people are supported; they
also hold military exercises in repute, and moreover have many
ordinances to uphold them.

Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself
odious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only
be driven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this
world are so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a
whole year in the field without being interfered with. And whoever
should reply: If the people have property outside the city, and see it
burnt, they will not remain patient, and the long siege and self-
interest will make them forget their prince; to this I answer that a
powerful and courageous prince will overcome all such difficulties by
giving at one time hope to his subjects that the evil will not be for
long, at another time fear of the cruelty of the enemy, then
preserving himself adroitly from those subjects who seem to him to be
too bold.

Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and
ruin the country at the time when the spirits of the people are still
hot and ready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought
the prince to hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have
cooled, the damage is already done, the ills are incurred, and there
is no longer any remedy; and therefore they are so much the more ready
to unite with their prince, he appearing to be under obligations to
them now that their houses have been burnt and their possessions
ruined in his defence. For it is the nature of men to be bound by the
benefits they confer as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if
everything is well considered, it will not be difficult for a wise
prince to keep the minds of his citizens steadfast from first to last,
when he does not fail to support and defend them.

CHAPTER XI

CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES

It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities,
touching which all difficulties are prior to getting possession,
because they are acquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they
can be held without either; for they are sustained by the ancient
ordinances of religion, which are so all-powerful, and of such a
character that the principalities may be held no matter how their
princes behave and live. These princes alone have states and do not
defend them; and they have subjects and do not rule them; and the
states, although unguarded, are not taken from them, and the subjects,
although not ruled, do not care, and they have neither the desire nor
the ability to alienate themselves. Such principalities only are
secure and happy. But being upheld by powers, to which the human mind
cannot reach, I shall speak no more of them, because, being exalted
and maintained by God, it would be the act of a presumptuous and rash
man to discuss them.

Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the Church
has attained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from
Alexander backwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have
been called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest)
have valued the temporal power very slightly--yet now a king of France
trembles before it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and
to ruin the Venetians--although this may be very manifest, it does not
appear to me superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory.

Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,[*] this country was
under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of Naples, the
Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two principal
anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms;
the other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those
about whom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians.
To restrain the Venetians the union of all the others was necessary,
as it was for the defence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they
made use of the barons of Rome, who, being divided into two factions,
Orsini and Colonnesi, had always a pretext for disorder, and, standing
with arms in their hands under the eyes of the Pontiff, kept the
pontificate weak and powerless. And although there might arise
sometimes a courageous pope, such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune nor
wisdom could rid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope
is also a cause of weakness; for in the ten years, which is the
average life of a pope, he can with difficulty lower one of the
factions; and if, so to speak, one people should almost destroy the
Colonnesi, another would arise hostile to the Orsini, who would
support their opponents, and yet would not have time to ruin the
Orsini. This was the reason why the temporal powers of the pope were
little esteemed in Italy.

[*] Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494.

Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that
have ever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to
prevail; and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by
reason of the entry of the French, he brought about all those things
which I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. And although
his intention was not to aggrandize the Church, but the duke,
nevertheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the Church,
which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the heir to
all his labours.

Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing
all the Romagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through
the chastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found
the way open to accumulate money in a manner such as had never been
practised before Alexander's time. Such things Julius not only
followed, but improved upon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin
the Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of these
enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit,
inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not any
private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions within
the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them
some mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm:
the one, the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them;
and the other, not allowing them to have their own cardinals, who
caused the disorders among them. For whenever these factions have
their cardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because cardinals
foster the factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons are
compelled to support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates
arise disorders and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his
Holiness Pope Leo[*] found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to
be hoped that, if others made it great in arms, he will make it still
greater and more venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues.

[*] Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de' Medici.

CHAPTER XII

HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES

Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such
principalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having
considered in some degree the causes of their being good or bad, and
having shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and
to hold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of
offence and defence which belong to each of them.

We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his
foundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to
ruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or
composite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good
laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are
well armed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the
discussion and shall speak of the arms.

I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state
are either his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed.
Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one
holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor
safe; for they are disunited, ambitious, and without discipline,
unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have
neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is
deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by
them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other
attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend,
which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are
ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if
war comes they take themselves off or run from the foe; which I should
have little trouble to prove, for the ruin of Italy has been caused by
nothing else than by resting all her hopes for many years on
mercenaries, and although they formerly made some display and appeared
valiant amongst themselves, yet when the foreigners came they showed
what they were. Thus it was that Charles, King of France, was allowed
to seize Italy with chalk in hand;[*] and he who told us that our sins
were the cause of it told the truth, but they were not the sins he
imagined, but those which I have related. And as they were the sins of
princes, it is the princes who have also suffered the penalty.

[*] "With chalk in hand," "col gesso." This is one of the bons mots of
Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with which Charles VIII
seized Italy, implying that it was only necessary for him to send
his quartermasters to chalk up the billets for his soldiers to
conquer the country. Cf. "The History of Henry VII," by Lord
Bacon: "King Charles had conquered the realm of Naples, and lost
it again, in a kind of a felicity of a dream. He passed the whole
length of Italy without resistance: so that it was true what Pope
Alexander was wont to say: That the Frenchmen came into Italy with
chalk in their hands, to mark up their lodgings, rather than with
swords to fight."

I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The
mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; if they
are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to their own
greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their master, or others
contrary to your intentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you
are ruined in the usual way.

And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way,
whether mercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted
to, either by a prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in
person and perform the duty of a captain; the republic has to send its
citizens, and when one is sent who does not turn out satisfactorily,
it ought to recall him, and when one is worthy, to hold him by the
laws so that he does not leave the command. And experience has shown
princes and republics, single-handed, making the greatest progress,
and mercenaries doing nothing except damage; and it is more difficult
to bring a republic, armed with its own arms, under the sway of one of
its citizens than it is to bring one armed with foreign arms. Rome and
Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The Switzers are completely
armed and quite free.

Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who
were oppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with
the Romans, although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for
captains. After the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made
captain of their soldiers by the Thebans, and after victory he took
away their liberty.

Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza
against the Venetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at
Caravaggio,[*] allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his
masters. His father, Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna[+]
of Naples, left her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw
herself into the arms of the King of Aragon, in order to save her
kingdom. And if the Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their
dominions by these arms, and yet their captains did not make
themselves princes, but have defended them, I reply that the
Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance, for of the able
captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some have not
conquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their
ambitions elsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto,[%]
and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but every
one will acknowledge that, had he conquered, the Florentines would
have stood at his discretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi always against
him, so they watched each other. Francesco turned his ambition to
Lombardy; Braccio against the Church and the kingdom of Naples. But
let us come to that which happened a short while ago. The Florentines
appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most prudent man, who
from a private position had risen to the greatest renown. If this man
had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have been proper for the
Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became the soldier of their
enemies they had no means of resisting, and if they held to him they
must obey him. The Venetians, if their achievements are considered,
will be seen to have acted safely and gloriously so long as they sent
to war their own men, when with armed gentlemen and plebians they did
valiantly. This was before they turned to enterprises on land, but
when they began to fight on land they forsook this virtue and followed
the custom of Italy. And in the beginning of their expansion on land,
through not having much territory, and because of their great
reputation, they had not much to fear from their captains; but when
they expanded, as under Carmignuola,[#] they had a taste of this
mistake; for, having found him a most valiant man (they beat the Duke
of Milan under his leadership), and, on the other hand, knowing how
lukewarm he was in the war, they feared they would no longer conquer
under him, and for this reason they were not willing, nor were they
able, to let him go; and so, not to lose again that which they had
acquired, they were compelled, in order to secure themselves, to
murder him. They had afterwards for their captains Bartolomeo da
Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of Pitigliano,[&] and the
like, under whom they had to dread loss and not gain, as happened
afterwards at Vaila,[$] where in one battle they lost that which in
eight hundred years they had acquired with so much trouble. Because
from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed and
inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.

[*] Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448.

[+] Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples.

[%] Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John
Hawkwood. He fought in the English wars in France, and was
knighted by Edward III; afterwards he collected a body of troops
and went into Italy. These became the famous "White Company." He
took part in many wars, and died in Florence in 1394. He was born
about 1320 at Sible Hedingham, a village in Essex. He married
Domnia, a daughter of Bernabo Visconti.

[#] Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390,
executed at Venice, 5th May 1432.

[&] Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San
Severino; died fighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of
Austria, in 1487. "Primo capitano in Italia."--Machiavelli. Count
of Pitigliano; Nicolo Orsini, born 1442, died 1510.

[$] Battle of Vaila in 1509.

And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled
for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously,
in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better
prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has
recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired
more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more
states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms
against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were
oppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain
authority in temporal power: in many others their citizens became
princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the
hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of
priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both
commenced to enlist foreigners.

The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,[*]
the Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others,
Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy.
After these came all the other captains who till now have directed the
arms of Italy; and the end of all their valour has been, that she has
been overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and
insulted by the Switzers. The principle that has guided them has been,
first, to lower the credit of infantry so that they might increase
their own. They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without
territory, they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few
infantry did not give them any authority; so they were led to employ
cavalry, with a moderate force of which they were maintained and
honoured; and affairs were brought to such a pass that, in an army of
twenty thousand soldiers, there were not to be found two thousand foot
soldiers. They had, besides this, used every art to lessen fatigue and
danger to themselves and their soldiers, not killing in the fray, but
taking prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not attack
towns at night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments
at night; they did not surround the camp either with stockade or
ditch, nor did they campaign in the winter. All these things were
permitted by their military rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I
have said, both fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought Italy to
slavery and contempt.

[*] Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in
Romagna. He was the leader of the famous "Company of St George,"
composed entirely of Italian soldiers. He died in 1409.

CHAPTER XIII

CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE'S OWN

Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a
prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by
Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the
enterprise against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned
to auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,[*] for
his assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in
themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always
disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their
captive.

[*] Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples),
surnamed "The Catholic," born 1542, died 1516.

And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish
to leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which
cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw
himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune
brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his
rash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and
the Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all
expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did not
become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his
auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs.

The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand
Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other
time of their troubles.

The Emperor of Constantinople,[*] to oppose his neighbours, sent ten
thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not
willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to
the infidels.

[*] Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383.

Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these
arms, for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with
them the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience
to others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time
and better opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of
one community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party,
which you have made their head, is not able all at once to assume
enough authority to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy
is most dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore,
has always avoided these arms and turned to his own; and has been
willing rather to lose with them than to conquer with the others, not
deeming that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others.

I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This
duke entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French
soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards,
such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries,
discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli;
whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and
dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference
between one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one
considers the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when
he had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he
relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count
and found it ever increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than
when every one saw that he was complete master of his own forces.

I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am
unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I
have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by
the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted
like our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him
that he could neither keep them not let them go, he had them all cut
to pieces, and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with
aliens.

I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament
applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight
with Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul
armed him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had
them on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he
wished to meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion,
the arms of others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down,
or they bind you fast.

Charles the Seventh,[*] the father of King Louis the Eleventh,[+]
having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English,
recognized the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he
established in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and
infantry. Afterwards his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and
began to enlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is,
as is now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having
raised the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the
value of his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether;
and his men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they
are so accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear
that they can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the
French cannot stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers
they do not come off well against others. The armies of the French
have thus become mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of
which arms together are much better than mercenaries alone or
auxiliaries alone, but much inferior to one's own forces. And this
example proves it, for the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if
the ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained.

[*] Charles VII of France, surnamed "The Victorious," born 1403, died
1461.

[+] Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483.

But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks
well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I
have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a
principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not
truly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first
disaster to the Roman Empire[*] should be examined, it will be found
to have commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because from
that time the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all
that valour which had raised it passed away to others.

[*] "Many speakers to the House the other night in the debate on the
reduction of armaments seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance
of the conditions under which the British Empire maintains its
existence. When Mr Balfour replied to the allegations that the
Roman Empire sank under the weight of its military obligations, he
said that this was 'wholly unhistorical.' He might well have added
that the Roman power was at its zenith when every citizen
acknowledged his liability to fight for the State, but that it
began to decline as soon as this obligation was no longer
recognized."--Pall Mall Gazette, 15th May 1906.

I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having
its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good
fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And
it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing
can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its
own strength. And one's own forces are those which are composed either
of subjects, citizens, or dependents; all others are mercenaries or
auxiliaries. And the way to make ready one's own forces will be easily
found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one
will consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many
republics and princes have armed and organized themselves, to which
rules I entirely commit myself.

CHAPTER XIV

THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR

A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything
else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is
the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force
that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often
enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the
contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than
of arms they have lost their states. And the first cause of your
losing it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire a
state is to be master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through being
martial, from a private person became Duke of Milan; and the sons,
through avoiding the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became
private persons. For among other evils which being unarmed brings you,
it causes you to be despised, and this is one of those ignominies
against which a prince ought to guard himself, as is shown later on.
Because there is nothing proportionate between the armed and the
unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who is armed should yield
obedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man
should be secure among armed servants. Because, there being in the one
disdain and in the other suspicion, it is not possible for them to
work well together. And therefore a prince who does not understand the
art of war, over and above the other misfortunes already mentioned,
cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought
never, therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and
in peace he should addict himself more to its exercise than in war;
this he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study.

As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well
organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he
accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of
localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the
valleys open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of
rivers and marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which
knowledge is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his
country, and is better able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by
means of the knowledge and observation of that locality, he
understands with ease any other which it may be necessary for him to
study hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers
and marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a certain
resemblance to those of other countries, so that with a knowledge of
the aspect of one country one can easily arrive at a knowledge of
others. And the prince that lacks this skill lacks the essential which
it is desirable that a captain should possess, for it teaches him to
surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to array the
battle, to besiege towns to advantage.

Philopoemen,[*] Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which
writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he
never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was
in the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them:
"If the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves
here with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should one
best advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to
retreat, how ought we to pursue?" And he would set forth to them, as
he went, all the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to
their opinion and state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by
these continual discussions there could never arise, in time of war,
any unexpected circumstances that he could not deal with.

[*] Philopoemen, "the last of the Greeks," born 252 B.C., died 183
B.C.

But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and
study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne
themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and
defeat, so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above
all do as an illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had
been praised and famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds
he always kept in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated
Achilles, Caesar Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life
of Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life
of Scipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in chastity,
affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to those things
which have been written of Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to
observe some such rules, and never in peaceful times stand idle, but
increase his resources with industry in such a way that they may be
available to him in adversity, so that if fortune chances it may find
him prepared to resist her blows.

CHAPTER XV

CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES,
ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED

It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a
prince towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have
written on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in
mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall depart
from the methods of other people. But, it being my intention to write
a thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to
me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of the matter than the
imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities
which in fact have never been known or seen, because how one lives is
so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what
is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his
preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his
professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much
that is evil.

Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how
to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity.
Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince,
and discussing those which are real, I say that all men when they are
spoken of, and chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are
remarkable for some of those qualities which bring them either blame
or praise; and thus it is that one is reputed liberal, another
miserly, using a Tuscan term (because an avaricious person in our
language is still he who desires to possess by robbery, whilst we call
one miserly who deprives himself too much of the use of his own); one
is reputed generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate; one
faithless, another faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another bold
and brave; one affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another
chaste; one sincere, another cunning; one hard, another easy; one
grave, another frivolous; one religious, another unbelieving, and the
like. And I know that every one will confess that it would be most
praiseworthy in a prince to exhibit all the above qualities that are
considered good; but because they can neither be entirely possessed
nor observed, for human conditions do not permit it, it is necessary
for him to be sufficiently prudent that he may know how to avoid the
reproach of those vices which would lose him his state; and also to
keep himself, if it be possible, from those which would not lose him
it; but this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon
himself to them. And again, he need not make himself uneasy at
incurring a reproach for those vices without which the state can only
be saved with difficulty, for if everything is considered carefully,
it will be found that something which looks like virtue, if followed,
would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet
followed brings him security and prosperity.

CHAPTER XVI

CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS

Commencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I
say that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless,
liberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation
for it, injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should
be exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the
reproach of its opposite. Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among
men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of
magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts
all his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to
maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax
them, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him
odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by
any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded
few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by
whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and
wishing to draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of
being miserly.

Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of
liberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if
he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in
time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that
with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself
against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without
burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises
liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless,
and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few.

We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who
have been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the
Second was assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for
liberality, yet he did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he
made war on the King of France; and he made many wars without imposing
any extraordinary tax on his subjects, for he supplied his additional
expenses out of his long thriftiness. The present King of Spain would
not have undertaken or conquered in so many enterprises if he had been
reputed liberal. A prince, therefore, provided that he has not to rob
his subjects, that he can defend himself, that he does not become poor
and abject, that he is not forced to become rapacious, ought to hold
of little account a reputation for being mean, for it is one of those
vices which will enable him to govern.

And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and
many others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal,
and by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact,
or in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is
dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered
liberal; and Caesar was one of those who wished to become pre-eminent
in Rome; but if he had survived after becoming so, and had not
moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed his government. And if
any one should reply: Many have been princes, and have done great
things with armies, who have been considered very liberal, I reply:
Either a prince spends that which is his own or his subjects' or else
that of others. In the first case he ought to be sparing, in the
second he ought not to neglect any opportunity for liberality. And to
the prince who goes forth with his army, supporting it by pillage,
sack, and extortion, handling that which belongs to others, this
liberality is necessary, otherwise he would not be followed by
soldiers. And of that which is neither yours nor your subjects' you
can be a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it
does not take away your reputation if you squander that of others, but
adds to it; it is only squandering your own that injures you.

And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst
you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor
or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a
prince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised
and hated; and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to
have a reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred,
than to be compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to
incur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred.

CHAPTER XVII

CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER
TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED

Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every
prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel.
Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare
Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled
the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if
this be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much more
merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation for
cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed.[*] Therefore a prince, so
long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the
reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more
merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to
arise, from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to
injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with
a prince offend the individual only.

[*] During the rioting between the Cancellieri and Panciatichi
factions in 1502 and 1503.

And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the
imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers.
Hence Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her
reign owing to its being new, saying:

"Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt
Moliri, et late fines custode tueri."[*]

Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he
himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and
humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and
too much distrust render him intolerable.

[*] . . . against my will, my fate
A throne unsettled, and an infant state,
Bid me defend my realms with all my pow'rs,
And guard with these severities my shores.

Christopher Pitt.

Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than
feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish
to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person,
it is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either
must be dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in general of
men, that they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and
as long as you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you
their blood, property, life, and children, as is said above, when the
need is far distant; but when it approaches they turn against you. And
that prince who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected
other precautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained by
payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be
earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied
upon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than
one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation
which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity
for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment
which never fails.

Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he
does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well
being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as
he abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from
their women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the
life of someone, he must do it on proper justification and for
manifest cause, but above all things he must keep his hands off the
property of others, because men more quickly forget the death of their
father than the loss of their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for taking
away the property are never wanting; for he who has once begun to live
by robbery will always find pretexts for seizing what belongs to
others; but reasons for taking life, on the contrary, are more
difficult to find and sooner lapse. But when a prince is with his
army, and has under control a multitude of soldiers, then it is quite
necessary for him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, for without
it he would never hold his army united or disposed to its duties.

Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that
having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to
fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or
against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This
arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his
boundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of his
soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not
sufficient to produce this effect. And short-sighted writers admire
his deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the
principal cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not
have been sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that
most excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of
man, against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this
arose from nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his
soldiers more license than is consistent with military discipline. For
this he was upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the
corrupter of the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a
legate of Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the
insolence of the legate punished, owing entirely to his easy nature.
Insomuch that someone in the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there
were many men who knew much better how not to err than to correct the
errors of others. This disposition, if he had been continued in the
command, would have destroyed in time the fame and glory of Scipio;
but, he being under the control of the Senate, this injurious
characteristic not only concealed itself, but contributed to his
glory.

Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the
conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing
according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish
himself on that which is in his own control and not in that of others;
he must endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted.

CHAPTER XVIII[*]

CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH

[*] "The present chapter has given greater offence than any other
portion of Machiavelli's writings." Burd, "Il Principe," p. 297.

Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and
to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience
has been that those princes who have done great things have held good
faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the
intellect of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have
relied on their word. You must know there are two ways of
contesting,[*] the one by the law, the other by force; the first
method is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first
is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the
second. Therefore it is necessary for a prince to understand how to
avail himself of the beast and the man. This has been figuratively
taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how Achilles and
many other princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse,
who brought them up in his discipline; which means solely that, as
they had for a teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is
necessary for a prince to know how to make use of both natures, and
that one without the other is not durable. A prince, therefore, being
compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox and
the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself against snares and
the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. Therefore, it is
necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the
wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not understand what they
are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith
when such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons
that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely
good this precept would not hold, but because they are bad, and will
not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe it with
them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince legitimate reasons to
excuse this non-observance. Of this endless modern examples could be
given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been made void
and of no effect through the faithlessness of princes; and he who has
known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best.

[*] "Contesting," i.e. "striving for mastery." Mr Burd points out that
this passage is imitated directly from Cicero's "De Officiis":
"Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem,
alterum per vim; cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum;
confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore."

But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic,
and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and
so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will
always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent
example I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing
else but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he
always found victims; for there never was a man who had greater power
in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet
would observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded
according to his wishes,[*] because he well understood this side of
mankind.

[*] "Nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad votum)." The
words "ad votum" are omitted in the Testina addition, 1550.

Alexander never did what he said,
Cesare never said what he did.

Italian Proverb.

Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good
qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to
have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and
always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them
is useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright,
and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require not to
be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite.

And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one,
cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed, being
often forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to
fidelity,[*] friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is
necessary for him to have a mind ready to turn itself accordingly as
the winds and variations of fortune force it, yet, as I have said
above, not to diverge from the good if he can avoid doing so, but, if
compelled, then to know how to set about it.

[*] "Contrary to fidelity" or "faith," "contro alla fede," and "tutto
fede," "altogether faithful," in the next paragraph. It is
noteworthy that these two phrases, "contro alla fede" and "tutto
fede," were omitted in the Testina edition, which was published
with the sanction of the papal authorities. It may be that the
meaning attached to the word "fede" was "the faith," i.e. the
Catholic creed, and not as rendered here "fidelity" and
"faithful." Observe that the word "religione" was suffered to
stand in the text of the Testina, being used to signify
indifferently every shade of belief, as witness "the religion," a
phrase inevitably employed to designate the Huguenot heresy. South
in his Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this passage as
follows: "That great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe, Nicolo
Machiavel, laid down this for a master rule in his political
scheme: 'That the show of religion was helpful to the politician,
but the reality of it hurtful and pernicious.'"

For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets
anything slip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named
five qualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him
altogether merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There
is nothing more necessary to appear to have than this last quality,
inasmuch as men judge generally more by the eye than by the hand,
because it belongs to everybody to see you, to few to come in touch
with you. Every one sees what you appear to be, few really know what
you are, and those few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of
the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the
actions of all men, and especially of princes, which it is not prudent
to challenge, one judges by the result.

For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and
holding his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he
will be praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by
what a thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world
there are only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when
the many have no ground to rest on.

One prince[*] of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never
preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is
most hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him
of reputation and kingdom many a time.

[*] Ferdinand of Aragon. "When Machiavelli was writing 'The Prince' it
would have been clearly impossible to mention Ferdinand's name
here without giving offence." Burd's "Il Principe," p. 308.

CHAPTER XIX

THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED

Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I
have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss
briefly under this generality, that the prince must consider, as has
been in part said before, how to avoid those things which will make
him hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he
will have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other
reproaches.

It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious,
and to be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from
both of which he must abstain. And when neither their property nor
their honor is touched, the majority of men live content, and he has
only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease
in many ways.

It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous,
effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince
should guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show
in his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his
private dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments are
irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one can
hope either to deceive him or to get round him.

That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself,
and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for,
provided it is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by
his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a
prince ought to have two fears, one from within, on account of his
subjects, the other from without, on account of external powers. From
the latter he is defended by being well armed and having good allies,
and if he is well armed he will have good friends, and affairs will
always remain quiet within when they are quiet without, unless they
should have been already disturbed by conspiracy; and even should
affairs outside be disturbed, if he has carried out his preparations
and has lived as I have said, as long as he does not despair, he will
resist every attack, as I said Nabis the Spartan did.

But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has
only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can
easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by
keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for
him to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most
efficacious remedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is
not to be hated and despised by the people, for he who conspires
against a prince always expects to please them by his removal; but
when the conspirator can only look forward to offending them, he will
not have the courage to take such a course, for the difficulties that
confront a conspirator are infinite. And as experience shows, many
have been the conspiracies, but few have been successful; because he
who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he take a companion except
from those whom he believes to be malcontents, and as soon as you have
opened your mind to a malcontent you have given him the material with
which to content himself, for by denouncing you he can look for every
advantage; so that, seeing the gain from this course to be assured,
and seeing the other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a
very rare friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to
keep faith with you.

And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the
side of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect
of punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is
the majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends
and the state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the
popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as
to conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before
the execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel
to the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy,
and thus cannot hope for any escape.

Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content
with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer
Annibale Bentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the
present Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had
conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer
Giovanni,[*] who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination
the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the
popular goodwill which the house of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days
in Bologna; which was so great that, although none remained there
after the death of Annibale who was able to rule the state, the
Bolognese, having information that there was one of the Bentivogli
family in Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of
a blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of
their city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due
course to the government.

[*] Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan 1508. He
ruled Bologna from 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli's strong condemnation
of conspiracies may get its edge from his own very recent
experience (February 1513), when he had been arrested and tortured
for his alleged complicity in the Boscoli conspiracy.

For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies
of little account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is
hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear
everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes
have taken every care not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to
keep the people satisfied and contented, for this is one of the most
important objects a prince can have.

Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France,
and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty
and security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its
authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of
the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths
would be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing
the hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he
wished to protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the
particular care of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach
which he would be liable to from the nobles for favouring the people,
and from the people for favouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter,
who should be one who could beat down the great and favour the lesser
without reproach to the king. Neither could you have a better or a
more prudent arrangement, or a greater source of security to the king
and kingdom. From this one can draw another important conclusion, that
princes ought to leave affairs of reproach to the management of
others, and keep those of grace in their own hands. And further, I
consider that a prince ought to cherish the nobles, but not so as to
make himself hated by the people.

It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths
of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary
to my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great
qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have
been killed by subjects who have conspired against them. Wishing,
therefore, to answer these objections, I will recall the characters of
some of the emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin were
not different to those alleged by me; at the same time I will only
submit for consideration those things that are noteworthy to him who
studies the affairs of those times.

It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to
the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were
Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son
Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.

There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the
ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be
contended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to
put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so
beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a
hard thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because
the people loved peace, and for this reason they loved the unaspiring
prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who was bold,
cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite willing he
should exercise upon the people, so that they could get double pay and
give vent to their own greed and cruelty. Hence it arose that those
emperors were always overthrown who, either by birth or training, had
no great authority, and most of them, especially those who came new to
the principality, recognizing the difficulty of these two opposing
humours, were inclined to give satisfaction to the soldiers, caring
little about injuring the people. Which course was necessary, because,
as princes cannot help being hated by someone, they ought, in the
first place, to avoid being hated by every one, and when they cannot
compass this, they ought to endeavour with the utmost diligence to
avoid the hatred of the most powerful. Therefore, those emperors who
through inexperience had need of special favour adhered more readily
to the soldiers than to the people; a course which turned out
advantageous to them or not, accordingly as the prince knew how to
maintain authority over them.

From these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being
all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane,
and benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and
died honoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary
title, and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and
afterwards, being possessed of many virtues which made him respected,
he always kept both orders in their places whilst he lived, and was
neither hated nor despised.

But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers,
who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not
endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus,
having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added
contempt for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of
his administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is
acquired as much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said
before, a prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to do
evil; for when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of to
maintain yourself--it may be either the people or the soldiers or the
nobles--you have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and
then good works will do you harm.

But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness,
that among the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in
the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by
him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who
allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the
army conspired against him, and murdered him.

Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus
Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and rapacious--
men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to commit every
kind of iniquity against the people; and all, except Severus, came to
a bad end; but in Severus there was so much valour that, keeping the
soldiers friendly, although the people were oppressed by him, he
reigned successfully; for his valour made him so much admired in the
sight of the soldiers and people that the latter were kept in a way
astonished and awed and the former respectful and satisfied. And
because the actions of this man, as a new prince, were great, I wish
to show briefly that he knew well how to counterfeit the fox and the
lion, which natures, as I said above, it is necessary for a prince to
imitate.

Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in
Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to
Rome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the
praetorian soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to
aspire to the throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy
before it was known that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the
Senate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian. After
this there remained for Severus, who wished to make himself master of
the whole empire, two difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of
the Asiatic army, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the
other in the west where Albinus was, who also aspired to the throne.
And as he considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile to both,
he decided to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the latter he
wrote that, being elected emperor by the Senate, he was willing to
share that dignity with him and sent him the title of Caesar; and,
moreover, that the Senate had made Albinus his colleague; which things
were accepted by Albinus as true. But after Severus had conquered and
killed Niger, and settled oriental affairs, he returned to Rome and
complained to the Senate that Albinus, little recognizing the benefits
that he had received from him, had by treachery sought to murder him,
and for this ingratitude he was compelled to punish him. Afterwards he
sought him out in France, and took from him his government and life.
He who will, therefore, carefully examine the actions of this man will
find him a most valiant lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him
feared and respected by every one, and not hated by the army; and it
need not be wondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold the
empire so well, because his supreme renown always protected him from
that hatred which the people might have conceived against him for his
violence.

But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent
qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and
acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of
fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which
caused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and
cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single
murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all those
of Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by
those he had around him, to such an extent that he was murdered in the
midst of his army by a centurion. And here it must be noted that such-
like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted with a resolved and
desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes, because any one who
does not fear to die can inflict them; but a prince may fear them the
less because they are very rare; he has only to be careful not to do
any grave injury to those whom he employs or has around him in the
service of the state. Antoninus had not taken this care, but had
contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom also he daily
threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it turned out,
was a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor's ruin.

But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to
hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it,
and he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his
people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave
himself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he
might indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not
maintaining his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete
with gladiators, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the
imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being
hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against
and was killed.

It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very
warlike man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of
Alexander, of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected
Maximinus to the throne. This he did not possess for long, for two
things made him hated and despised; the one, his having kept sheep in
Thrace, which brought him into contempt (it being well known to all,
and considered a great indignity by every one), and the other, his
having at the accession to his dominions deferred going to Rome and
taking possession of the imperial seat; he had also gained a
reputation for the utmost ferocity by having, through his prefects in
Rome and elsewhere in the empire, practised many cruelties, so that
the whole world was moved to anger at the meanness of his birth and to
fear at his barbarity. First Africa rebelled, then the Senate with all
the people of Rome, and all Italy conspired against him, to which may
be added his own army; this latter, besieging Aquileia and meeting
with difficulties in taking it, were disgusted with his cruelties, and
fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered him.

I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being
thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this
discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have
this difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in
a far less degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some
indulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that
are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as
were the armies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more
necessary to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it
is now more necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan,
to satisfy the people rather the soldiers, because the people are the
more powerful.

From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him
twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend
the security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that,
putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep them
his friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in
the hands of soldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the
people, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the
state of the Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason
that it is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called
either an hereditary or a newly formed principality; because the sons
of the old prince are not the heirs, but he who is elected to that
position by those who have authority, and the sons remain only
noblemen. And this being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a new
principality, because there are none of those difficulties in it that
are met with in new ones; for although the prince is new, the
constitution of the state is old, and it is framed so as to receive
him as if he were its hereditary lord.

But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will
consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been
fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how
it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in
another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to
unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous for
Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was
heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been utterly
destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated
Severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in
his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot
imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow
those of Severus, but he ought to take from Severus those parts which
are necessary to found his state, and from Marcus those which are
proper and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and
firm.

CHAPTER XX

ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES
OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?

1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed
their subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by
factions; others have fostered enmities against themselves; others
have laid themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in
the beginning of their governments; some have built fortresses; some
have overthrown and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a
final judgment on all of these things unless one possesses the
particulars of those states in which a decision has to be made,
nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as the matter of itself
will admit.

2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather
when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by
arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted
become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your
subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be
armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be
handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which
they quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the
latter, considering it to be necessary that those who have the most
danger and service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when
you disarm them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust
them, either for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these
opinions breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain
unarmed, it follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the
character already shown; even if they should be good they would not be
sufficient to defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted
subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new
principality has always distributed arms. Histories are full of
examples. But when a prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a
province to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of
that state, except those who have been his adherents in acquiring it;
and these again, with time and opportunity, should be rendered soft
and effeminate; and matters should be managed in such a way that all
the armed men in the state shall be your own soldiers who in your old
state were living near you.

3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed
to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by
fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their
tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This
may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way
balanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept
for to-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use;
rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided
cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always
assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist.
The Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the
Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although
they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these
disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their
differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not
afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one
party at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue,
therefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never
be permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one
the more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace,
but if war comes this policy proves fallacious.

4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the
difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore
fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who
has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes
enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may
have the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher,
as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many
consider that a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with
craft to foster some animosity against himself, so that, having
crushed it, his renown may rise higher.

5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and
assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were
distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted.
Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those who
had been distrusted than by others. But on this question one cannot
speak generally, for it varies so much with the individual; I will
only say this, that those men who at the commencement of a princedom
have been hostile, if they are of a description to need assistance to
support themselves, can always be gained over with the greatest ease,
and they will be tightly held to serve the prince with fidelity,
inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for them to cancel by
deeds the bad impression which he had formed of them; and thus the
prince always extracts more profit from them than from those who,
serving him in too much security, may neglect his affairs. And since
the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means
of secret favours has acquired a new state, that he must well consider
the reasons which induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be
not a natural affection towards him, but only discontent with their
government, then he will only keep them friendly with great trouble
and difficulty, for it will be impossible to satisfy them. And
weighing well the reasons for this in those examples which can be
taken from ancient and modern affairs, we shall find that it is easier
for the prince to make friends of those men who were contented under
the former government, and are therefore his enemies, than of those
who, being discontented with it, were favourable to him and encouraged
him to seize it.

6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states
more securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit
to those who might design to work against them, and as a place of
refuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has been
made use of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in
our times has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di
Castello so that he might keep that state; Guido Ubaldo, Duke of
Urbino, on returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by
Cesare Borgia, razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that
province, and considered that without them it would be more difficult
to lose it; the Bentivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar
decision. Fortresses, therefore, are useful or not according to
circumstances; if they do you good in one way they injure you in
another. And this question can be reasoned thus: the prince who has
more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to build
fortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners than from the
people ought to leave them alone. The castle of Milan, built by
Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make, more trouble for the house
of Sforza than any other disorder in the state. For this reason the
best possible fortress is--not to be hated by the people, because,
although you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not save you if
the people hate you, for there will never be wanting foreigners to
assist a people who have taken arms against you. It has not been seen
in our times that such fortresses have been of use to any prince,
unless to the Countess of Forli,[*] when the Count Girolamo, her
consort, was killed; for by that means she was able to withstand the
popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and thus recover
her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that time that the
foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses were of little
value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her, and when the
people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners. Therefore, it would
have been safer for her, both then and before, not to have been hated
by the people than to have had the fortresses. All these things
considered then, I shall praise him who builds fortresses as well as
him who does not, and I shall blame whoever, trusting in them, cares
little about being hated by the people.

[*] Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and Lucrezia
Landriani, born 1463, died 1509. It was to the Countess of Forli
that Machiavelli was sent as envy on 1499. A letter from Fortunati
to the countess announces the appointment: "I have been with the
signori," wrote Fortunati, "to learn whom they would send and
when. They tell me that Nicolo Machiavelli, a learned young
Florentine noble, secretary to my Lords of the Ten, is to leave
with me at once." Cf. "Catherine Sforza," by Count Pasolini,
translated by P. Sylvester, 1898.

CHAPTER XXI

HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN

Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and
setting a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the
present King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because
he has risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to
be the foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his
deeds you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In
the beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise
was the foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and
without any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of
Castile occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any
innovations; thus they did not perceive that by these means he was
acquiring power and authority over them. He was able with the money of
the Church and of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long
war to lay the foundation for the military skill which has since
distinguished him. Further, always using religion as a plea, so as to
undertake greater schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to
driving out and clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be
a more admirable example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he
assailed Africa, he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked
France; and thus his achievements and designs have always been great,
and have kept the minds of his people in suspense and admiration and
occupied with the issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a
way, one out of the other, that men have never been given time to work
steadily against him.

Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal
affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da
Milano, who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life
doing some extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some
method of rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken
about. And a prince ought, above all things, always endeavour in every
action to gain for himself the reputation of being a great and
remarkable man.

A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a
downright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he
declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which
course will always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because
if two of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a
character that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him
or not. In either case it will always be more advantageous for you to
declare yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first
case, if you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey
to the conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been
conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to
protect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want
doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who
loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in
hand, court his fate.

Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Aetolians to drive
out the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of
the Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand
the Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be
discussed in the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of
Antiochus urged them to stand neutral. To this the Roman legate
answered: "As for that which has been said, that it is better and more
advantageous for your state not to interfere in our war, nothing can
be more erroneous; because by not interfering you will be left,
without favour or consideration, the guerdon of the conqueror." Thus
it will always happen that he who is not your friend will demand your
neutrality, whilst he who is your friend will entreat you to declare
yourself with arms. And irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers,
generally follow the neutral path, and are generally ruined. But when
a prince declares himself gallantly in favour of one side, if the
party with whom he allies himself conquers, although the victor may be
powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is indebted to him, and
there is established a bond of amity; and men are never so shameless
as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing you. Victories
after all are never so complete that the victor must not show some
regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally yourself
loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may aid
you, and you become companions on a fortune that may rise again.

In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that
you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it
greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction
of one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have
saved him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do
with your assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to
be noted that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance
with one more powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking
others, unless necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he
conquers you are at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much
as possible being at the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined
with France against the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused
their ruin, could have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as
happened to the Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to
attack Lombardy, then in such a case, for the above reasons, the
prince ought to favour one of the parties.

Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe
courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones,
because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid
one trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in
knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice
to take the lesser evil.

A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour
the proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his
citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and
agriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not
be deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken
away from him or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but
the prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things
and designs in any way to honour his city or state.

Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and
spectacles at convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is
divided into guilds or into societies,[*] he ought to hold such bodies
in esteem, and associate with them sometimes, and show himself an
example of courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining
the majesty of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in
anything.

[*] "Guilds or societies," "in arti o in tribu." "Arti" were craft or
trade guilds, cf. Florio: "Arte . . . a whole company of any trade
in any city or corporation town." The guilds of Florence are most
admirably described by Mr Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the
subject (Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhat similar
character, called "artel," exist in Russia to-day, cf. Sir
Mackenzie Wallace's "Russia," ed. 1905: "The sons . . . were
always during the working season members of an artel. In some of
the larger towns there are artels of a much more complex kind--
permanent associations, possessing large capital, and pecuniarily
responsible for the acts of the individual members." The word
"artel," despite its apparent similarity, has, Mr Aylmer Maude
assures me, no connection with "ars" or "arte." Its root is that
of the verb "rotisya," to bind oneself by an oath; and it is
generally admitted to be only another form of "rota," which now
signifies a "regimental company." In both words the underlying
idea is that of a body of men united by an oath. "Tribu" were
possibly gentile groups, united by common descent, and included
individuals connected by marriage. Perhaps our words "septs" or
"clans" would be most appropriate.

CHAPTER XXII

CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES

The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and
they are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince.
And the first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his
understanding, is by observing the men he has around him; and when
they are capable and faithful he may always be considered wise,
because he has known how to recognize the capable and to keep them
faithful. But when they are otherwise one cannot form a good opinion
of him, for the prime error which he made was in choosing them.

There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of
Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to
be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there
are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself;
another which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which
neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first
is the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless.
Therefore, it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the
first rank, he was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to
know good and bad when it is said and done, although he himself may
not have the initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in
his servant, and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the
servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is kept honest.

But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one
test which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his
own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in
everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you
ever be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in
his hands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince,
and never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not
concerned.

On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to
study him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing
with him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that
he cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire
more, many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make
him dread chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards
servants, are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is
otherwise, the end will always be disastrous for either one or the
other.

CHAPTER XXIII

HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED

I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it
is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless
they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of
whom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own
affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved
with difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves
they run the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no
other way of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men
understand that to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when
every one may tell you the truth, respect for you abates.

Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the
wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking
the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires,
and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and
listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions.
With these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry
himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more
freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of
these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and
be steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either
overthrown by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions
that he falls into contempt.

I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man
of affairs to Maximilian,[*] the present emperor, speaking of his
majesty, said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in
anything. This arose because of his following a practice the opposite
to the above; for the emperor is a secretive man--he does not
communicate his designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on
them. But as in carrying them into effect they become revealed and
known, they are at once obstructed by those men whom he has around
him, and he, being pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows
that those things he does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever
understands what he wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on
his resolutions.

[*] Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the Holy Roman
Empire. He married, first, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold;
after her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus became involved in
Italian politics.

A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he
wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every
one from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to
be a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning
the things of which he inquired; also, on learning that nay one, on
any consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger
be felt.

And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an
impression of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but
through the good advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they
are deceived, because this is an axiom which never fails: that a
prince who is not wise himself will never take good advice, unless by
chance he has yielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens
to be a very prudent man. In this case indeed he may be well governed,
but it would not be for long, because such a governor would in a short
time take away his state from him.

But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more
than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to
unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests,
and the prince will not know how to control them or to see through
them. And they are not to found otherwise, because men will always
prove untrue to you unless they are kept honest by constraint.
Therefore it must be inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they
come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the
prince from good counsels.

CHAPTER XXIV

WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES

The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince
to appear well established, and render him at once more secure and
fixed in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the
actions of a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an
hereditary one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men
and bind far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted
more by the present than by the past, and when they find the present
good they enjoy it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost
defence of a prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will
be a double glory for him to have established a new principality, and
adorned and strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies,
and with a good example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who,
born a prince, shall lose his state by want of wisdom.

And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in
Italy in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and
others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in
regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in
the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the
people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known
how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that
have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost.

Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who
was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to
the greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being
a warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the
nobles, he sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and
if in the end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he
retained the kingdom.

Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their
principalities after so many years' possession, but rather their own
sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a
change (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the
calm against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they
thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that
the people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would
recall them. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is
very bad to have neglected all other expedients for that, since you
would never wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find
someone later on to restore you. This again either does not happen,
or, if it does, it will not be for your security, because that
deliverance is of no avail which does not depend upon yourself; those
only are reliable, certain, and durable that depend on yourself and
your valour.

CHAPTER XXV

WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER

It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the
opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by
fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and
that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us
believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let
chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times
because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and may
still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes
pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion.
Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true
that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,[*] but that
she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little
less.

[*] Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: "The older one gets the
more convinced one becomes that his Majesty King Chance does
three-quarters of the business of this miserable universe."
Sorel's "Eastern Question."

I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood
overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away
the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to
its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet,
though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when
the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences
and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may pass
away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so
dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where
valour has not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her
forces where she knows that barriers and defences have not been raised
to constrain her.

And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes,
and which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an
open country without barriers and without any defence. For if it had
been defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France,
either this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made
or it would not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say
concerning resistance to fortune in general.

But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may
be seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any
change of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly
from causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that
the prince who relies entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I
believe also that he will be successful who directs his actions
according to the spirit of the times, and that he whose actions do not
accord with the times will not be successful. Because men are seen, in
affairs that lead to the end which every man has before him, namely,
glory and riches, to get there by various methods; one with caution,
another with haste; one by force, another by skill; one by patience,
another by its opposite; and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by
a different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one
attain his end, the other fail; and similarly, two men by different
observances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the other
impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than whether or not they
conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows from
what I have said, that two men working differently bring about the
same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his object and
the other does not.

Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs
himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such
a way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but
if times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his
course of action. But a man is not often found sufficiently
circumspect to know how to accommodate himself to the change, both
because he cannot deviate from what nature inclines him to do, and
also because, having always prospered by acting in one way, he cannot
be persuaded that it is well to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious
man, when it is time to turn adventurous, does not know how to do it,
hence he is ruined; but had he changed his conduct with the times
fortune would not have changed.

Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs,
and found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of
action that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise
against Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The
Venetians were not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he
had the enterprise still under discussion with the King of France;
nevertheless he personally entered upon the expedition with his
accustomed boldness and energy, a move which made Spain and the
Venetians stand irresolute and passive, the latter from fear, the
former from desire to recover the kingdom of Naples; on the other
hand, he drew after him the King of France, because that king, having
observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his friend so as
to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him. Therefore
Julius with his impetuous action accomplished what no other pontiff
with simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in Rome
until he could get away, with his plans arranged and everything fixed,
as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded.
Because the King of France would have made a thousand excuses, and the
others would have raised a thousand fears.

I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they
all succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him
experience the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which
required him to go cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because
he would never have deviated from those ways to which nature inclined
him.

I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind
steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are
successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I
consider that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because
fortune is a woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary
to beat and ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be
mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more
coldly. She is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men,
because they are less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity
command her.

CHAPTER XXVI

AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS

Having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and
wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a
new prince, and whether there were elements that would give an
opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of
things which would do honour to him and good to the people of this
country, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new
prince that I never knew a time more fit than the present.

And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should
be captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the
Persians should be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the
greatness of the soul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be
dispersed to illustrate the capabilities of Theseus: then at the
present time, in order to discover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it
was necessary that Italy should be reduced to the extremity that she
is now in, that she should be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more
oppressed than the Persians, more scattered than the Athenians;
without head, without order, beaten, despoiled, torn, overrun; and to
have endured every kind of desolation.

Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us
think he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was
afterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected
him; so that Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet
heal her wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of
Lombardy, to the swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany,
and cleanse those sores that for long have festered. It is seen how
she entreats God to send someone who shall deliver her from these
wrongs and barbarous insolencies. It is seen also that she is ready
and willing to follow a banner if only someone will raise it.

Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope
than in your illustrious house,[*] with its valour and fortune,
favoured by God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and
which could be made the head of this redemption. This will not be
difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the
men I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet
they were men, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the
present offers, for their enterprises were neither more just nor
easier than this, nor was God more their friend than He is yours.

[*] Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal by Leo X.
In 1523 Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the title of Clement
VII.

With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is
necessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in
them. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the
willingness is great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only
follow those men to whom I have directed your attention. Further than
this, how extraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested beyond
example: the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has
poured forth water, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to
your greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to do
everything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory
which belongs to us.

And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians
have been able to accomplish all that is expected from your
illustrious house; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so
many campaigns, it has always appeared as if military virtue were
exhausted, this has happened because the old order of things was not
good, and none of us have known how to find a new one. And nothing
honours a man more than to establish new laws and new ordinances when
he himself was newly risen. Such things when they are well founded and
dignified will make him revered and admired, and in Italy there are
not wanting opportunities to bring such into use in every form.

Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head.
Look attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how
superior the Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But
when it comes to armies they do not bear comparison, and this springs
entirely from the insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are
capable are not obedient, and each one seems to himself to know, there
having never been any one so distinguished above the rest, either by
valour or fortune, that others would yield to him. Hence it is that
for so long a time, and during so much fighting in the past twenty
years, whenever there has been an army wholly Italian, it has always
given a poor account of itself; the first witness to this is Il Taro,
afterwards Allesandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.[*]

[*] The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua, 1501;
Genoa, 1507; Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513.

If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these
remarkable men who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before
all things, as a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided
with your own forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or
better soldiers. And although singly they are good, altogether they
will be much better when they find themselves commanded by their
prince, honoured by him, and maintained at his expense. Therefore it
is necessary to be prepared with such arms, so that you can be
defended against foreigners by Italian valour.

And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very
formidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which
a third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be
relied upon to overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist
cavalry, and the Switzers are afraid of infantry whenever they
encounter them in close combat. Owing to this, as has been and may
again be seen, the Spaniards are unable to resist French cavalry, and
the Switzers are overthrown by Spanish infantry. And although a
complete proof of this latter cannot be shown, nevertheless there was
some evidence of it at the battle of Ravenna, when the Spanish
infantry were confronted by German battalions, who follow the same
tactics as the Swiss; when the Spaniards, by agility of body and with
the aid of their shields, got in under the pikes of the Germans and
stood out of danger, able to attack, while the Germans stood helpless,
and, if the cavalry had not dashed up, all would have been over with
them. It is possible, therefore, knowing the defects of both these
infantries, to invent a new one, which will resist cavalry and not be
afraid of infantry; this need not create a new order of arms, but a
variation upon the old. And these are the kind of improvements which
confer reputation and power upon a new prince.

This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for
letting Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express
the love with which he would be received in all those provinces which
have suffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst
for revenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what
tears. What door would be closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to
him? What envy would hinder him? What Italian would refuse him homage?
To all of us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your
illustrious house take up this charge with that courage and hope with
which all just enterprises are undertaken, so that under its standard
our native country may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be
verified that saying of Petrarch:

Virtu contro al Furore
Prendera l'arme, e fia il combatter corto:
Che l'antico valore
Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto.

Virtue against fury shall advance the fight,
And it i' th' combat soon shall put to flight:
For the old Roman valour is not dead,
Nor in th' Italians' brests extinguished.

Edward Dacre, 1640.

THE LIFE OFCASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA

WRITTEN BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI

And sent to his friends
ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI
And
LUIGI ALAMANNI

CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI
1284-1328

It appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonderful thing to those who
have considered the matter, that all men, or the larger number of
them, who have performed great deeds in the world, and excelled all
others in their day, have had their birth and beginning in baseness
and obscurity; or have been aggrieved by Fortune in some outrageous
way. They have either been exposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or
they have had so mean a parentage that in shame they have given
themselves out to be sons of Jove or of some other deity. It would be
wearisome to relate who these persons may have been because they are
well known to everybody, and, as such tales would not be particularly
edifying to those who read them, they are omitted. I believe that
these lowly beginnings of great men occur because Fortune is desirous
of showing to the world that such men owe much to her and little to
wisdom, because she begins to show her hand when wisdom can really
take no part in their career: thus all success must be attributed to
her. Castruccio Castracani of Lucca was one of those men who did great
deeds, if he is measured by the times in which he lived and the city
in which he was born; but, like many others, he was neither fortunate
nor distinguished in his birth, as the course of this history will
show. It appeared to be desirable to recall his memory, because I have
discerned in him such indications of valour and fortune as should make
him a great exemplar to men. I think also that I ought to call your
attention to his actions, because you of all men I know delight most
in noble deeds.

The family of Castracani was formerly numbered among the noble
families of Lucca, but in the days of which I speak it had somewhat
fallen in estate, as so often happens in this world. To this family
was born a son Antonio, who became a priest of the order of San
Michele of Lucca, and for this reason was honoured with the title of
Messer Antonio. He had an only sister, who had been married to
Buonaccorso Cenami, but Buonaccorso dying she became a widow, and not
wishing to marry again went to live with her brother. Messer Antonio
had a vineyard behind the house where he resided, and as it was
bounded on all sides by gardens, any person could have access to it
without difficulty. One morning, shortly after sunrise, Madonna
Dianora, as the sister of Messer Antonio was called, had occasion to
go into the vineyard as usual to gather herbs for seasoning the
dinner, and hearing a slight rustling among the leaves of a vine she
turned her eyes in that direction, and heard something resembling the
cry of an infant. Whereupon she went towards it, and saw the hands and
face of a baby who was lying enveloped in the leaves and who seemed to
be crying for its mother. Partly wondering and partly fearing, yet
full of compassion, she lifted it up and carried it to the house,
where she washed it and clothed it with clean linen as is customary,
and showed it to Messer Antonio when he returned home. When he heard
what had happened and saw the child he was not less surprised or
compassionate than his sister. They discussed between themselves what
should be done, and seeing that he was priest and that she had no
children, they finally determined to bring it up. They had a nurse for
it, and it was reared and loved as if it were their own child. They
baptized it, and gave it the name of Castruccio after their father. As
the years passed Castruccio grew very handsome, and gave evidence of
wit and discretion, and learnt with a quickness beyond his years those
lessons which Messer Antonio imparted to him. Messer Antonio intended
to make a priest of him, and in time would have inducted him into his
canonry and other benefices, and all his instruction was given with
this object; but Antonio discovered that the character of Castruccio
was quite unfitted for the priesthood. As soon as Castruccio reached
the age of fourteen he began to take less notice of the chiding of
Messer Antonio and Madonna Dianora and no longer to fear them; he left
off reading ecclesiastical books, and turned to playing with arms,
delighting in nothing so much as in learning their uses, and in
running, leaping, and wrestling with other boys. In all exercises he
far excelled his companions in courage and bodily strength, and if at
any time he did turn to books, only those pleased him which told of
wars and the mighty deeds of men. Messer Antonio beheld all this with
vexation and sorrow.

There lived in the city of Lucca a gentleman of the Guinigi family,
named Messer Francesco, whose profession was arms and who in riches,
bodily strength, and valour excelled all other men in Lucca. He had
often fought under the command of the Visconti of Milan, and as a
Ghibelline was the valued leader of that party in Lucca. This
gentleman resided in Lucca and was accustomed to assemble with others
most mornings and evenings under the balcony of the Podesta, which is
at the top of the square of San Michele, the finest square in Lucca,
and he had often seen Castruccio taking part with other children of
the street in those games of which I have spoken. Noticing that
Castruccio far excelled the other boys, and that he appeared to
exercise a royal authority over them, and that they loved and obeyed
him, Messer Francesco became greatly desirous of learning who he was.
Being informed of the circumstances of the bringing up of Castruccio
he felt a greater desire to have him near to him. Therefore he called
him one day and asked him whether he would more willingly live in the
house of a gentleman, where he would learn to ride horses and use
arms, or in the house of a priest, where he would learn nothing but
masses and the services of the Church. Messer Francesco could see that
it pleased Castruccio greatly to hear horses and arms spoken of, even
though he stood silent, blushing modestly; but being encouraged by
Messer Francesco to speak, he answered that, if his master were
agreeable, nothing would please him more than to give up his priestly
studies and take up those of a soldier. This reply delighted Messer
Francesco, and in a very short time he obtained the consent of Messer
Antonio, who was driven to yield by his knowledge of the nature of the
lad, and the fear that he would not be able to hold him much longer.

Thus Castruccio passed from the house of Messer Antonio the priest to
the house of Messer Francesco Guinigi the soldier, and it was
astonishing to find that in a very short time he manifested all that
virtue and bearing which we are accustomed to associate with a true
gentleman. In the first place he became an accomplished horseman, and
could manage with ease the most fiery charger, and in all jousts and
tournaments, although still a youth, he was observed beyond all
others, and he excelled in all exercises of strength and dexterity.
But what enhanced so much the charm of these accomplishments, was the
delightful modesty which enabled him to avoid offence in either act or
word to others, for he was deferential to the great men, modest with
his equals, and courteous to his inferiors. These gifts made him
beloved, not only by all the Guinigi family, but by all Lucca. When
Castruccio had reached his eighteenth year, the Ghibellines were
driven from Pavia by the Guelphs, and Messer Francesco was sent by the
Visconti to assist the Ghibellines, and with him went Castruccio, in
charge of his forces. Castruccio gave ample proof of his prudence and
courage in this expedition, acquiring greater reputation than any
other captain, and his name and fame were known, not only in Pavia,
but throughout all Lombardy.

Castruccio, having returned to Lucca in far higher estimation that he
left it, did not omit to use all the means in his power to gain as
many friends as he could, neglecting none of those arts which are
necessary for that purpose. About this time Messer Francesco died,
leaving a son thirteen years of age named Pagolo, and having appointed
Castruccio to be his son's tutor and administrator of his estate.
Before he died Francesco called Castruccio to him, and prayed him to
show Pagolo that goodwill which he (Francesco) had always shown to
HIM, and to render to the son the gratitude which he had not been able
to repay to the father. Upon the death of Francesco, Castruccio became
the governor and tutor of Pagolo, which increased enormously his power
and position, and created a certain amount of envy against him in
Lucca in place of the former universal goodwill, for many men
suspected him of harbouring tyrannical intentions. Among these the
leading man was Giorgio degli Opizi, the head of the Guelph party.
This man hoped after the death of Messer Francesco to become the chief
man in Lucca, but it seemed to him that Castruccio, with the great
abilities which he already showed, and holding the position of
governor, deprived him of his opportunity; therefore he began to sow
those seeds which should rob Castruccio of his eminence. Castruccio at
first treated this with scorn, but afterwards he grew alarmed,
thinking that Messer Giorgio might be able to bring him into disgrace
with the deputy of King Ruberto of Naples and have him driven out of
Lucca.

The Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione of the Faggiuola of
Arezzo, who being in the first place elected their captain afterwards
became their lord. There resided in Paris some exiled Ghibellines from
Lucca, with whom Castruccio held communications with the object of
effecting their restoration by the help of Uguccione. Castruccio also
brought into his plans friends from Lucca who would not endure the
authority of the Opizi. Having fixed upon a plan to be followed,
Castruccio cautiously fortified the tower of the Onesti, filling it
with supplies and munitions of war, in order that it might stand a
siege for a few days in case of need. When the night came which had
been agreed upon with Uguccione, who had occupied the plain between
the mountains and Pisa with many men, the signal was given, and
without being observed Uguccione approached the gate of San Piero and
set fire to the portcullis. Castruccio raised a great uproar within
the city, calling the people to arms and forcing open the gate from
his side. Uguccione entered with his men, poured through the town, and
killed Messer Giorgio with all his family and many of his friends and
supporters. The governor was driven out, and the government reformed
according to the wishes of Uguccione, to the detriment of the city,
because it was found that more than one hundred families were exiled
at that time. Of those who fled, part went to Florence and part to
Pistoia, which city was the headquarters of the Guelph party, and for
this reason it became most hostile to Uguccione and the Lucchese.

As it now appeared to the Florentines and others of the Guelph party
that the Ghibellines absorbed too much power in Tuscany, they
determined to restore the exiled Guelphs to Lucca. They assembled a
large army in the Val di Nievole, and seized Montecatini; from thence
they marched to Montecarlo, in order to secure the free passage into
Lucca. Upon this Uguccione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces,
and with a number of German cavalry which he drew out of Lombardy, he
moved against the quarters of the Florentines, who upon the appearance
of the enemy withdrew from Montecarlo, and posted themselves between
Montecatini and Pescia. Uguccione now took up a position near to
Montecarlo, and within about two miles of the enemy, and slight
skirmishes between the horse of both parties were of daily occurrence.
Owing to the illness of Uguccione, the Pisans and Lucchese delayed
coming to battle with the enemy. Uguccione, finding himself growing
worse, went to Montecarlo to be cured, and left the command of the
army in the hands of Castruccio. This change brought about the ruin of
the Guelphs, who, thinking that the hostile army having lost its
captain had lost its head, grew over-confident. Castruccio observed
this, and allowed some days to pass in order to encourage this belief;
he also showed signs of fear, and did not allow any of the munitions
of the camp to be used. On the other side, the Guelphs grew more
insolent the more they saw these evidences of fear, and every day they
drew out in the order of battle in front of the army of Castruccio.
Presently, deeming that the enemy was sufficiently emboldened, and
having mastered their tactics, he decided to join battle with them.
First he spoke a few words of encouragement to his soldiers, and
pointed out to them the certainty of victory if they would but obey
his commands. Castruccio had noticed how the enemy had placed all his
best troops in the centre of the line of battle, and his less reliable
men on the wings of the army; whereupon he did exactly the opposite,
putting his most valiant men on the flanks, while those on whom he
could not so strongly rely he moved to the centre. Observing this
order of battle, he drew out of his lines and quickly came in sight of
the hostile army, who, as usual, had come in their insolence to defy
him. He then commanded his centre squadrons to march slowly, whilst he
moved rapidly forward those on the wings. Thus, when they came into
contact with the enemy, only the wings of the two armies became
engaged, whilst the center battalions remained out of action, for
these two portions of the line of battle were separated from each
other by a long interval and thus unable to reach each other. By this
expedient the more valiant part of Castruccio's men were opposed to
the weaker part of the enemy's troops, and the most efficient men of
the enemy were disengaged; and thus the Florentines were unable to
fight with those who were arrayed opposite to them, or to give any
assistance to their own flanks. So, without much difficulty,
Castruccio put the enemy to flight on both flanks, and the centre
battalions took to flight when they found themselves exposed to
attack, without having a chance of displaying their valour. The defeat
was complete, and the loss in men very heavy, there being more than
ten thousand men killed with many officers and knights of the Guelph
party in Tuscany, and also many princes who had come to help them,
among whom were Piero, the brother of King Ruberto, and Carlo, his
nephew, and Filippo, the lord of Taranto. On the part of Castruccio
the loss did not amount to more than three hundred men, among whom was
Francesco, the son of Uguccione, who, being young and rash, was killed
in the first onset.

This victory so greatly increased the reputation of Castruccio that
Uguccione conceived some jealousy and suspicion of him, because it
appeared to Uguccione that this victory had given him no increase of
power, but rather than diminished it. Being of this mind, he only
waited for an opportunity to give effect to it. This occurred on the
death of Pier Agnolo Micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in
Lucca, the murderer of whom fled to the house of Castruccio for
refuge. On the sergeants of the captain going to arrest the murderer,
they were driven off by Castruccio, and the murderer escaped. This
affair coming to the knowledge of Uguccione, who was than at Pisa, it
appeared to him a proper opportunity to punish Castruccio. He
therefore sent for his son Neri, who was the governor of Lucca, and
commissioned him to take Castruccio prisoner at a banquet and put him
to death. Castruccio, fearing no evil, went to the governor in a
friendly way, was entertained at supper, and then thrown into prison.
But Neri, fearing to put him to death lest the people should be
incensed, kept him alive, in order to hear further from his father
concerning his intentions. Ugucionne cursed the hesitation and
cowardice of his son, and at once set out from Pisa to Lucca with four
hundred horsemen to finish the business in his own way; but he had not
yet reached the baths when the Pisans rebelled and put his deputy to
death and created Count Gaddo della Gherardesca their lord. Before
Uguccione reached Lucca he heard of the occurrences at Pisa, but it
did not appear wise to him to turn back, lest the Lucchese with the
example of Pisa before them should close their gates against him. But
the Lucchese, having heard of what had happened at Pisa, availed
themselves of this opportunity to demand the liberation of Castruccio,
notwithstanding that Uguccione had arrived in their city. They first
began to speak of it in private circles, afterwards openly in the
squares and streets; then they raised a tumult, and with arms in their
hands went to Uguccione and demanded that Castruccio should be set at
liberty. Uguccione, fearing that worse might happen, released him from
prison. Whereupon Castruccio gathered his friends around him, and with
the help of the people attacked Uguccione; who, finding he had no
resource but in flight, rode away with his friends to Lombardy, to the
lords of Scale, where he died in poverty.

But Castruccio from being a prisoner became almost a prince in Lucca,
and he carried himself so discreetly with his friends and the people
that they appointed him captain of their army for one year. Having
obtained this, and wishing to gain renown in war, he planned the
recovery of the many towns which had rebelled after the departure of
Uguccione, and with the help of the Pisans, with whom he had concluded
a treaty, he marched to Serezzana. To capture this place he
constructed a fort against it, which is called to-day Zerezzanello; in
the course of two months Castruccio captured the town. With the
reputation gained at that siege, he rapidly seized Massa, Carrara, and
Lavenza, and in a short time had overrun the whole of Lunigiana. In
order to close the pass which leads from Lombardy to Lunigiana, he
besieged Pontremoli and wrested it from the hands of Messer Anastagio
Palavicini, who was the lord of it. After this victory he returned to
Lucca, and was welcomed by the whole people. And now Castruccio,
deeming it imprudent any longer to defer making himself a prince, got
himself created the lord of Lucca by the help of Pazzino del Poggio,
Puccinello dal Portico, Francesco Boccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi, all
of whom he had corrupted; and he was afterwards solemnly and
deliberately elected prince by the people. At this time Frederick of
Bavaria, the King of the Romans, came into Italy to assume the
Imperial crown, and Castruccio, in order that he might make friends
with him, met him at the head of five hundred horsemen. Castruccio had
left as his deputy in Lucca, Pagolo Guinigi, who was held in high
estimation, because of the people's love for the memory of his father.
Castruccio was received in great honour by Frederick, and many
privileges were conferred upon him, and he was appointed the emperor's
lieutenant in Tuscany. At this time the Pisans were in great fear of
Gaddo della Gherardesca, whom they had driven out of Pisa, and they
had recourse for assistance to Frederick. Frederick created Castruccio
the lord of Pisa, and the Pisans, in dread of the Guelph party, and
particularly of the Florentines, were constrained to accept him as
their lord.

Frederick, having appointed a governor in Rome to watch his Italian
affairs, returned to Germany. All the Tuscan and Lombardian
Ghibellines, who followed the imperial lead, had recourse to
Castruccio for help and counsel, and all promised him the governorship
of his country, if enabled to recover it with his assistance. Among
these exiles were Matteo Guidi, Nardo Scolari, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzo
Nardi, and Piero Buonaccorsi, all exiled Florentines and Ghibellines.
Castruccio had the secret intention of becoming the master of all
Tuscany by the aid of these men and of his own forces; and in order to
gain greater weight in affairs, he entered into a league with Messer
Matteo Visconti, the Prince of Milan, and organized for him the forces
of his city and the country districts. As Lucca had five gates, he
divided his own country districts into five parts, which he supplied
with arms, and enrolled the men under captains and ensigns, so that he
could quickly bring into the field twenty thousand soldiers, without
those whom he could summon to his assistance from Pisa. While he
surrounded himself with these forces and allies, it happened at Messer
Matteo Visconti was attacked by the Guelphs of Piacenza, who had
driven out the Ghibellines with the assistance of a Florentine army
and the King Ruberto. Messer Matteo called upon Castruccio to invade
the Florentines in their own territories, so that, being attacked at
home, they should be compelled to draw their army out of Lombardy in
order to defend themselves. Castruccio invaded the Valdarno, and
seized Fucecchio and San Miniato, inflicting immense damage upon the
country. Whereupon the Florentines recalled their army, which had
scarcely reached Tuscany, when Castruccio was forced by other
necessities to return to Lucca.

There resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio family, who were so
powerful that they could not only elevate Castruccio, but even advance
him to the dignity of prince; and it appearing to them they had not
received such rewards for their services as they deserved, they
incited other families to rebel and to drive Castruccio out of Lucca.
They found their opportunity one morning, and arming themselves, they
set upon the lieutenant whom Castruccio had left to maintain order and
killed him. They endeavoured to raise the people in revolt, but
Stefano di Poggio, a peaceable old man who had taken no hand in the
rebellion, intervened and compelled them by his authority to lay down
their arms; and he offered to be their mediator with Castruccio to
obtain from him what they desired. Therefore they laid down their arms
with no greater intelligence than they had taken them up. Castruccio,
having heard the news of what had happened at Lucca, at once put
Pagolo Guinigi in command of the army, and with a troop of cavalry set
out for home. Contrary to his expectations, he found the rebellion at
an end, yet he posted his men in the most advantageous places
throughout the city. As it appeared to Stefano that Castruccio ought
to be very much obliged to him, he sought him out, and without saying
anything on his own behalf, for he did not recognize any need for
doing so, he begged Castruccio to pardon the other members of his
family by reason of their youth, their former friendships, and the
obligations which Castruccio was under to their house. To this
Castruccio graciously responded, and begged Stefano to reassure
himself, declaring that it gave him more pleasure to find the tumult
at an end than it had ever caused him anxiety to hear of its
inception. He encouraged Stefano to bring his family to him, saying
that he thanked God for having given him the opportunity of showing
his clemency and liberality. Upon the word of Stefano and Castruccio
they surrendered, and with Stefano were immediately thrown into prison
and put to death. Meanwhile the Florentines had recovered San Miniato,
whereupon it seemed advisable to Castruccio to make peace, as it did
not appear to him that he was sufficiently secure at Lucca to leave
him. He approached the Florentines with the proposal of a truce, which
they readily entertained, for they were weary of the war, and desirous
of getting rid of the expenses of it. A treaty was concluded with them
for two years, by which both parties agreed to keep the conquests they
had made. Castruccio thus released from this trouble, turned his
attention to affairs in Lucca, and in order that he should not again
be subject to the perils from which he had just escaped, he, under
various pretences and reasons, first wiped out all those who by their
ambition might aspire to the principality; not sparing one of them,
but depriving them of country and property, and those whom he had in
his hands of life also, stating that he had found by experience that
none of them were to be trusted. Then for his further security he
raised a fortress in Lucca with the stones of the towers of those whom
he had killed or hunted out of the state.

Whilst Castruccio made peace with the Florentines, and strengthened
his position in Lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of open war,
of increasing his importance elsewhere. It appeared to him that if he
could get possession of Pistoia, he would have one foot in Florence,
which was his great desire. He, therefore, in various ways made
friends with the mountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia that
both parties confided their secrets to him. Pistoia was divided, as it
always had been, into the Bianchi and Neri parties; the head of the
Bianchi was Bastiano di Possente, and of the Neri, Jacopo da Gia. Each
of these men held secret communications with Castruccio, and each
desired to drive the other out of the city; and, after many
threatenings, they came to blows. Jacopo fortified himself at the
Florentine gate, Bastiano at that of the Lucchese side of the city;
both trusted more in Castruccio than in the Florentines, because they
believed that Castruccio was far more ready and willing to fight than
the Florentines, and they both sent to him for assistance. He gave
promises to both, saying to Bastiano that he would come in person, and
to Jacopo that he would send his pupil, Pagolo Guinigi. At the
appointed time he sent forward Pagolo by way of Pisa, and went himself
direct to Pistoia; at midnight both of them met outside the city, and
both were admitted as friends. Thus the two leaders entered, and at a
signal given by Castruccio, one killed Jacopo da Gia, and the other
Bastiano di Possente, and both took prisoners or killed the partisans
of either faction. Without further opposition Pistoia passed into the
hands of Castruccio, who, having forced the Signoria to leave the
palace, compelled the people to yield obedience to him, making them
many promises and remitting their old debts. The countryside flocked
to the city to see the new prince, and all were filled with hope and
quickly settled down, influenced in a great measure by his great
valour.

About this time great disturbances arose in Rome, owing to the
dearness of living which was caused by the absence of the pontiff at
Avignon. The German governor, Enrico, was much blamed for what
happened--murders and tumults following each other daily, without his
being able to put an end to them. This caused Enrico much anxiety lest
the Romans should call in Ruberto, the King of Naples, who would drive
the Germans out of the city, and bring back the Pope. Having no nearer
friend to whom he could apply for help than Castruccio, he sent to
him, begging him not only to give him assistance, but also to come in
person to Rome. Castruccio considered that he ought not to hesitate to
render the emperor this service, because he believed that he himself
would not be safe if at any time the emperor ceased to hold Rome.
Leaving Pagolo Guinigi in command at Lucca, Castruccio set out for
Rome with six hundred horsemen, where he was received by Enrico with
the greatest distinction. In a short time the presence of Castruccio
obtained such respect for the emperor that, without bloodshed or
violence, good order was restored, chiefly by reason of Castruccio
having sent by sea from the country round Pisa large quantities of
corn, and thus removed the source of the trouble. When he had
chastised some of the Roman leaders, and admonished others, voluntary
obedience was rendered to Enrico. Castruccio received many honours,
and was made a Roman senator. This dignity was assumed with the
greatest pomp, Castruccio being clothed in a brocaded toga, which had
the following words embroidered on its front: "I am what God wills."
Whilst on the back was: "What God desires shall be."

During this time the Florentines, who were much enraged that
Castruccio should have seized Pistoia during the truce, considered how
they could tempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not
be difficult in his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in Florence
were Baldo Cecchi and Jacopo Baldini, both men of leading and ready to
face danger. These men kept up communications with their friends in
Pistoia, and with the aid of the Florentines entered the city by
night, and after driving out some of Castruccio's officials and
partisans, and killing others, they restored the city to its freedom.
The news of this greatly angered Castruccio, and taking leave of
Enrico, he pressed on in great haste to Pistoia. When the Florentines
heard of his return, knowing that he would lose no time, they decided
to intercept him with their forces in the Val di Nievole, under the
belief that by doing so they would cut off his road to Pistoia.
Assembling a great army of the supporters of the Guelph cause, the
Florentines entered the Pistoian territories. On the other hand,
Castruccio reached Montecarlo with his army; and having heard where
the Florentines' lay, he decided not to encounter it in the plains of
Pistoia, nor to await it in the plains of Pescia, but, as far as he
possibly could, to attack it boldly in the Pass of Serravalle. He
believed that if he succeeded in this design, victory was assured,
although he was informed that the Florentines had thirty thousand men,
whilst he had only twelve thousand. Although he had every confidence
in his own abilities and the valour of his troops, yet he hesitated to
attack his enemy in the open lest he should be overwhelmed by numbers.
Serravalle is a castle between Pescia and Pistoia, situated on a hill
which blocks the Val di Nievole, not in the exact pass, but about a
bowshot beyond; the pass itself is in places narrow and steep, whilst
in general it ascends gently, but is still narrow, especially at the
summit where the waters divide, so that twenty men side by side could
hold it. The lord of Serravalle was Manfred, a German, who, before
Castruccio became lord of Pistoia, had been allowed to remain in
possession of the castle, it being common to the Lucchese and the
Pistoians, and unclaimed by either--neither of them wishing to
displace Manfred as long as he kept his promise of neutrality, and
came under obligations to no one. For these reasons, and also because
the castle was well fortified, he had always been able to maintain his
position. It was here that Castruccio had determined to fall upon his
enemy, for here his few men would have the advantage, and there was no
fear lest, seeing the large masses of the hostile force before they
became engaged, they should not stand. As soon as this trouble with
Florence arose, Castruccio saw the immense advantage which possession
of this castle would give him, and having an intimate friendship with
a resident in the castle, he managed matters so with him that four
hundred of his men were to be admitted into the castle the night
before the attack on the Florentines, and the castellan put to death.

Castruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage the
Florentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away
from Pistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did not move his
army from Montecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on until they
reached their encampment under Serravalle, intending to cross the hill
on the following morning. In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the
castle at night, had also moved his army from Montecarlo, and marching
from thence at midnight in dead silence, had reached the foot of
Serravalle: thus he and the Florentines commenced the ascent of the
hill at the same time in the morning. Castruccio sent forward his
infantry by the main road, and a troop of four hundred horsemen by a
path on the left towards the castle. The Florentines sent forward four
hundred cavalry ahead of their army which was following, never
expecting to find Castruccio in possession of the hill, nor were they
aware of his having seized the castle. Thus it happened that the
Florentine horsemen mounting the hill were completely taken by
surprise when they discovered the infantry of Castruccio, and so close
were they upon it they had scarcely time to pull down their visors. It
was a case of unready soldiers being attacked by ready, and they were
assailed with such vigour that with difficulty they could hold their
own, although some few of them got through. When the noise of the
fighting reached the Florentine camp below, it was filled with
confusion. The cavalry and infantry became inextricably mixed: the
captains were unable to get their men either backward or forward,
owing to the narrowness of the pass, and amid all this tumult no one
knew what ought to be done or what could be done. In a short time the
cavalry who were engaged with the enemy's infantry were scattered or
killed without having made any effective defence because of their
unfortunate position, although in sheer desperation they had offered a
stout resistance. Retreat had been impossible, with the mountains on
both flanks, whilst in front were their enemies, and in the rear their
friends. When Castruccio saw that his men were unable to strike a
decisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight, he sent one
thousand infantrymen round by the castle, with orders to join the four
hundred horsemen he had previously dispatched there, and commanded the
whole force to fall upon the flank of the enemy. These orders they
carried out with such fury that the Florentines could not sustain the
attack, but gave way, and were soon in full retreat--conquered more by
their unfortunate position than by the valour of their enemy. Those in
the rear turned towards Pistoia, and spread through the plains, each
man seeking only his own safety. The defeat was complete and very
sanguinary. Many captains were taken prisoners, among whom were
Bandini dei Rossi, Francesco Brunelleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa,
all Florentine noblemen, with many Tuscans and Neapolitans who fought
on the Florentine side, having been sent by King Ruberto to assist the
Guelphs. Immediately the Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out
the friends of the Guelphs, and surrendered to Castruccio. He was not
content with occupying Prato and all the castles on the plains on both
sides of the Arno, but marched his army into the plain of Peretola,
about two miles from Florence. Here he remained many days, dividing
the spoils, and celebrating his victory with feasts and games, holding
horse races, and foot races for men and women. He also struck medals
in commemoration of the defeat of the Florentines. He endeavoured to
corrupt some of the citizens of Florence, who were to open the city
gates at night; but the conspiracy was discovered, and the
participators in it taken and beheaded, among whom were Tommaso
Lupacci and Lambertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeat caused the
Florentines great anxiety, and despairing of preserving their liberty,
they sent envoys to King Ruberto of Naples, offering him the dominion
of their city; and he, knowing of what immense importance the
maintenance of the Guelph cause was to him, accepted it. He agreed
with the Florentines to receive from them a yearly tribute of two
hundred thousand florins, and he send his son Carlo to Florence with
four thousand horsemen.

Shortly after this the Florentines were relieved in some degree of the
pressure of Castruccio's army, owing to his being compelled to leave
his positions before Florence and march on Pisa, in order to suppress
a conspiracy that had been raised against him by Benedetto Lanfranchi,
one of the first men in Pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland
should be under the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formed this
conspiracy, intending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of
Castruccio, and drive out the garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy
paucity of numbers is essential to secrecy, so for its execution a few
are not sufficient, and in seeking more adherents to his conspiracy
Lanfranchi encountered a person who revealed the design to Castruccio.
This betrayal cannot be passed by without severe reproach to Bonifacio
Cerchi and Giovanni Guidi, two Florentine exiles who were suffering
their banishment in Pisa. Thereupon Castruccio seized Benedetto and
put him to death, and beheaded many other noble citizens, and drove
their families into exile. It now appeared to Castruccio that both
Pisa and Pistoia were thoroughly disaffected; he employed much thought
and energy upon securing his position there, and this gave the
Florentines their opportunity to reorganize their army, and to await
the coming of Carlo, the son of the King of Naples. When Carlo arrived
they decided to lose no more time, and assembled a great army of more
than thirty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry--having called
to their aid every Guelph there was in Italy. They consulted whether
they should attack Pistoia or Pisa first, and decided that it would be
better to march on the latter--a course, owing to the recent
conspiracy, more likely to succeed, and of more advantage to them,
because they believed that the surrender of Pistoia would follow the
acquisition of Pisa.

In the early part of May 1328, the Florentines put in motion this army
and quickly occupied Lastra, Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing
from thence on to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of the enormous
army which the Florentines were sending against him, he was in no
degree alarmed, believing that the time had now arrived when Fortune
would deliver the empire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no
reason to think that his enemy would make a better fight, or had
better prospects of success, than at Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled
twenty thousand foot soldiers and four thousand horsemen, and with
this army went to Fucecchio, whilst he sent Pagolo Guinigi to Pisa
with five thousand infantry. Fucecchio has a stronger position than
any other town in the Pisan district, owing to its situation between
the rivers Arno and Gusciana and its slight elevation above the
surrounding plain. Moreover, the enemy could not hinder its being
victualled unless they divided their forces, nor could they approach
it either from the direction of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get
through to Pisa, or attack Castruccio's forces except at a
disadvantage. In one case they would find themselves placed between
his two armies, the one under his own command and the other under
Pagolo, and in the other case they would have to cross the Arno to get
to close quarters with the enemy, an undertaking of great hazard. In
order to tempt the Florentines to take this latter course, Castruccio
withdrew his men from the banks of the river and placed them under the
walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide expanse of land between them and
the river.

The Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, held a council of war to
decide whether they should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio, and,
having weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon the
latter. The river Arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet
the water reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the
saddles of the horsemen. On the morning of 10 June 1328, the
Florentines commenced the battle by ordering forward a number of
cavalry and ten thousand infantry. Castruccio, whose plan of action
was fixed, and who well knew what to do, at once attacked the
Florentines with five thousand infantry and three thousand horsemen,
not allowing them to issue from the river before he charged them; he
also sent one thousand light infantry up the river bank, and the same
number down the Arno. The infantry of the Florentines were so much
impeded by their arms and the water that they were not able to mount
the banks of the river, whilst the cavalry had made the passage of the
river more difficult for the others, by reason of the few who had
crossed having broken up the bed of the river, and this being deep
with mud, many of the horses rolled over with their riders and many of
them had stuck so fast that they could not move. When the Florentine
captains saw the difficulties their men were meeting, they withdrew
them and moved higher up the river, hoping to find the river bed less
treacherous and the banks more adapted for landing. These men were met
at the bank by the forces which Castruccio had already sent forward,
who, being light armed with bucklers and javelins in their hands, let
fly with tremendous shouts into the faces and bodies of the cavalry.
The horses, alarmed by the noise and the wounds, would not move
forward, and trampled each other in great confusion. The fight between
the men of Castruccio and those of the enemy who succeeded in crossing
was sharp and terrible; both sides fought with the utmost desperation
and neither would yield. The soldiers of Castruccio fought to drive
the others back into the river, whilst the Florentines strove to get a
footing on land in order to make room for the others pressing forward,
who if they could but get out of the water would be able to fight, and
in this obstinate conflict they were urged on by their captains.
Castruccio shouted to his men that these were the same enemies whom
they had before conquered at Serravalle, whilst the Florentines
reproached each other that the many should be overcome by the few. At
length Castruccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted, and that
both his men and the enemy were utterly exhausted, and that both sides
had many killed and wounded, pushed forward another body of infantry
to take up a position at the rear of those who were fighting; he then
commanded these latter to open their ranks as if they intended to
retreat, and one part of them to turn to the right and another to the
left. This cleared a space of which the Florentines at once took
advantage, and thus gained possession of a portion of the battlefield.
But when these tired soldiers found themselves at close quarters with
Castruccio's reserves they could not stand against them and at once
fell back into the river. The cavalry of either side had not as yet
gained any decisive advantage over the other, because Castruccio,
knowing his inferiority in this arm, had commanded his leaders only to
stand on the defensive against the attacks of their adversaries, as he
hoped that when he had overcome the infantry he would be able to make
short work of the cavalry. This fell out as he had hoped, for when he
saw the Florentine army driven back across the river he ordered the
remainder of his infantry to attack the cavalry of the enemy. This
they did with lance and javelin, and, joined by their own cavalry,
fell upon the enemy with the greatest fury and soon put him to flight.
The Florentine captains, having seen the difficulty their cavalry had
met with in crossing the river, had attempted to make their infantry
cross lower down the river, in order to attack the flanks of
Castruccio's army. But here, also, the banks were steep and already
lined by the men of Castruccio, and this movement was quite useless.
Thus the Florentines were so completely defeated at all points that
scarcely a third of them escaped, and Castruccio was again covered
with glory. Many captains were taken prisoners, and Carlo, the son of
King Ruberto, with Michelagnolo Falconi and Taddeo degli Albizzi, the
Florentine commissioners, fled to Empoli. If the spoils were great,
the slaughter was infinitely greater, as might be expected in such a
battle. Of the Florentines there fell twenty thousand two hundred and
thirty-one men, whilst Castruccio lost one thousand five hundred and
seventy men.

But Fortune growing envious of the glory of Castruccio took away his
life just at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus
ruined all those plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry
into effect, and in the successful prosecution of which nothing but
death could have stopped him. Castruccio was in the thick of the
battle the whole of the day; and when the end of it came, although
fatigued and overheated, he stood at the gate of Fucecchio to welcome
his men on their return from victory and personally thank them. He was
also on the watch for any attempt of the enemy to retrieve the
fortunes of the day; he being of the opinion that it was the duty of a
good general to be the first man in the saddle and the last out of it.
Here Castruccio stood exposed to a wind which often rises at midday on
the banks of the Arno, and which is often very unhealthy; from this he
took a chill, of which he thought nothing, as he was accustomed to
such troubles; but it was the cause of his death. On the following
night he was attacked with high fever, which increased so rapidly that
the doctors saw it must prove fatal. Castruccio, therefore, called
Pagolo Guinigi to him, and addressed him as follows:

"If I could have believed that Fortune would have cut me off in the
midst of the career which was leading to that glory which all my
successes promised, I should have laboured less, and I should have
left thee, if a smaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils,
because I should have been content with the governorships of Lucca and
Pisa. I should neither have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the
Florentines with so many injuries. But I would have made both these
peoples my friends, and I should have lived, if no longer, at least
more peacefully, and have left you a state without a doubt smaller,
but one more secure and established on a surer foundation. But
Fortune, who insists upon having the arbitrament of human affairs, did
not endow me with sufficient judgment to recognize this from the
first, nor the time to surmount it. Thou hast heard, for many have
told thee, and I have never concealed it, how I entered the house of
thy father whilst yet a boy--a stranger to all those ambitions which
every generous soul should feel--and how I was brought up by him, and
loved as though I had been born of his blood; how under his governance
I learned to be valiant and capable of availing myself of all that
fortune, of which thou hast been witness. When thy good father came to
die, he committed thee and all his possessions to my care, and I have
brought thee up with that love, and increased thy estate with that
care, which I was bound to show. And in order that thou shouldst not
only possess the estate which thy father left, but also that which my
fortune and abilities have gained, I have never married, so that the
love of children should never deflect my mind from that gratitude
which I owed to the children of thy father. Thus I leave thee a vast
estate, of which I am well content, but I am deeply concerned,
inasmuch as I leave it thee unsettled and insecure. Thou hast the city
of Lucca on thy hands, which will never rest contented under they
government. Thou hast also Pisa, where the men are of nature
changeable and unreliable, who, although they may be sometimes held in
subjection, yet they will ever disdain to serve under a Lucchese.
Pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten up with factions and
deeply incensed against thy family by reason of the wrongs recently
inflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours the offended
Florentines, injured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly
destroyed, who will hail the news of my death with more delight than
they would the acquisition of all Tuscany. In the Emperor and in the
princes of Milan thou canst place no reliance, for they are far
distant, slow, and their help is very long in coming. Therefore, thou
hast no hope in anything but in thine own abilities, and in the memory
of my valour, and in the prestige which this latest victory has
brought thee; which, as thou knowest how to use it with prudence, will
assist thee to come to terms with the Florentines, who, as they are
suffering under this great defeat, should be inclined to listen to
thee. And whereas I have sought to make them my enemies, because I
believed that war with them would conduce to my power and glory, thou
hast every inducement to make friends of them, because their alliance
will bring thee advantages and security. It is of the greatest
important in this world that a man should know himself, and the
measure of his own strength and means; and he who knows that he has
not a genius for fighting must learn how to govern by the arts of
peace. And it will be well for thee to rule they conduct by my
counsel, and to learn in this way to enjoy what my life-work and
dangers have gained; and in this thou wilt easily succeed when thou
hast learnt to believe that what I have told thee is true. And thou
wilt be doubly indebted to me, in that I have left thee this realm and
have taught thee how to keep it."

After this there came to Castruccio those citizens of Pisa, Pistoia,
and Lucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending
Pagolo to them, and making them swear obedience to him as his
successor, he died. He left a happy memory to those who had known him,
and no prince of those times was ever loved with such devotion as he
was. His obsequies were celebrated with every sign of mourning, and he
was buried in San Francesco at Lucca. Fortune was not so friendly to
Pagolo Guinigi as she had been to Castruccio, for he had not the
abilities. Not long after the death of Castruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa,
and then Pistoia, and only with difficulty held on to Lucca. This
latter city continued in the family of Guinigi until the time of the
great-grandson of Pagolo.

From what has been related here it will be seen that Castruccio was a
man of exceptional abilities, not only measured by men of his own
time, but also by those of an earlier date. In stature he was above
the ordinary height, and perfectly proportioned. He was of a gracious
presence, and he welcomed men with such urbanity that those who spoke
with him rarely left him displeased. His hair was inclined to be red,
and he wore it cut short above the ears, and, whether it rained or
snowed, he always went without a hat. He was delightful among friends,
but terrible to his enemies; just to his subjects; ready to play false
with the unfaithful, and willing to overcome by fraud those whom he
desired to subdue, because he was wont to say that it was the victory
that brought the glory, not the methods of achieving it. No one was
bolder in facing danger, none more prudent in extricating himself. He
was accustomed to say that men ought to attempt everything and fear
nothing; that God is a lover of strong men, because one always sees
that the weak are chastised by the strong. He was also wonderfully
sharp or biting though courteous in his answers; and as he did not
look for any indulgence in this way of speaking from others, so he was
not angered with others did not show it to him. It has often happened
that he has listened quietly when others have spoken sharply to him,
as on the following occasions. He had caused a ducat to be given for a
partridge, and was taken to task for doing so by a friend, to whom
Castruccio had said: "You would not have given more than a penny."
"That is true," answered the friend. Then said Castruccio to him: "A
ducat is much less to me." Having about him a flatterer on whom he had
spat to show that he scorned him, the flatterer said to him:
"Fisherman are willing to let the waters of the sea saturate them in
order that they make take a few little fishes, and I allow myself to
be wetted by spittle that I may catch a whale"; and this was not only
heard by Castruccio with patience but rewarded. When told by a priest
that it was wicked for him to live so sumptuously, Castruccio said:
"If that be a vice than you should not fare so splendidly at the
feasts of our saints." Passing through a street he saw a young man as
he came out of a house of ill fame blush at being seen by Castruccio,
and said to him: "Thou shouldst not be ashamed when thou comest out,
but when thou goest into such places." A friend gave him a very
curiously tied knot to undo and was told: "Fool, do you think that I
wish to untie a thing which gave so much trouble to fasten."
Castruccio said to one who professed to be a philosopher: "You are
like the dogs who always run after those who will give them the best
to eat," and was answered: "We are rather like the doctors who go to
the houses of those who have the greatest need of them." Going by
water from Pisa to Leghorn, Castruccio was much disturbed by a
dangerous storm that sprang up, and was reproached for cowardice by
one of those with him, who said that he did not fear anything.
Castruccio answered that he did not wonder at that, since every man
valued his soul for what is was worth. Being asked by one what he
ought to do to gain estimation, he said: "When thou goest to a banquet
take care that thou dost not seat one piece of wood upon another." To
a person who was boasting that he had read many things, Castruccio
said: "He knows better than to boast of remembering many things."
Someone bragged that he could drink much without becoming intoxicated.
Castruccio replied: "An ox does the same." Castruccio was acquainted
with a girl with whom he had intimate relations, and being blamed by a
friend who told him that it was undignified for him to be taken in by
a woman, he said: "She has not taken me in, I have taken her." Being
also blamed for eating very dainty foods, he answered: "Thou dost not
spend as much as I do?" and being told that it was true, he continued:
"Then thou art more avaricious than I am gluttonous." Being invited by
Taddeo Bernardi, a very rich and splendid citizen of Luca, to supper,
he went to the house and was shown by Taddeo into a chamber hung with
silk and paved with fine stones representing flowers and foliage of
the most beautiful colouring. Castruccio gathered some saliva in his
mouth and spat it out upon Taddeo, and seeing him much disturbed by
this, said to him: "I knew not where to spit in order to offend thee
less." Being asked how Caesar died he said: "God willing I will die as
he did." Being one night in the house of one of his gentlemen where
many ladies were assembled, he was reproved by one of his friends for
dancing and amusing himself with them more than was usual in one of
his station, so he said: "He who is considered wise by day will not be
considered a fool at night." A person came to demand a favour of
Castruccio, and thinking he was not listening to his plea threw
himself on his knees to the ground, and being sharply reproved by
Castruccio, said: "Thou art the reason of my acting thus for thou hast
thy ears in thy feet," whereupon he obtained double the favour he had
asked. Castruccio used to say that the way to hell was an easy one,
seeing that it was in a downward direction and you travelled
blindfolded. Being asked a favour by one who used many superfluous
words, he said to him: "When you have another request to make, send
someone else to make it." Having been wearied by a similar man with a
long oration who wound up by saying: "Perhaps I have fatigued you by
speaking so long," Castruccio said: "You have not, because I have not
listened to a word you said." He used to say of one who had been a
beautiful child and who afterwards became a fine man, that he was
dangerous, because he first took the husbands from the wives and now
he took the wives from their husbands. To an envious man who laughed,
he said: "Do you laugh because you are successful or because another
is unfortunate?" Whilst he was still in the charge of Messer Francesco
Guinigi, one of his companions said to him: "What shall I give you if
you will let me give you a blow on the nose?" Castruccio answered: "A
helmet." Having put to death a citizen of Lucca who had been
instrumental in raising him to power, and being told that he had done
wrong to kill one of his old friends, he answered that people deceived
themselves; he had only killed a new enemy. Castruccio praised greatly
those men who intended to take a wife and then did not do so, saying
that they were like men who said they would go to sea, and then
refused when the time came. He said that it always struck him with
surprise that whilst men in buying an earthen or glass vase would
sound it first to learn if it were good, yet in choosing a wife they
were content with only looking at her. He was once asked in what
manner he would wish to be buried when he died, and answered: "With
the face turned downwards, for I know when I am gone this country will
be turned upside down." On being asked if it had ever occurred to him
to become a friar in order to save his soul, he answered that it had
not, because it appeared strange to him that Fra Lazerone should go to
Paradise and Uguccione della Faggiuola to the Inferno. He was once
asked when should a man eat to preserve his health, and replied: "If
the man be rich let him eat when he is hungry; if he be poor, then
when he can." Seeing on of his gentlemen make a member of his family
lace him up, he said to him: "I pray God that you will let him feed
you also." Seeing that someone had written upon his house in Latin the
words: "May God preserve this house from the wicked," he said, "The
owner must never go in." Passing through one of the streets he saw a
small house with a very large door, and remarked: "That house will fly
through the door." He was having a discussion with the ambassador of
the King of Naples concerning the property of some banished nobles,
when a dispute arose between them, and the ambassador asked him if he
had no fear of the king. "Is this king of yours a bad man or a good
one?" asked Castruccio, and was told that he was a good one, whereupon
he said, "Why should you suggest that I should be afraid of a good
man?"

I could recount many other stories of his sayings both witty and
weighty, but I think that the above will be sufficient testimony to
his high qualities. He lived forty-four years, and was in every way a
prince. And as he was surrounded by many evidences of his good
fortune, so he also desired to have near him some memorials of his bad
fortune; therefore the manacles with which he was chained in prison
are to be seen to this day fixed up in the tower of his residence,
where they were placed by him to testify for ever to his days of
adversity. As in his life he was inferior neither to Philip of
Macedon, the father of Alexander, nor to Scipio of Rome, so he died in
the same year of his age as they did, and he would doubtless have
excelled both of them had Fortune decreed that he should be born, not
in Lucca, but in Macedonia or Rome.

DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY
THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING
VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR
PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI

BY

NICOLO MACHIAVELLI

The Duke Valentino had returned from Lombardy, where he had been to
clear himself with the King of France from the calumnies which had
been raised against him by the Florentines concerning the rebellion of
Arezzo and other towns in the Val di Chiana, and had arrived at Imola,
whence he intended with his army to enter upon the campaign against
Giovanni Bentivogli, the tyrant of Bologna: for he intended to bring
that city under his domination, and to make it the head of his
Romagnian duchy.

These matters coming to the knowledge of the Vitelli and Orsini and
their following, it appeared to them that the duke would become too
powerful, and it was feared that, having seized Bologna, he would seek
to destroy them in order that he might become supreme in Italy. Upon
this a meeting was called at Magione in the district of Perugia, to
which came the cardinal, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini,
Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni, the
tyrant of Perugia, and Messer Antonio da Venafro, sent by Pandolfo
Petrucci, the Prince of Siena. Here were discussed the power and
courage of the duke and the necessity of curbing his ambitions, which
might otherwise bring danger to the rest of being ruined. And they
decided not to abandon the Bentivogli, but to strive to win over the
Florentines; and they send their men to one place and another,
promising to one party assistance and to another encouragement to
unite with them against the common enemy. This meeting was at once
reported throughout all Italy, and those who were discontented under
the duke, among whom were the people of Urbino, took hope of effecting
a revolution.

Thus it arose that, men's minds being thus unsettled, it was decided
by certain men of Urbino to seize the fortress of San Leo, which was
held for the duke, and which they captured by the following means. The
castellan was fortifying the rock and causing timber to be taken
there; so the conspirators watched, and when certain beams which were
being carried to the rock were upon the bridge, so that it was
prevented from being drawn up by those inside, they took the
opportunity of leaping upon the bridge and thence into the fortress.
Upon this capture being effected, the whole state rebelled and
recalled the old duke, being encouraged in this, not so much by the
capture of the fort, as by the Diet at Magione, from whom they
expected to get assistance.

Those who heard of the rebellion at Urbino thought they would not lose
the opportunity, and at once assembled their men so as to take any
town, should any remain in the hands of the duke in that state; and
they sent again to Florence to beg that republic to join with them in
destroying the common firebrand, showing that the risk was lessened
and that they ought not to wait for another opportunity.

But the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry reasons, of the Vitelli
and Orsini, not only would not ally themselves, but sent Nicolo
Machiavelli, their secretary, to offer shelter and assistance to the
duke against his enemies. The duke was found full of fear at Imola,
because, against everybody's expectation, his soldiers had at once
gone over to the enemy and he found himself disarmed and war at his
door. But recovering courage from the offers of the Florentines, he
decided to temporize before fighting with the few soldiers that
remained to him, and to negotiate for a reconciliation, and also to
get assistance. This latter he obtained in two ways, by sending to the
King of France for men and by enlisting men-at-arms and others whom he
turned into cavalry of a sort: to all he gave money.

Notwithstanding this, his enemies drew near to him, and approached
Fossombrone, where they encountered some men of the duke and, with the
aid of the Orsini and Vitelli, routed them. When this happened, the
duke resolved at once to see if he could not close the trouble with
offers of reconciliation, and being a most perfect dissembler he did
not fail in any practices to make the insurgents understand that he
wished every man who had acquired anything to keep it, as it was
enough for him to have the title of prince, whilst others might have
the principality.

And the duke succeeded so well in this that they sent Signor Pagolo to
him to negotiate for a reconciliation, and they brought their army to
a standstill. But the duke did not stop his preparations, and took
every care to provide himself with cavalry and infantry, and that such
preparations might not be apparent to the others, he sent his troops
in separate parties to every part of the Romagna. In the meanwhile
there came also to him five hundred French lancers, and although he
found himself sufficiently strong to take vengeance on his enemies in
open war, he considered that it would be safer and more advantageous
to outwit them, and for this reason he did not stop the work of
reconciliation.

And that this might be effected the duke concluded a peace with them
in which he confirmed their former covenants; he gave them four
thousand ducats at once; he promised not to injure the Bentivogli; and
he formed an alliance with Giovanni; and moreover he would not force
them to come personally into his presence unless it pleased them to do
so. On the other hand, they promised to restore to him the duchy of
Urbino and other places seized by them, to serve him in all his
expeditions, and not to make war against or ally themselves with any
one without his permission.

This reconciliation being completed, Guido Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino,
again fled to Venice, having first destroyed all the fortresses in his
state; because, trusting in the people, he did not wish that the
fortresses, which he did not think he could defend, should be held by
the enemy, since by these means a check would be kept upon his
friends. But the Duke Valentino, having completed this convention, and
dispersed his men throughout the Romagna, set out for Imola at the end
of November together with his French men-at-arms: thence he went to
Cesena, where he stayed some time to negotiate with the envoys of the
Vitelli and Orsini, who had assembled with their men in the duchy of
Urbino, as to the enterprise in which they should now take part; but
nothing being concluded, Oliverotto da Fermo was sent to propose that
if the duke wished to undertake an expedition against Tuscany they
were ready; if he did not wish it, then they would besiege Sinigalia.
To this the duke replied that he did not wish to enter into war with
Tuscany, and thus become hostile to the Florentines, but that he was
very willing to proceed against Sinigalia.

It happened that not long afterwards the town surrendered, but the
fortress would not yield to them because the castellan would not give
it up to any one but the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him
to come there. This appeared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being
invited by them, and not going of his own will, he would awaken no
suspicions. And the more to reassure them, he allowed all the French
men-at-arms who were with him in Lombardy to depart, except the
hundred lancers under Mons. di Candales, his brother-in-law. He left
Cesena about the middle of December, and went to Fano, and with the
utmost cunning and cleverness he persuaded the Vitelli and Orsini to
wait for him at Sinigalia, pointing out to them that any lack of
compliance would cast a doubt upon the sincerity and permanency of the
reconciliation, and that he was a man who wished to make use of the
arms and councils of his friends. But Vitellozzo remained very
stubborn, for the death of his brother warned him that he should not
offend a prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, persuaded by
Pagolo Orsini, whom the duke had corrupted with gifts and promises, he
agreed to wait.

Upon this the duke, before his departure from Fano, which was to be on
30th December 1502, communicated his designs to eight of his most
trusted followers, among whom were Don Michele and the Monsignor
d'Euna, who was afterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon as
Vitellozzo, Pagolo Orsini, the Duke di Gravina, and Oliverotto should
arrive, his followers in pairs should take them one by one, entrusting
certain men to certain pairs, who should entertain them until they
reached Sinigalia; nor should they be permitted to leave until they
came to the duke's quarters, where they should be seized.

The duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen and infantry, of which
there were more than two thousand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to
assemble by daybreak at the Metauro, a river five miles distant from
Fano, and await him there. He found himself, therefore, on the last
day of December at the Metauro with his men, and having sent a
cavalcade of about two hundred horsemen before him, he then moved
forward the infantry, whom he accompanied with the rest of the men-at-
arms.

Fano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca situate on the shore of
the Adriatic Sea, fifteen miles distant from each other, so that he
who goes towards Sinigalia has the mountains on his right hand, the
bases of which are touched by the sea in some places. The city of
Sinigalia is distant from the foot of the mountains a little more than
a bow-shot and from the shore about a mile. On the side opposite to
the city runs a little river which bathes that part of the walls
looking towards Fano, facing the high road. Thus he who draws near to
Sinigalia comes for a good space by road along the mountains, and
reaches the river which passes by Sinigalia. If he turns to his left
hand along the bank of it, and goes for the distance of a bow-shot, he
arrives at a bridge which crosses the river; he is then almost abreast
of the gate that leads into Sinigalia, not by a straight line, but
transversely. Before this gate there stands a collection of houses
with a square to which the bank of the river forms one side.

The Vitelli and Orsini having received orders to wait for the duke,
and to honour him in person, sent away their men to several castles
distant from Sinigalia about six miles, so that room could be made for
the men of the duke; and they left in Sinigalia only Oliverotto and
his band, which consisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and
fifty horsemen, who were quartered in the suburb mentioned above.
Matters having been thus arranged, the Duke Valentino left for
Sinigalia, and when the leaders of the cavalry reached the bridge they
did not pass over, but having opened it, one portion wheeled towards
the river and the other towards the country, and a way was left in the
middle through which the infantry passed, without stopping, into the
town.

Vitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina on mules, accompanied by a
few horsemen, went towards the duke; Vitellozo, unarmed and wearing a
cape lined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of his
approaching death--a circumstance which, in view of the ability of the
man and his former fortune, caused some amazement. And it is said that
when he parted from his men before setting out for Sinigalia to meet
the duke he acted as if it were his last parting from them. He
recommended his house and its fortunes to his captains, and advised
his nephews that it was not the fortune of their house, but the
virtues of their fathers that should be kept in mind. These three,
therefore, came before the duke and saluted him respectfully, and were
received by him with goodwill; they were at once placed between those
who were commissioned to look after them.

But the duke noticing that Oliverotto, who had remained with his band
in Sinigalia, was missing--for Oliverotto was waiting in the square
before his quarters near the river, keeping his men in order and
drilling them--signalled with his eye to Don Michelle, to whom the
care of Oliverotto had been committed, that he should take measures
that Oliverotto should not escape. Therefore Don Michele rode off and
joined Oliverotto, telling him that it was not right to keep his men
out of their quarters, because these might be taken up by the men of
the duke; and he advised him to send them at once to their quarters
and to come himself to meet the duke. And Oliverotto, having taken
this advice, came before the duke, who, when he saw him, called to
him; and Oliverotto, having made his obeisance, joined the others.

So the whole party entered Sinigalia, dismounted at the duke's
quarters, and went with him into a secret chamber, where the duke made
them prisoners; he then mounted on horseback, and issued orders that
the men of Oliverotto and the Orsini should be stripped of their arms.
Those of Oliverotto, being at hand, were quickly settled, but those of
the Orsini and Vitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentiment
of the destruction of their masters, had time to prepare themselves,
and bearing in mind the valour and discipline of the Orsinian and
Vitellian houses, they stood together against the hostile forces of
the country and saved themselves.

But the duke's soldiers, not being content with having pillaged the
men of Oliverotto, began to sack Sinigalia, and if the duke had not
repressed this outrage by killing some of them they would have
completely sacked it. Night having come and the tumult being silenced,
the duke prepared to kill Vitellozzo and Oliverotto; he led them into
a room and caused them to be strangled. Neither of them used words in
keeping with their past lives: Vitellozzo prayed that he might ask of
the pope full pardon for his sins; Oliverotto cringed and laid the
blame for all injuries against the duke on Vitellozzo. Pagolo and the
Duke di Gravina Orsini were kept alive until the duke heard from Rome
that the pope had taken the Cardinal Orsino, the Archbishop of
Florence, and Messer Jacopo da Santa Croce. After which news, on 18th
January 1502, in the castle of Pieve, they also were strangled in the
same way.

Machiavelli and His Political Philosophy

The problem of the state had already been discussed by Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy, which had advanced a solution based on the premise that man, by reason of his rational nature, tends to the perfect society, the state. Consequently, the positive elements of the state, and in particular the element of morality, must be derived from the concept of the rational being and not from the fact of man's actual historical behavior.

The concept of morality, like all rational concepts, is something absolute, which cannot vary even though it has been disobeyed. Thus, even granted the hypothesis that all men tell lies, the rational concept of lying as a moral evil, remains constant. For Machiavelli this principle did not hold true, because of the immanentist principle that the state must be considered in itself without reference to any reality which might transcend it.

The problem which Machiavelli sets out to solve is how to enlarge and maintain the state, which must be ordered to the greater good of the citizens. To solve this problem, Machiavelli appeals to history, which reveals that states rise out of the conflict of violent passions, and that a leader succeeds in forming and maintaining a state only if with greater passion than his opponent he is able to triumph over him.

Machiavelli draws the conclusion that the prince or autocrat cannot appeal to Christian ascetical or renunciatory morality, but must use force and cunning, according to circumstances, to overcome his adversaries. Hence the principle of the new science in politics was: "The end justifies the means." The prince must justify his action in reference to the maintenance of the state; and he will be a good ruler if he achieves this end, regardless of what means he uses.

Nevertheless the prince (and the state) of Machiavelli have an ethics, surely not Christian ethics, but the Humanist Renaissance ethics of love of country. Machiavelli was an eyewitness to the miseries which afflicted the Italy of his day, divided and lacerated as it was by discord and the wars of various princes. To put an end to the role of these princes, whose ambitions laid all Italy open to strife, he dreamed of the rise of an ideal prince, the incarnation of Caesar Borgia, who, with the force of a lion and the cunning of a wolf, would succeed in subjugating all petty rulers and forming a single Italian state.

Seeing that the rulers of his day were egoistic and wicked, Machiavelli dreamed of raising up in his prince a greater egoism and more violent passions in order to overcome the power of the local tyrants and to establish a principality which must save Italy, the Italy which in his day was "without a head, without order, lacerated and beaten."

Along with the theories of Machiavelli must be considered the politico-religious thought of Girolamo Savonarola (1452-1498). Savonarola also starts with a consideration of the actual chaos of society and of the Church, and sees a possibility of a renovation through the intervention of a lay prince (for him, Charles VIII). For Savonarola the intervention of a lay prince must be only occasional, because he does not deny the Church lives and moves in virtue of the eternal promise of its founder, Jesus Christ. Thus he cannot be judged heretical.

Note must also be taken of the political thought of the Catholic priest Giovanni Botero (1540-1617). In his work Of the Nature of the State, comprising ten books, he counsels the prince to prudently hide his weaknesses, in order to preserve his regal reputation, and to fully respect the Catholic religion, which is a precious and indispensable means for rendering politically docile men who are profoundly inclined to evil, and to direct the militia and into war the instinctive ferocity of man.

ON THE ART OF WAR BY

NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

CITIZEN AND SECRETARY OF FLORENCE TO

LORENZO DI FILIPPO STROZZI,

A GENTLEMEN OF FLORENCE

Preface

Many, Lorenzo, have held and still hold the opinion, that there is nothing
which has less in common with another, and that is so dissimilar, as
civilian life is from the military. Whence it is often observed, if anyone
designs to avail himself of an enlistment in the army, that he soon changes,
not only his clothes, but also his customs, his habits, his voice, and in
the presence of any civilian custom, he goes to pieces; for I do not believe
that any man can dress in civilian clothes who wants to be quick and ready
for any violence; nor can that man have civilian customs and habits, who
judges those customs to be effeminate and those habits not conducive to his
actions; nor does it seem right to him to maintain his ordinary appearance
and voice who, with his beard and cursing, wants to make other men afraid:
which makes such an opinion in these times to be very true. But if they
should consider the ancient institutions, they would not find matter more
united, more in conformity, and which, of necessity, should be like to each
other as much as these (civilian and military); for in all the arts that are
established in a society for the sake of the common good of men, all those
institutions created to (make people) live in fear of the laws and of God
would be in vain, if their defense had not been provided for and which, if
well arranged, will maintain not only these, but also those that are not
well established. And so (on the contrary), good institutions without the
help of the military are not much differently disordered than the habitation
of a superb and regal palace, which, even though adorned with jewels and
gold, if it is not roofed over will not have anything to protect it from the
rain. And, if in any other institutions of a City and of a Republic every
diligence is employed in keeping men loyal, peaceful, and full of the fear
of God, it is doubled in the military; for in what man ought the country
look for greater loyalty than in that man who has to promise to die for her?
In whom ought there to be a greater love of peace, than in him who can only
be injured by war? In whom ought there to be a greater fear of God than in
him who, undergoing infinite dangers every day, has more need for His aid?
If these necessities in forming the life of the soldier are well considered,
they are found to be praised by those who gave the laws to the Commanders
and by those who were put in charge of military training, and followed and
imitated with all diligence by others.

But because military institutions have become completely corrupt and far
removed from the ancient ways, these sinister opinions have arisen which
make the military hated and intercourse with those who train them avoided.
And I, judging, by what I have seen and read, that it is not impossible to
restore its ancient ways and return some form of past virtue to it, have
decided not to let this leisure time of mine pass without doing something,
to write what I know of the art of war, to the satisfaction of those who are
lovers of the ancient deeds. And although it requires courage to treat of
those matters of which others have made a profession, none the less, I do
not believe that it is a mistake to occupy a position with words, which may,
with greater presumption, have been occupied with deeds; for the errors
which I should make in writing can be corrected without injury to anyone,
but those which are made with deeds cannot be found out except by the ruin
of the Commanders.

You, Lorenzo, will therefore consider the quality of these efforts of mine,
and will give in your judgement of them that censure or praise which will
appear to you to be merited. I send you these, as much as to show myself
grateful for all the benefits I have received from you, although I will not
include in them the (review) of this work of mine, as well as also, because
being accustomed to honor similar works of those who shine because of their
nobility, wealth, genius, and liberality, I know you do not have many equals
in wealth and nobility, few in ingenuity, and no one in liberality.

FIRST BOOK

As I believe that it is possible for one to praise, without concern, any man

after he is dead since every reason and supervision for adulation is

lacking, I am not apprehensive in praising our own Cosimo Ruccelai, whose

name is never remembered by me without tears, as I have recognized in him

those parts which can be desired in a good friend among friends and in a

citizen of his country. For I do not know what pertained to him more than to

spend himself willingly, not excepting that courage of his, for his friends,

and I do not know of any enterprise that dismayed him when he knew it was

for the good of his country. And I confess freely not to have met among so

many men whom I have known and worked with, a man in whom there was a mind

more fired with great and magnificent things. Nor does one grieve with the

friends of another of his death, except for his having been born to die

young unhonored within his own home, without having been able to benefit

anyone with that mind of his, for one would know that no one could speak of

him, except (to say) that a good friend had died. It does not remain for us,

however, or for anyone else who, like us, knew him, to be able because of

this to keep the faith (since deeds do not seem to) to his laudable

qualities. It is true however, that fortune was not so unfriendly to him

that it did not leave some brief memory of the dexterity of his genius, as

was demonstrated by some of his writings and compositions of amorous verses,

in which (as he was not in love) he (employed as an) exercise in order not

to use his time uselessly in his juvenile years, in order that fortune might

lead him to higher thoughts. Here, it can be clearly comprehended, that if

his objective was exercise, how very happily he described his ideas, and how

much he was honored in his poetry. Fortune, however, having deprived us of

the use of so great a friend, it appears to me it is not possible to find

any other better remedy than for us to seek to benefit from his memory, and

recover from it any matter that was either keenly observed or wisely

discussed. And as there is nothing of his more recent than the discussions

which the Lord Fabrizio Colonna had with him in his gardens, where matters

pertaining to war were discussed at length by that Lord, with (questions)

keenly and prudently asked by Cosimo, it seemed proper to me having been

present with other friends of ours, to recall him to memory, so that reading

it, the friends of Cosimo who met there will renew in their minds the memory

of his virtue, and another part grieving for not having been there, will

learn in part of many things discussed wisely by a most sagacious man useful

not only to the military way of life, but to the civilian as well. I will

relate, therefore, how Fabrizio Colonna, when he returned from Lombardy

where he had fought a long time gloriously for the Catholic King, decided to

pass through Florence to rest several days in that City in order to visit

His Excellency the Duke, and see again several gentlemen with whom he had

been familiar in the past. Whence it appeared proper to Cosimo to invite him

to a banquet in his gardens, not so much to show his generosity as to have

reason to talk to him at length, and to learn and understand several things

from him, according as one can hope to from such a man, for it appeared to

him to give him an opportunity to spend a day discussing such matters as

would satisfy his mind.

Fabrizio, therefore, came as planned, and was received by Cosimo

together with several other loyal friends of his, among whom were

Zanobi Buondelmonti, Battista Della Palla, and Luigi Alamanni, young

men most ardent in the same studies and loved by him, whose good

qualities, because they were also praised daily by himself, we will omit.

Fabrizio, therefore, was honored according to the times and the place,

with all the highest honors they could give him. As soon as the convivial

pleasures were past and the table cleared and every arrangement of

feasting finished, which, in the presence of great men and those who

have their minds turned to honorable thoughts is soon accomplished,

and because the day was long and the heat intense, Cosimo, in order

to satisfy their desire better, judged it would be well to take the

opportunity to escape the heat by leading them to the more secret and

shadowy part of his garden: when they arrived there and chairs brought

out, some sat on the grass which was most fresh in the place, some sat

on chairs placed in those parts under the shadow of very high trees;

Fabrizio praised the place as most delightful, and looking especially at

the trees, he did not recognize one of them, and looked puzzled.

Cosimo, becoming aware of this said: Perhaps you have no knowledge

of some of these trees, but do not wonder about them, because here

are some which were more widely known by the ancients than are

those commonly seen today. And giving him the name of some and

telling him that Bernardo, his grandfather, had worked hard in their

culture, Fabrizio replied: I was thinking that it was what you said I was,

and this place and this study make me remember several Princes of the

Kingdom, who delighted in their ancient culture and the shadow they

cast. And stopping speaking of this, and somewhat upon himself as

though in suspense, he added: If I did not think I would offend you, I

would give you my opinion: but I do not believe in talking and

discussing things with friends in this manner that I insult them. How

much better would they have done (it is said with peace to everyone)

to seek to imitate the ancients in the strong and rugged things, not in the

soft and delicate, and in the things they did under the sun, not in the

shadows, to adopt the honest and perfect ways of antiquity, not the

false and corrupt; for while these practices were pleasing to my

Romans, my country (without them) was ruined. To which Cosimo

replied (but to avoid the necessity of having to repeat so many times

who is speaking, and what the other adds, only the names of those

speaking will be noted, without repeating the others). Cosimo,

therefore, said: You have opened the way for a discussion which I

desired, and I pray you to speak without regard, for I will question you

without regard; and if, in questioning or in replying, I accuse or excuse

anyone, it will not be for accusing or excusing, but to understand the

truth from you.

FABRIZIO: And I will be much content to tell you what I know of all

that you ask me; whether it be true or not, I will leave to your

judgement. And I will be grateful if you ask me, for I am about to learn

as much from what you ask me, as you will from me replying to you,

because many times a wise questioner causes one to consider many

things and understand many others which, without having been asked,

would never have been understood.

COSIMO: I want to return to what you first were saying, that my

grandfather and those of yours had more wisely imitated the ancients in

rugged things than in delicate ones, and I want to excuse my side

because I will let you excuse the other (your side). I do not believe that

in your time there was a man who disliked living as softly as he, and

that he was so much a lover of that rugged life which you praise: none

the less he recognized he could not practice it in his personal life, nor in

that of his sons, having been born in so corrupted an age, where

anyone who wanted to depart from the common usage would be

deformed and despised by everyone. For if anyone in a naked state

should thrash upon the sand under the highest sun, or upon the snow in

the most icy months of winter, as did Diogenes, he would be

considered mad. If anyone (like the Spartan) should raise his children

on a farm, make them sleep in the open, go with head and feet bare,

bathe in cold water in order to harden them to endure vicissitudes, so

that they then might love life less and fear death less, he would be

praised by few and followed by none. So that dismayed at these ways

of living, he presently leaves the ways of the ancients, and in imitating

antiquity, does only that which he can with little wonderment.

FABRIZIO: You have excused him strongly in this part, and certainly

you speak the truth: but I did not speak so much of these rugged ways

of living, as of those other more human ways which have a greater

conformity to the ways of living today, which I do not believe should

have been difficult to introduce by one who is numbered among the

Princes of a City. I will never forego my examples of my Romans. If

their way of living should be examined, and the institutions in their

Republic, there will be observed in her many things not impossible to

introduce in a Society where there yet might be something of good.

COSIMO: What are those things similar to the ancients that you would

introduce?

FABRIZIO: To honor and reward virtu, not to have contempt for

poverty, to esteem the modes and orders of military discipline, to

constrain citizens to love one another, to live without factions, to

esteem less the private than the public good, and other such things

which could easily be added in these times. It is not difficult to

persuade (people) to these ways, when one considers these at length

and approaches them in the usual manner, for the truth will appear in

such (examinations) that every common talent is capable of undertaking

them. Anyone can arrange these things; (for example), one plants trees

under the shadow of which he lives more happily and merrily than if he

had not (planted them).

COSIMO: I do not want to reply to anything of what you have

spoken, but I do want leave to give a judgment on these, which can be

easily judged, and I shall address myself to you who accuse those who

in serious and important actions are not imitators of the ancients,

thinking that in this way I can more easily carry out my intentions. I

should want, therefore, to know from you whence it arises that, on the

one hand you condemn those who do not imitate the ancients in their

actions, on the other hand, in matters of war which is your profession

and in which you are judged to be excellent, it is not observed that you

have employed any of the ancient methods, or those which have some

similarity.

FABRIZIO: You have come to the point where I expected you to, for

what I said did not merit any other question, nor did I wish for any

other. And although I am able to save myself with a simple excuse,

none the less I want, for your greater satisfaction and mine, since the

season (weather) allows it, to enter into a much longer discussion. Men

who want to do something, ought first to prepare themselves with all

industry, in order ((when the opportunity is seen)) to be prepared to

achieve that which they have proposed. And whenever the

preparations are undertaken cautiously, unknown to anyone, no none

can be accused of negligence unless he is first discovered by the

occasion; in which if it is not then successful, it is seen that either he has

not sufficiently prepared himself, or that he has not in some part given

thought to it. And as the opportunity has not come to me to be able to

show the preparations I would make to bring the military to your

ancient organization, and it I have not done so, I cannot be blamed

either by you or by others. I believe this excuse is enough to respond

to your accusation.

COSIMO: It would be enough if I was certain that the opportunity did

not present itself.

FABRIZIO: But because I know you could doubt whether this

opportunity had come about or not, I want to discuss at length ((if you

will listen to me with patience)) which preparations are necessary to be

made first, what occasion needs to arise, what difficulty impedes the

preparations from becoming beneficial and the occasion from arriving,

and that this is ((which appears a paradox)) most difficult and most

easy to do.

COSIMO: You cannot do anything more pleasing for me and for the

others than this. But if it is not painful for you to speak, it will never be

painful for us to listen. But at this discussion may be long, I want help

from these, my friends, and with your permission, and they and I pray

you one thing, that you do not become annoyed if we sometimes

interrupt you with some opportune question.

FABRIZIO: I am most content that you, Cosimo, with these other

young people here, should question me, for I believe that young men

will become more familiar with military matters, and will more easily

understand what I have to say. The others, whose hair (head) is white

and whose blood is icy, in part are enemies of war and in part

incorrigible, as those who believe that the times and not the evil ways

constrain men to live in such a fashion. So ask anything of me, with

assurance and without regard; I desire this, as much because it will

afford me a little rest, as because it will give me pleasure not to leave

any doubts in your minds. I want to begin from your words, where you

said to me that in war ((which is my profession)) I have not employed

any of the ancient methods. Upon this I say, that this being a profession

by which men of every time were not able to live honestly, it cannot be

employed as a profession except by a Republic or a Kingdom; and

both of these, if well established, will never allow any of their citizens or

subjects to employ it as a profession: for he who practices it will never

be judged to be good, as to gain some usefulness from it at any time he

must be rapacious, deceitful, violent, and have many qualities, which of

necessity, do not make him good: nor can men who employ this as a

profession, the great as well as the least, be made otherwise, for this

profession does not provide for them in peace. Whence they are

obliged, either to hope that there will be no peace or to gain so much

for themselves in times of war, that they can provide for themselves in

times of peace. And wherever one of these two thoughts exists, it does

not occur in a good man; for, from the desire to provide for oneself in

every circumstance, robberies, violence and assassinations result,

which such soldiers do to friends as well as to enemies: and from not

desiring peace, there arises those deceptions which Captains

perpetrate upon those whom they lead, because war hardens them:

and even if peace occurs frequently, it happens that the leaders, being

deprived of their stipends and of their licentious mode of living, raise a

flag of piracy, and without any mercy sack a province.

Do you not have within the memory of events of your time, many

soldiers in Italy, finding themselves without employment because of the

termination of wars, gathered themselves into very troublesome gangs,

calling themselves companies, and went about levying tribute on the

towns and sacking the country, without there being any remedy able to

be applied? Have you not read how the Carthaginian soldiers, when

the first war they engaged in with the Romans under Matus and

Spendius was ended, tumultuously chose two leaders, and waged a

more dangerous war against the Carthaginians than that which they had

just concluded with the Romans? And in the time of our fathers,

Francesco Sforza, in order to be able to live honorably (comfortably)

in times of peace, not only deceived the Milanese, in whose pay he

was, but took away their liberty and became their Prince. All the other

soldiers of Italy, who have employed the military as their particular

profession, have been like this man; and if, through their malignity, they

have not become Dukes of Milan, so much more do they merit to be

censured; for without such a return ((if their lives were to be

examined)), they all have the same cares. Sforza, father of Francesco,

constrained Queen Giovanna to throw herself into the arms of the King

of Aragon, having abandoned her suddenly, and left her disarmed amid

her enemies, only in order to satisfy his ambition of either levying tribute

or taking the Kingdom. Braccio, with the same industry, sought to

occupy the Kingdom of Naples, and would have succeeded, had he

not been routed and killed at Aquilla. Such evils do not result from

anything else other than the existence of men who employ the practice

of soldiering as their own profession. Do you not have a proverb which

strengthens my argument, which says: War makes robbers, and peace

hangs them? For those who do not know how to live by another

practice, and not finding any one who will support them in that, and not

having so much virtu that they know how to come and live together

honorably, are forced by necessity to roam the streets, and justice is

forced to extinguish them.

COSIMO: You have made me turn this profession (art) of soldiering

back almost to nothing, and I had supposed it to be the most excellent

and most honorable of any: so that if you do not clarify this better, I will

not be satisfied; for if it is as you say, I do not know whence arises the

glory of Caesar, Pompey, Scipio, Marcellus, and of so many Roman

Captains who are celebrated for their fame as the Gods.

FABRIZIO: I have not yet finished discussing all that I proposed,

which included two things: the one, that a good man was not able to

undertake this practice because of his profession: the other, that a well

established Republic or Kingdom would never permit its subjects or

citizens to employ it for their profession. Concerning the first, I have

spoken as much as has occurred to me: it remains for me to talk of the

second, where I shall reply to this last question of yours, and I say that

Pompey and Caesar, and almost all those Captains who were in Rome

after the last Carthaginian war, acquired fame as valiant men, not as

good men: but those who had lived before them acquired glory as

valiant and good men: which results from the fact that these latter did

not take up the practice of war as their profession; and those whom I

named first as those who employed it as their profession. And while the

Republic lived immaculately, no great citizen ever presumed by means

of such a practice to enrich himself during (periods of) peace by

breaking laws, despoiling the provinces, usurping and tyrannizing the

country, and imposing himself in every way; nor did anyone of the

lowest fortune think of violating the sacred agreement, adhere himself

to any private individual, not fearing the Senate, or to perform any

disgraceful act of tyranny in order to live at all times by the profession

of war. But those who were Captains, being content with the triumph,

returned with a desire for the private life; and those who were

members (of the army) returned with a desire to lay down the arms

they had taken up; and everyone returned to the art (trade or

profession) by which they ordinarily lived; nor was there ever anyone

who hoped to provide for himself by plunder and by means of these

arts. A clear and evident example of this as it applies to great citizens

can be found in the Regent Attilio, who, when he was captain of the

Roman armies in Africa, and having almost defeated the Carthaginians,

asked the Senate for permission to return to his house to look after his

farms which were being spoiled by his laborers. Whence it is clearer

than the sun, that if that man had practiced war as his profession, and

by means of it thought to obtain some advantage for himself, having so

many provinces which (he could) plunder, he would not have asked

permission to return to take care of his fields, as each day he could

have obtained more than the value of all his possessions. But as these

good men, who do not practice war as their profession, do not expect

to gain anything from it except hard work, danger, and glory, as soon

as they are sufficiently glorious, desire to return to their homes and live

from the practice of their own profession. As to men of lower status

and gregarious soldiers, it is also true that every one voluntarily

withdrew from such a practice, for when he was not fighting would

have desired to fight, but when he was fighting wanted to be dismissed.

Which illustrates the many ways, and especially in seeing that it was

among the first privileges, that the Roman people gave to one of its

Citizens, that he should not be constrained unwillingly to fight. Rome,

therefore, while she was well organized ((which it was up to the time of

the Gracchi)) did not have one soldier who had to take up this practice

as a profession, and therefore had few bad ones, and these were

severely punished. A well ordered City, therefore, ought to desire that

this training for war ought to be employed in times of peace as an

exercise, and in times of war as a necessity and for glory, and allow the

public only to use it as a profession, as Rome did. And any citizen who

has other aims in (using) such exercises is not good, and any City

which governs itself otherwise, is not well ordered.

COSIMO: I am very much content and satisfied with what you have

said up to now, and this conclusion which you have made pleases me

greatly: and I believe it will be true when expected from a Republic, but

as to Kings, I do not yet know why I should believe that a King would

not want particularly to have around him those who take up such a

practice as their profession.

FABRIZIO: A well ordered Kingdom ought so much the more avoid

such artifices, for these only are the things which corrupt the King and

all the Ministers in a Tyranny. And do not, on the other side, tell me of

some present Kingdom, for I will not admit them to be all well ordered

Kingdoms; for Kingdoms that are well ordered do not give absolute

(power to) Rule to their Kings, except in the armies, for only there is a

quick decision necessary, and, therefore, he who (rules) there must

have this unique power: in other matters, he cannot do anything without

counsel, and those who counsel him have to fear those whom he may

have near him who, in times of peace, desire war because they are

unable to live without it. But I want to dwell a little longer on this

subject, and look for a Kingdom totally good, but similar to those that

exist today, where those who take up the profession of war for

themselves still ought to be feared by the King, for the sinews of armies

without any doubt are the infantry. So that if a King does not organize

himself in such a way that his infantry in time of peace are content to

return to their homes and live from the practice of their own

professions, it must happen of necessity that he will be ruined; for there

is not to be found a more dangerous infantry than that which is

composed of those who make the waging of war their profession; for

you are forced to make war always, or pay them always, or to risk the

danger that they take away the Kingdom from you. To make war

always is not possible: (and) one cannot pay always; and, hence, that

danger is run of losing the State. My Romans ((as I have said)), as long

as they were wise and good, never permitted that their citizens should

take up this practice as their profession, notwithstanding that they were

able to raise them at all times, for they made war at all times: but in

order to avoid the harm which this continuous practice of theirs could

do to them, since the times did not change, they changed the men, and

kept turning men over in their legions so that every fifteen years they

always completely re-manned them: and thus they desired men in the

flower of their age, which is from eighteen to thirty five years, during

which time their legs, their hands, and their eyes, worked together, nor

did they expect that their strength should decrease in them, or that

malice should grow in them, as they did in corrupt times.

Ottavianus first, and then Tiberius, thinking more of their own power

than the public usefulness, in order to rule over the Roman people

more easily, begun to disarm them and to keep the same armies

continually at the frontiers of the Empire. And because they did not

think it sufficient to hold the Roman People and the Senate in check,

they instituted an army called the Praetorian (Guard), which was kept

near the walls of Rome in a fort adjacent to that City. And as they now

begun freely to permit men assigned to the army to practice military

matters as their profession, there soon resulted that these men became

insolent, and they became formidable to the Senate and damaging to

the Emperor. Whence there resulted that many men were killed

because of their insolence, for they gave the Empire and took it away

from anyone they wished, and it often occurred that at one time there

were many Emperors created by the several armies. From which state

of affairs proceeded first the division of the Empire and finally its ruin.

Kings ought, therefore, if they want to live securely, have their infantry

composed of men, who, when it is necessary for him to wage war, will

willingly go forth to it for love of him, and afterwards when peace

comes, more willingly return to their homes; which will always happen

if he selects men who know how to live by a profession other than this.

And thus he ought to desire, with the coming of peace, that his Princes

return to governing their people, gentlemen to the cultivation of their

possessions, and the infantry to their particular arts (trades or

professions); and everyone of these will willingly make war in order to

have peace, and will not seek to disturb the peace to have war.

COSIMO: Truly, this reasoning of yours appears to me well

considered: none the less, as it is almost contrary to what I have

thought up to now, my mind is not yet purged of every doubt. For I see

many Lords and Gentlemen who provide for themselves in times of

peace through the training for war, as do your equals who obtain

provisions from Princes and the Community. I also see almost all the

men at arms remaining in the garrisons of the city and of the fortresses.

So that it appears to me that there is a long time of peace for everyone.

FABRIZIO: I do not believe that you believe this, that everyone has a

place in time of peace; for other reasons can be cited for their being

stationed there, and the small number of people who remain in the

places mentioned by you will answer your question. What is the

proportion of infantry needed to be employed in time of war to that in

peace? for while the fortresses and the city are garrisoned in times of

peace, they are much more garrisoned in times of war; to this should

be added the soldiers kept in the field who are a great number, but all

of whom are released in time of peace. And concerning the garrisons

of States, who are a small number, Pope Julius and you have shown

how much they are to be feared who do not know any other

profession than war, as you have taken them out of your garrisons

because of their insolence, and placed the Swiss there, who are born

and raised under the laws and are chosen by the community in an

honest election; so do not say further that in peace there is a place for

every man. As to the men at arms continued in their enlistment in peace

time, the answer appears more difficult. None the less, whoever

considers everything well, will easily find the answer, for this thing of

keeping on the men at arms is a corrupt thing and not good. The

reason is this; as there are men who do not have any art (trade or

profession), a thousand evils will arise every day in those States where

they exist, and especially so if they were to be joined by a great

number of companions: but as they are few, and unable by themselves

to constitute an army, they therefore, cannot do any serious damage.

None the less, they have done so many times, as I said of Francesco

and of Sforza, his father, and of Braccio of Perugia. So I do not

approve of this custom of keeping men at arms, both because it is

corrupt and because it can cause great evils.

COSIMO: Would you do without them?, or if you keep them, how

would you do so?

FABRIZIO: By means of an ordinance, not like those of the King of

France, because they are as dangerous and insolent as ours, but like

those of the ancients, who created horsemen (cavalry) from their

subjects, and in times of peace sent them back to their homes to live

from the practice of their own profession, as I shall discuss at length

before I finish this discussion. So, if this part of the army can now live

by such a practice even when there is peace, it stems from a corrupt

order. As to the provisions that are reserved for me and the other

leaders, I say to you that this likewise is a most corrupt order, for a

wise Republic ought not to give them to anyone, rather it ought to

employ its citizens as leaders in war, and in time of peace desire that

they return to their professions. Thus also, a wise King ought not to

give (provisions) to them, or if he does give them, the reasons ought to

be either as a reward for some excellent act, or in order to avail himself

of such a man in peace as well as in war. And because you have

mentioned me, I want the example to include me, and I say I have

never practiced war as a profession, for my profession is to govern my

subjects, and defend them, and in order to defend them, I must love

peace but know how to make war; and my King does not reward and

esteem me so much for what I know of war, as because I know also

how to counsel him in peace. Any King ought not, therefore, to want to

have next to him anyone who is not thusly constituted, if he is wise and

wants to govern prudently; for if he has around him either too many

lovers of peace or too many lovers of war, they will cause him to err. I

cannot, in this first discussion of mine and according to my suggestion,

say otherwise, and if this is not enough for you, you must seek one

which satisfies you better. You can begin to recognize how much

difficulty there is in bringing the ancient methods into modem wars, and

what preparations a wise man must make, and what opportunities he

can hope for to put them into execution. But little by little you will know

these things better if the discussion on bringing any part of the ancient

institutions to the present order of things does not weary you.

COSIMO: If we first desired to hear your discussion of these matters,

truly what you have said up to now redoubles that desire. We thank

you, therefore, for what we have had and ask you for the rest.

FABRIZIO: Since this is your pleasure, I want to begin to treat of this

matter from the beginning being able in that way to demonstrate it more

fully, so that it may be better understood. The aim of those who want

to make war is to be able to combat in the field with every (kind) of

enemy, and to be able to win the engagement. To want to do this, they

must raise an army. In raising an army, it is necessary to find men, arm

them, organize them, train them in small and large (battle) orders, lodge

them, and expose them to the enemy afterwards, either at a standstill or

while marching. All the industry of war in the field is placed in these

things, which are the more necessary and honored (in the waging of

war). And if one does well in offering battle to the enemy, all the other

errors he may make in the conduct of the war are supportable: but if he

lacks this organization, even though he be valiant in other particulars, he

will never carry on a war to victory (and honor). For, as one

engagement that you win cancels out every other bad action of yours,

so likewise, when you lose one, all the things you have done well

before become useless. Since it is necessary, therefore, first to find

men, you must come to the Deletto (Draft) of them, as thus the

ancients called it, and which we call Scelta (Selection): but in order to

call it by a more honored name, I want us to preserve the name of

Deletto. Those who have drawn up regulations for war want men to

be chosen from temperate countries as they have spirit and are

prudent; for warm countries give rise to men who are prudent but not

spirited, and cold (countries) to men who are spirited but not prudent.

This regulation is drawn up well for one who is the Prince of all the

world, and is therefore permitted to draw men from those places that

appear best to him: but wanting to draw up a regulation that anyone

can use, one must say that every Republic and every Kingdom ought to

take soldiers from their own country, whether it is hot, cold, or

temperate. For, from ancient examples, it is seen that in every country,

good soldiers are made by training; because where nature is lacking,

industry supplies it, which, in this case, is worth more than nature: And

selecting them from another place cannot be called Deletto, because

Deletto means to say to take the best of a province, and to have the

power to select as well those who do not want to fight as those who

do want to. This Deletto therefore, cannot be made unless the places

are subject to you; for you cannot take whoever you want in the

countries that are not yours, but you need to take those who want to

come.

COSIMO: And of those who want to come, it can even be said, that

they turn and leave you, and because of this, it can then be called a

Deletto.

FABRIZIO: In a certain way, you say what is true: but consider the

defects that such as Deletto has in itself, for often it happens that it is

not a Deletto. The first thing (to consider), is that those who are not

your subjects and do not willingly want to fight, are not of the best,

rather they are of the worst of a province; for if nay are troublesome,

idle, without restraint, without religion, subject to the rule of the father,

blasphemous, gamblers, and in every way badly brought up, they are

those who want to fight, (and) these habits cannot be more contrary to

a true and good military life. When there are so many of such men

offered to you that they exceed the number you had designated, you

can select them; but if the material is bad, it is impossible for the

Deletto to be good: but many times it happens that they are not so

many as (are needed) to fill the number you require: so that being

forced to take them all, it results that it can no longer be called the

making of a Deletto, but in enlisting of infantry. The armies of Italy and

other places are raised today with these evils, except in Germany,

where no one is enlisted by command of the Prince, but according to

the wishes of those who want to fight. Think, therefore, what methods

of those ancients can now be introduced in an army of men put

together by similar means.

COSIMO: What means should be taken therefore?

FABRIZIO: What I have just said: select them from your own

subjects, and with the authority of the Prince.

COSIMO: Would you introduce any ancient form in those thus

selected?

FABRIZIO: You know well it would be so; if it is a Principality, he

who should command should be their Prince or an ordinary Lord; or if

it is a Republic, a citizen who for the time should be Captain: otherwise

it is difficult to do the thing well.

COSIMO: Why?

FABRIZIO: I will tell you in time: for now, I want this to suffice for

you, that it cannot be done well in any other way.

COSIMO: If you have, therefore, to make ibis Deletto in your

country, whence do you judge it better to draw them, from the City or

the Countryside?

FABRIZIO: Those who have written of this all agree that it is better to

select them from the Countryside, as they are men accustomed to

discomfort, brought up on hard work, accustomed to be in the sun and

avoid the shade, know how to handle the sword, dig a ditch, carry a

load, and are without cunning or malice. But on this subject, my

opinion would be, that as soldiers are of two kinds, afoot and on

horseback, that those afoot be selected from the Countryside, and

those on horseback from the City.

COSIMO: Of what age would you draw them?

FABRIZIO: If I had to raise an (entirely) new army, I would draw

them from seventeen to forty years of age; if the army already exists

and I had to replenish it, at seventeen years of age always.

COSIMO: I do not understand this distinction well.

FABRIZIO: I will tell you: if I should have to organize an army where

there is none, it would be necessary to select all those men who were

more capable, as long as they were of military age, in order to instruct

them as I would tell them: but if I should have to make the Deletto in

places where the army was (already) organized, in order to supplement

it, I would take those of seventeen years of age, because the others

having been taken for some time would have been selected and

instructed.

COSIMO: Therefore you would want to make an ordinance similar to

that which exists in our countries.

FABRIZIO: You say well: it is true that I would arm them, captain

them, train them, and organize them, in a way which I do not know

whether or not you have organized them similarly.

COSIMO: Therefore you praise the ordinance?

FABRIZIO: Why would you want me to condemn it?

COSIMO: Because many wise men have censured it.

FABRIZIO: You say something contrary, when you say a wise man

censured the ordinance: for he can be held a wise man and to have

censured them wrongly.

COSIMO: The wrong conclusion that he has made will always cause

us to have such a opinion.

FABRIZIO: Watch out that the defect is not yours, but his: as that

which you recognized before this discussion furnishes proof.

COSIMO: You do a most gracious thing. But I want to tell you that

you should be able to justify yourself better in that of which those men

are accused. These men say thusly: either that it is useless and our

trusting in it will cause us to lose the State: or it is of virtue, and he who

governs through it can easily deprive her of it. They cite the Romans,

who by their own arms lost their liberty: They cite the Venetians and

the King of France, of whom they say that the former, in order not to

obey one of its Citizens employed the arms of others, and the King

disarmed his People so as to be able to command them more easily.

But they fear the uselessness of this much more; for which uselessness

they cite two principal reasons: the one, because they are inexpert; the

other, for having to fight by force: because they say that they never

learn anything from great men, and nothing good is ever done by force.

FABRIZIO: All the reasons that you mention are from men who are

not far sighted, as I shall clearly show. And first, as to the uselessness,

I say to you that no army is of more use than your own, nor can an

army of your own be organized except in this way. And as there is no

debating over this, which all the examples of ancient history does for

us, I do not want to lose time over it. And because they cite

inexperience and force, I say ((as it is true)) that inept experience gives

rise to little spirit (enthusiasm) and force makes for discontent: but

experience and enthusiasm gains for themselves the means for arming,

training, and organizing them, as you will see in the first part of this

discussion. But as to force, you must understand that as men are

brought to the army by commandment of the Prince, they have to

come, whether it is entirely by force or entirely voluntarily: for if it were

entirely from desire, there would not be a Deletto as only a few of

them would go; so also, the (going) entirely by force would produce

bad results; therefore, a middle way ought to be taken where neither

the entirely forced or entirely voluntarily (means are used), but they

should come, drawn by the regard they have for the Prince, where they

are more afraid of of his anger then the immediate punishment: and it

will always happen that there will be a compulsion mixed with

willingness, from which that discontent cannot arise which causes bad

effects. Yet I do not claim that an army thus constituted cannot be

defeated; for many times the Roman armies were overcome, and the

army of Hannibal was defeated: so that it can be seen that no army can

be so organized that a promise can be given that it cannot be routed.

These wise men of yours, therefore, ought not measure this uselessness

from having lost one time, but to believe that just as they can lose, so

too they can win and remedy the cause of the defeat. And if they

should look into this, they will find that it would not have happened

because of a defect in the means, but of the organization which was not

sufficiently perfect. And, as I have said, they ought to provide for you,

not by censuring the organization, but by correcting it: as to how this

ought to be done, you will come to know little by little.

As to being apprehensive that such organization will not deprive you of

the State by one who makes himself a leader, I reply, that the arms

carried by his citizens or subjects, given to them by laws and

ordinances, never do him harm, but rather are always of some

usefulness, and preserve the City uncorrupted for a longer time by

means of these (arms), than without (them). Rome remained free four

hundred years while armed: Sparta eight hundred: Many other Cities

have been dis-armed, and have been free less than forty years; for

Cities have need of arms, and if they do not have arms of their own,

they hire them from foreigners, and the arms of foreigners more readily

do harm to the public good than their own; for they are easier to

corrupt, and a citizen who becomes powerful can more readily avail

himself, and can also manage the people more readily as he has to

oppress men who are disarmed. In addition to this, a City ought to fear

two enemies more than one. One which avails itself of foreigners

immediately has to fear not only its citizens, but the foreigners that it

enlists; and, remembering what I told you a short while ago of

Francesco Sforza, (you will see that) that fear ought to exist. One

which employs its own arms, has not other fear except of its own

Citizens. But of all the reasons which can be given, I want this one to

serve me, that no one ever established any Republic or Kingdom who

did not think that it should be defended by those who lived there with

arms: and if the Venetians had been as wise in this as in their other

institutions, they would have created a new world Kingdom; but who

so much more merit censure, because they had been the first who were

armed by their founders. And not having dominion on land, they armed

themselves on the sea, where they waged war with virtu, and with arms

in hand enlarged their country. But when the time came when they had

to wage war on land to defend Venice and where they ought to have

sent their own citizens to fight (on land), they enlisted as their captain (a

foreigner), the Marquis of Mantua. This was the sinister course which

prevented them from rising to the skies and expanding. And they did

this in the belief that, as they knew how to wage war at sea, they

should not trust themselves in waging it on land; which was an unwise

belief (distrust), because a Sea captain, who is accustomed to combat

with winds, water, and men, could more easily become a Captain on

land where the combat is with men only, than a land Captain become a

sea one. And my Romans, knowing how to combat on land and not on

the sea, when the war broke out with the Carthaginians who were

powerful on the sea, did not enlist Greeks or Spaniards experienced at

sea, but imposed that change on those citizens they sent (to fight) on

land, and they won. If they did this in order that one of their citizens

should not become Tyrant, it was a fear that was given little

consideration; for, in addition to the other reasons mentioned a short

while ago concerning such a proposal, if a citizen (skilled) in (the use

of) arms at sea had never been made a Tyrant in a City situated in the

sea, so much less would he be able to do this if he were (skilled) in (the

use of arms) on land. And, because of this, they ought to have seen

that arms in the hands of their own citizens could not create Tyrants,

but the evil institutions of a Government are those which cause a City

to be tyrannized; and, as they had a good Government, did not have to

fear arms of their own citizens. They took an imprudent course,

therefore, which was the cause of their being deprived of much glory

and happiness. As to the error which the King of France makes in not

having his people disciplined to war, from what has been cited from

examples previously mentioned, there is no one ((devoid of some

particular passion of theirs)) who does not judge this defect to be in the

Republic, and that this negligence alone is what makes it weak. But I

have made too great a digression and have gotten away from my

subject: yet I have done this to answer you and to show you, that no

reliance can be had on arms other than ones own, and ones own arms

cannot be established otherwise than by way of an ordinance, nor can

forms of armies be introduced in any place, nor military discipline

instituted. If you have read the arrangements which the first Kings

made in Rome, and most especially of Servius Tullus, you will find that

the institution of classes is none other than an arrangement to be able

quickly to put together an army for the defense of that City. But turning

to our Deletto, I say again, that having to replenish an established (old)

organization, I would take the seventeen year olds, but having to create

a new one, I would take them of every age between seventeen and

forty in order to avail myself of them quickly.

COSIMO: Would you make a difference of what profession (art) you

would choose them from?

FABRIZIO: These writers do so, for they do not want that bird

hunters, fishermen, cooks, procurers, and anyone who makes

amusement his calling should be taken, but they want that, in addition

to tillers of the soil, smiths and blacksmiths, carpenters, butchers,

hunters, and such like, should be taken. But I would make little

difference in conjecturing from his calling how good the man may be,

but how much I can use him with the greatest usefulness. And for this

reason, the peasants, who are accustomed to working the land, are

more useful than anyone else, for of all the professions (arts), this one is

used more than any other in the army: After this, are the forgers

(smiths), carpenters, blacksmiths, shoemakers; of whom it is useful to

have many, for their skills succeed in many things, as they are a very

good thing for a soldier to have, from whom you draw double service.

COSIMO: How are those who are or are not suitable to fight chosen?

FABRIZIO: I want to talk of the manner of selecting a new

organization in order to make it after wards into an army; which yet

also apply in the discussion of the selection that should be made in

re-manning an old (established) organization. I say, therefore, that how

good the man is that you have to select as a soldier is recognized either

from his experience, shown by some excellent deeds of his, or by

conjecture. The proof of virtu cannot be found in men who are newly

selected, and who never before have been selected; and of the former,

few or none are found in an organization which is newly established. It

is necessary, therefore, lacking experience to have recourse to

conjecture, which is derived from their age, profession, and physical

appearance. The first two have been discussed: it remains to talk of the

third. And yet I say that some have wanted that the soldier be big,

among whom was Pyrrhus: Some others have chosen them only from

the strength of the body, as Caesar did: which strength of body is

conjectured from the composition of the members and the gracefulness

of aspect. And yet some of those who write say that he should have

lively and merry eyes, a nervy neck, a large breast, muscular arms, long

fingers, a small stomach, round hips, sleek legs and feet: which parts

usually render a man strong and agile, which are the two things sought

above everything else in a soldier. He ought, above all, to have regard

for his habits and that there should be in him a (sense of) honesty and

shame, otherwise there will be selected only an instrument of trouble

and a beginning of corruption; for there is no one who believes that in a

dishonest education and in a brutish mind, there can exist some virtu

which in some part may be praiseworthy. Nor does it appear to me

superfluous, rather I believe it necessary, in order for you to

understand better the importance of this selection, to tell you the

method that the Roman Consuls at the start of their Magistracy

observed in selecting the Roman legions. In which Deletto, because

those who had to be selected were to be a mixture of new and veteran

men ((because of the continuing wars)), they proceeded from

experience with regard to the old (veteran) men, and from conjecture

with regard to the new. And this ought to be noted, that these Deletti

are made, either for immediate training and use, or for future

employment.

I have talked, and will talk, of those that are made for future

employment, because my intention is to show you how an army can be

organized in countries where there is no military (organization), in which

countries I cannot have Deletti in order to make use of them. But in

countries where it is the custom to call out armies, and by means of the

Prince, these (Deletti) exist, as was observed at Rome and is today

observed among the Swiss. For in these Deletti, if they are for the

(selection of) new men, there are so many others accustomed to being

under military orders, that the old (veteran) and new, being mixed

together, make a good and united body. Notwithstanding this, the

Emperors, when they began to hold fixed the (term of service of the)

soldiers, placed new men in charge over the soldiers, whom they called

Tironi, as teachers to train them, as is seen in the life of the Emperor

Maximus: which thing, while Rome was free, was instituted, not in the

army, but within the City: and as the military exercises where the young

men were trained were in the City, there resulted that those then

chosen to go to war, being accustomed in the method of mock

warfare, could easily adapt themselves to real war. But afterwards,

when these Emperors discontinued these exercises, it was necessary to

employ the methods I have described to you. Arriving, therefore, at the

methods of the Roman Selection, I say that, as soon as the Roman

Consuls, on whom was imposed the carrying on of the war, had

assumed the Magistracy, in wanting to organize their armies ((as it was

the custom that each of them had two legions of Roman men, who

were the nerve (center) of their armies)), created twenty four military

Tribunes, proposing six for each legion, who filled that office which

today is done by those whom we call Constables. After they had

assembled all the Roman men adept at carrying arms, and placed the

Tribunes of each legion apart from each of the others. Afterwards, by

lot they drew the Tribes, from which the first Selection was to be

made, and of that Tribe they selected four of their best men, from

whom one was selected by the Tribunes of the first legion, and of the

other three, one was selected by the Tribunes of the second legion; of

the other two, one was selected by the Tribunes of the third, and that

last belonged to the fourth legion. After these four, four others were

selected, of whom the first man was selected by the Tribunes of the

second legion, the second by those of the third, the third by those of

the fourth, the fourth remained to the first. After, another four were

chosen: the first man was selected by the (Tribunes of the) third

(legion), the second by the fourth, the third by the first, the fourth

remained to the second. And thus this method of selection changed

successively, so that the selection came to be equal, and the legions

equalized. And as we said above, this was done where the men were

to be used immediately: and as it was formed of men of whom a good

part were experienced in real warfare, and everyone in mock battles,

this Deletto was able to be based on conjecture and experience. But

when a new army was to be organized and the selection made for

future employment, this Deletto cannot be based except on conjecture,

which is done by age and physical appearance.

COSIMO: I believe what you have said is entirely true: but before you

pass on to other discussion, I want to ask about one thing which you

have made me remember, when you said that the Deletto which should

be made where these men are not accustomed to fighting should be

done by conjecture: for I have heard our organization censured in many

of its parts, and especially as to number; for many say that a lesser

number ought to be taken, of whom those that are drawn would be

better and the selection better, as there would not be as much hardship

imposed on the men, and some reward given them, by means of which

they would be more content and could be better commanded. Whence

I would like to know your opinion on this part, and if you preferred a

greater rather than a smaller number, and what methods you would use

in selecting both numbers.

FABRIZIO: Without doubt the greater number is more desirable and

more necessary than the smaller: rather, to say better, where a great

number are not available, a perfect organization cannot be made, and I

will easily refute all the reasons cited in favor of this. I say, therefore,

first, that where there are many people, as there are for example in

Tuscany, does not cause you to have better ones, or that the Deletto is

more selective; for desiring in the selection of men to judge them on the

basis of experience, only a very few would probably be found in that

country who would have had this experience, as much because few

have been in a war, as because of those few who have been, very few

have ever been put to the test, so that because of this they merit to be

chosen before the others: so that whoever is in a similar situation should

select them, must leave experience to one side and take them by

conjecture: and if I were brought to such a necessity, I would want to

see, if twenty young men of good physical appearance should come

before me, with what rule rule I ought to take some or reject some: so

that without doubt I believe that every man will confess that it is a much

smaller error to take them all in arming and training them, being unable

to know (beforehand) which of them are better, and to reserve to

oneself afterwards to make a more certain Deletto where, during the

exercises with the army, those of greater courage and vitality may be

observed. So that, considering everything, the selection in this case of a

few in order to have them better, is entirely false. As to causing less

hardship to the country and to the men, I say that the ordinance,

whether it is bad or insufficient, does not cause any hardship: for this

order does not take men away from their business, and does not bind

them so that they cannot go to carry out their business, because it only

obliges them to come together for training on their free days, which

proposition does not do any harm either to the country or the men;

rather, to the young, it ought to be delightful, for where, on holidays

they remain basely indolent in their hangouts, they would now attend

these exercises with pleasure, for the drawing of arms, as it is a

beautiful spectacle, is thus delightful to the young men. As to being able

to pay (more to) the lesser number, and thereby keeping them more

content and obedient, I reply, that no organization of so few can be

made, who are paid so continually, that their pay satisfies them. For

instance, if an army of five thousand infantry should be organized, in

wanting to pay them so that it should be believed they would be

contented, they must be given at least ten thousand ducats a month. To

begin with, this number of infantry is not enough to make an army, and

the payment is unendurable to a State; and on the other hand, it is not

sufficient to keep the men content and obligated to respect your

position. So that in doing this although much would be spent, it would

provide little strength, and would not be sufficient to defend you, or

enable you to undertake any enterprise. If you should give them more,

or take on more, so much more impossible would it be for you to pay

them: if you should give them less, or take on fewer, so much less

would be content and so much less useful would they be to you.

Therefore, those who consider things which are either useless or

impossible. But it is indeed necessary to pay them when they are levied

to send to war.

But even if such an arrangement should give some hardship to those

enrolled in it in times of peace, which I do not see, they are still

recompensed by all those benefits which an army established in a City

bring; for without them, nothing is secure. I conclude that whoever

desires a small number in order to be able to pay them, or for any

other reason cited by you, does not know (what he is doing); for it will

also happen, in my opinion, that any number will always diminish in

your hands, because of the infinite impediments that men have; so that

the small number will succeed at nothing. However, when you have a

large organization, you can at your election avail yourself of few or of

many. In addition to this, it serves you in fact and reputation, for the

large number will always give you reputation. Moreover, in creating the

organization, in order to keep men trained, if you enroll a small number

of men in many countries, and the armies are very distant from each

other, you cannot without the gravest injury to them assemble them for

(joint) exercises, and without this training the organization is useless, as

will be shown in its proper place.

COSIMO: What you have said is enough on my question: but I now

desire that you resolve another doubt for me. There are those who say

that such a multitude of armed men would cause confusion, trouble,

and disorder in the country.

FABRIZIO: This is another vain opinion for the reason I will tell you.

These organized under arms can cause disorders in two ways: either

among themselves, or against others; both of these can be obviated

where discipline by itself should not do so: for as to troubles among

themselves, the organization removes them, not brings them up,

because in the organization you give them arms and leaders. If the

country where you organize them is so unwarlike that there are not

arms among its men, and so united that there are no leaders, such an

organization will make them more ferocious against the foreigner, but in

no way will make it more disunited, because men well organized,

whether armed or unarmed, fear the laws, and can never change,

unless the leaders you give them cause a change; and I will later tell you

the manner of doing this. But if the country where you have organized

an army is warlike and disunited, this organization alone is reason

enough to unite them, for these men have arms and leaders for

themselves: but the arms are useless for war, and the leaders causes of

troubles; but this organization gives them arms useful for war, and

leaders who will extinguish troubles; for as soon as some one is injured

in that country, he has recourse to his (leader) of the party, who, to

maintain his reputation, advises him to avenge himself, (and) not to

remain in peace. The public leader does the contrary. So that by this

means, the causes for trouble are removed, and replaced by those for

union; and provinces which are united but effeminate (unwarlike) lose

their usefulness but maintain the union, while those that are disunited

and troublesome remain united; and that disordinate ferocity which they

usually employ, is turned to public usefulness.

As to desiring that they do us injury against others, it should be kept in

mind that they cannot do this except by the leaders who govern them.

In desiring that the leaders do not cause disorders, it is necessary to

have care that they do not acquire too much authority over them. And

you have to keep in mind that this authority is acquired either naturally

or by accident: And as to nature, it must be provided that whoever is

born in one place is not put in charge of men enrolled in another place,

but is made a leader in those places where he does not have any

natural connections. As to accidents, the organization should be such

that each year the leaders are exchanged from command to command;

for continuous authority over the same men generates so much unity

among them, which can easily be converted into prejudice against the

Prince. As to these exchanges being useful to those who have

employed them, and injurious to those who have not observed them, is

known from the example of the Kingdom of Assyria and from the

Empire of the Romans, in which it is seen that the former Kingdom

endured a thousand years without tumult and without civil war; which

did not result from anything else than the exchanges of those Captains,

who were placed in charge of the care of the armies, from place to

place every year. Nor, for other reasons, (did it result) in the Roman

Empire; once the blood (race) of Caesar was extinguished, so many

civil wars arose among the Captains of the armies, and so many

conspiracies of the above mentioned Captains against the Emperors,

resulting from the continuing of those Captains in their same

Commands. And if any of those Emperors, and any who later held the

Empire by reputation, such as Hadrian, Marcus, Severus, and others

like them, would have observed such happenings, and would have

introduced this custom of exchanging Captains in that Empire, without

doubt they would have made it more tranquil and lasting; for the

Captains would have had fewer opportunities for creating tumults, and

the Emperors fewer causes to fear them, and the Senate, when there

was a lack in the succession, would have had more authority in the

election of Emperors, and consequently, better conditions would have

resulted. But the bad customs of men, whether from ignorance or little

diligence, or from examples of good or bad, are never put aside.

COSIMO: I do not know if, with my question, I have gone outside the

limits you set; for from the Deletto we have entered into another

discussion, and if I should not be excused a little, I shall believe I merit

some reproach.

FABRIZIO: This did us no harm; for all this discussion was necessary

in wanting to discuss the Organization (of an Army), which, being

censured by many, it was necessary to explain it, if it is desired that this

should take place before the Deletto. And before I discuss the other

parts, I want to discuss the Deletto for men on horseback. This

(selection) was done by the ancients from among the more wealthy,

having regard both for the age and quality of the men, selecting three

hundred for each legion: so that the Roman cavalry in every Consular

army did not exceed six hundred.

COSIMO: Did you organize the cavalry in order to train them at home

and avail yourself of them in the future?

FABRIZIO: Actually it is a necessity and cannot be done otherwise, if

you want to have them take up arms for you, and not to want to take

them away from those who make a profession of them.

COSIMO: How would you select them?

FABRIZIO: I would imitate the Romans: I would take the more

wealthy, and give them leaders in the same manner as they are given to

others today, and I would arm them, and train them.

COSIMO: Would it be well to give these men some provision?

FABRIZIO: Yes, indeed: but only as much as is necessary to take care

of the horse; for, as it brings an expense to your subjects, they could

complain of you. It would be necessary, therefore, to pay them for the

horse and its upkeep.

COSIMO: How many would you make? How would you arm them?

FABRIZIO: You pass into another discussion. I will tell you in its

place, which will be when I have said how the infantry ought to be

armed, and how they should prepare for an engagement.

 ON THE ART OF WAR BY

NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
CITIZEN AND SECRETARY OF FLORENCE TO

LORENZO DI FILIPPO STROZZI,
A GENTLEMEN OF FLORENCE

SECOND BOOK

I believe that it is necessary, once the men are found, to arm them; and in
wanting to do this, I believe it is necessary to examine what arms the
ancients used, and from them select the best. The Romans divided their
infantry into the heavily and lightly armed. The light armed they gave the
name Veliti. Under this name they included all those who operated with the
sling, cross-bow, and darts: and the greater part of them carried a helmet
(head covering) and a shield on the arm for their defense. These men fought
outside the regular ranks, and apart from the heavy armor, which was a
Casque that came up to the shoulders, they also carried a Cuirass which,
with the skirt, came down to the knees, and their arms and legs were covered
by shin-guards and bracelets; they also carried a shield on the arm, two
arms in length and one in width, which had an iron hoop on it to be able to
sustain a blow, and another underneath, so that in rubbing on the ground, it
should not be worn out. For attacking, they had cinched on their left side a
sword of an arm and a half length, and a dagger on the right side. They
carried a spear, which they called Pilus, and which they hurled at the enemy
at the start of a battle. These were the important Roman arms, with which
they conquered the world. And although some of the ancient writers also gave
them, in addition to the aforementioned arms, a shaft in the hand in the
manner of a spit, I do not know how a staff can be used by one who holds a
shield, for in managing it with two hands it is impeded by the shield, and
he cannot do anything worthwhile with one hand because of its heaviness. In
addition to this, to combat in the ranks with the staff (as arms) is
useless, except in the front rank where there is ample space to deploy the
entire staff, which cannot be done in the inner ranks, because the nature of
the battalions ((as I will tell you in their organization)) is to press its
ranks continually closer together, as this is feared less, even though
inconvenient, than for the ranks to spread further apart, where the danger
is most apparent. So that all the arms which exceed two arms in length are
useless in tight places; for if you have a staff and want to use it with
both hands, and handled so that the shield should not annoy you, you cannot
attack an enemy with it who is next to you. If you take it in one hand in
order to serve yourself of the shield, you cannot pick it up except in the
middle, and there remains so much of the staff in the back part, that those
who are behind impede you in using it. And that this is true, that the
Romans did not have the staff, or, having it, they valued it little, you
will read in all the engagements noted by Titus Livius in his history, where
you will see that only very rarely is mention made of the shaft, rather he
always says that, after hurling the spears, they put their hands on the
sword. Therefore I want to leave this staff, and relate how much the Romans
used the sword for offense, and for defense, the shield together with the
other arms mentioned above.

The Greeks did not arm so heavily for defense as did the Romans, but in the
offense relied more on this staff than on the sword, and especially the
Phalanxes of Macedonia, who carried staffs which they called Sarisse, a good
ten arms in length, with which they opened the ranks of the enemy and
maintained order in the Phalanxes. And although other writers say they also
had a shield, I do not know ((for the reasons given above)) how the Sarisse
and the shield could exist together. In addition to this, in the engagement
that Paulus Emilius had with Perseus, King of Macedonia, I do not remember
mention being made of shields, but only of the Sarisse and the difficulty
the Romans had in overcoming them. So that I conjecture that a Macedonian
Phalanx was nothing else than a battalion of Swiss is today, who have all
their strength and power in their pikes. The Romans ((in addition to the
arms)) ornamented the infantry with plumes; which things make the sight of
an army beautiful to friends, and terrible to the enemy. The arms for men on
horseback in the original ancient Roman (army) was a round shield, and they
had the head covered, but the rest (of the body) without armor. They had a
sword and a staff with an iron point, long and thin; whence they were unable
to hold the shield firm, and only make weak movements with the staff, and
because they had no armor, they were exposed to wounds. Afterwards, with
time, they were armed like the infantry, but the shield was much smaller and
square, and the staff more solid and with two iron tips, so that if the one
side was encumbered, they could avail themselves of the other. With these
arms, both for the infantry and the cavalry, my Romans occupied all the
world, and it must be believed, from the fruits that are observed, that they
were the best armed armies that ever existed.

And Titus Livius, in his histories, gives many proofs, where, in coming to
the comparison with enemy armies, he says, "but the Romans were superior in
virtu, kinds of arms, and discipline". And, therefore, I have discussed more
in particular the arms of the victors than those of the losers. It appears
proper to me to discuss only the present methods of arming. The infantry
have for their defense a breast plate of iron, and for offense a lance nine
armlengths long, which they call a pike, and a sword at their side, rather
round in the point than sharp. This is the ordinary armament of the infantry
today, for few have their arms and shins (protected by) armor, no one the
head; and those few carry a halberd in place of a pike, the shaft of which
((as you know)) is three armlengths long, and has the iron attached as an
axe. Among them they have three Scoppettieri (Exploders, i.e., Gunners),
who, with a burst of fire fill that office which anciently was done by
slingers and bow-men. This method of arming was established by the Germans,
and especially by the Swiss, who, being poor and wanting to live in freedom,
were, and are, obliged to combat with the ambitions of the Princes of
Germany, who were rich and could raise horses, which that people could not
do because of poverty: whence it happened that being on foot and wanting to
defend themselves from enemies who were on horseback, it behooved them to
search the ancient orders and find arms which should defend them from the
fury of horses. This necessity has caused them to maintain or rediscover the
ancient orders, without which, as every prudent man affirms, the infantry is
entirely useless. They therefore take up pikes as arms, which are most
useful not only in sustaining (the attacks of) horses, but to overcome them.
And because of the virtu of these arms and ancient orders, the Germans have
assumed so much audacity, that fifteen or twenty thousand of them would
assault any great number of horse, and there have been many examples of this
seen in the last twenty five years. And this example of their virtu founded
on these arms and these orders have been so powerful, that after King
Charles passed into Italy, every nation has imitated them: so that the
Spanish armies have come into a very great reputation.

COSIMO: What method of arms do you praise more, this German one or the
ancient Roman?

FABRIZIO: The Roman without any doubt, and I will tell you the good and the
bad of one and the other. The German infantry can sustain and overcome the
cavalry. They are more expeditious in marching and in organizing themselves,
because they are not burdened with arms. On the other hand, they are exposed
to blows from near and far because of being unarmed. They are useless in
land battles and in every fight where there is stalwart resistance. But the
Romans sustained and overcame the cavalry, as these (Germans) do. They were
safe from blows near and far because they were covered with armor. They were
better able to attack and sustain attacks having the shields. They could
more actively in tight places avail themselves of the sword than these
(Germans) with the pike; and even if the latter had the sword, being without
a shield, they become, in such a case, (equally) useless. They (the Romans)
could safely assault towns, having the body covered, and being able to cover
it even better with the shield. So that they had no other inconvenience than
the heaviness of the arms (armor) and the annoyance of having to carry them;
which inconveniences they overcame by accustoming the body to hardships and
inducing it to endure hard work. And you know we do not suffer from things
to which we are accustomed. And you must understand this, that the infantry
must be able to fight with infantry and cavalry, and those are always
useless who cannot sustain the (attacks of the) cavalry, or if they are able
to sustain them, none the less have fear of infantry who are better armed
and organized than they. Now if you will consider the German and the Roman
infantry, you will find in the German ((as we have said)) the aptitude of
overcoming cavalry, but great disadvantages when fighting with an infantry
organized as they are, and armed as the Roman. So that there will be this
advantage of the one over the other, that the Romans could overcome both the
infantry and the cavalry, and the Germans only the cavalry.

COSIMO: I would desire that you give some more particular example, so that
we might understand it better.

FABRIZIO: I say thusly, that in many places in our histories you will find
the Roman infantry to have defeated numberless cavalry, but you will never
find them to have been defeated by men on foot because of some defect they
may have had in their arms or because of some advantage the enemy had in
his. For if their manner of arming had been defective, it was necessary for
them to follow one of two courses: either when they found one who was better
armed than they, not to go on further with the conquest, or that they take
up the manner of the foreigner, and leave off theirs: and since neither
ensued, there follows, what can be easily conjectured, that this method of
arming was better than that of anyone else. This has not yet occurred with
the German infantry; for it has been seen that anytime they have had to
combat with men on foot organized and as obstinate as they, they have made a
bad showing; which results from the disadvantage they have in trying
themselves against the arms of the enemy. When Filippo Visconti, Duke of
Milan, was assaulted by eighteen thousand Swiss, he sent against them Count
Carmingnuola, who was his Captain at that time. This man with six thousand
cavalry and a few infantry went to encounter them, and, coming hand to hand
with them, was repulsed with very great damage. Whence Carmingnuola as a
prudent man quickly recognized the power of the enemy arms, and how much
they prevailed against cavalry, and the weakness of cavalry against those on
foot so organized; and regrouping his forces, again went to meet the Swiss,
and as they came near he made his men-at-arms descend from their horses, and
in that manner fought with them, and killed all but three thousand, who,
seeing themselves consumed without having any remedy, threw their arms on
the ground and surrendered.

COSIMO: Whence arises such a disadvantage?

FABRIZIO: I have told you a little while ago, but since you have not
understood it, I will repeat it to you. The German infantry ((as was said a
little while ago)) has almost no armor in defending itself, and use pikes
and swords for offense. They come with these arms and order of battle to
meet the enemy, who ((if he is well equipped with armor to defend himself,
as were the men-at-arms of Carmingnuola who made them descend to their
feet)) comes with his sword and order of battle to meet him, and he has no
other difficulty than to come near the Swiss until he makes contact with
them with the sword; for as soon as he makes contact with them, he combats
them safely, for the German cannot use the pike against the enemy who is
next to him because of the length of the staff, so he must use the sword,
which is useless to him, as he has no armor and has to meet an enemy that is
(protected) fully by armor. Whence, whoever considers the advantages and
disadvantages of one and the other, will see that the one without armor has
no remedy, but the one well armored will have no difficulty in overcoming
the first blow and the first passes of the pike: for in battles, as you will
understand better when I have demonstrated how they are put together, the
men go so that of necessity they accost each other in a way that they are
attacked on the breast, and if one is killed or thrown to the ground by the
pike, those on foot who remain are so numerous that they are sufficient for
victory. From this there resulted that Carmingnuola won with such a massacre
of the Swiss, and with little loss to himself.

COSIMO: I see that those with Carmingnuola were men-at-arms, who, although
they were on foot, were all covered with iron (armor), and, therefore, could
make the attempt that they made; so that I think it would be necessary to
arm the infantry in the same way if they want to make a similar attempt.

FABRIZIO: If you had remembered how I said the Romans were armed, you would
not think this way. For an infantryman who has his head covered with iron,
his breast protected by a cuirass and a shield, his arms and legs with
armor, is much more apt to defend himself from pikes, and enter among them,
than is a man-at-arms (cavalryman) on foot. I want to give you a small modem
example. The Spanish infantry had descended from Sicily into the Kingdom of
Naples in order to go and meet Consalvo who was besieged in Barletta by the
French. They came to an encounter against Monsignor D'Obigni with his
men-at-arms, and with about four thousand German infantry. The Germans,
coming hand to hand with their pikes low, penetrated the (ranks of the)
Spanish infantry; but the latter, aided by their spurs and the agility of
their bodies, intermingled themselves with the Germans, so that they (the
Germans) could not get near them with their swords; whence resulted the
death of almost all of them, and the victory of the Spaniards. Everyone
knows how many German infantry were killed in the engagement at Ravenna,
which resulted from the same causes, for the Spanish infantry got as close
as the reach of their swords to the German infantry, and would have
destroyed all of them, if the German infantry had not been succored by the
French Cavalry: none the less, the Spaniards pressing together made
themselves secure in that place. I conclude, therefore, that a good infantry
not only is able to sustain the (attack) of cavalry, but does not have fear
of infantry, which ((as I have said many times)) proceeds from its arms
(armor) and organization (discipline).

COSIMO: Tell us, therefore, how you would arm them.

FABRIZIO: I would take both the Roman arms and the German, and would want
half to be armed as the Romans, and the other half as the Germans. For, if
in six thousand infantry ((as I shall explain a little later)) I should have
three thousand infantry with shields like the Romans, and two thousand pikes
and a thousand gunners like the Germans, they would be enough for me; for I
would place the pikes either in the front lines of the battle, or where I
should fear the cavalry most; and of those with the shield and the sword, I
would serve myself to back up the pikes and to win the engagement, as I will
show you. So that I believe that an infantry so organized should surpass any
other infantry today.

COSIMO: What you have said to us is enough as regards infantry, but as to
cavalry, we desire to learn which seems the more strongly armed to you, ours
or that of the ancients?

FABRIZIO: I believe in these times, with respect to saddles and stirrups not
used by the ancients, one stays more securely on the horse than at that
time. I believe we arm more securely: so that today one squadron of very
heavily (armed) men-at-arms comes to be sustained with much more difficulty
than was the ancient cavalry. With all of this, I judge, none the less, that
no more account ought to be taken of the cavalry than was taken anciently;
for ((as has been said above)) they have often in our times been subjected
to disgrace by the infantry armed (armored) and organized as (described)
above. Tigranus, King of Armenia, came against the Roman army of which
Lucullus was Captain, with (an army) of one hundred fifty thousand cavalry,
among whom were many armed as our men-at-arms, whom they called Catafratti,
while on the other side the Romans did not total more than six thousand
(cavalry) and fifteen thousand infantry; so that Tigranus, when he saw the
army of the enemy, said: "These are just about enough horsemen for an
embassy". None the less, when they came to battle, he was routed; and he who
writes of that battle blames those Catafratti, showing them to be useless,
because, he says, that having their faces covered, their vision was impaired
and they were little adept at seeing and attacking the enemy, and as they
were heavily burdened by the armor, they could not regain their feet when
they fell, nor in any way make use of their persons. I say, therefore, that
those People or Kingdoms which esteem the cavalry more than the infantry,
are always weaker and more exposed to complete ruin, as has been observed in
Italy in our times, which has been plundered, ruined, and overrun by
foreigners, not for any other fault than because they had paid little
attention to the foot soldiers and had mounted all their soldiers on horses.
Cavalry ought to be used, but as a second and not the first reliance of an
army; for they are necessary and most useful in undertaking reconnaissance,
in overrunning and despoiling the enemy country, and to keep harassing and
troubling the enemy army so as to keep it continually under arms, and to
impede its provisions; but as to engagements and battles in the field, which
are the important things in war and the object for which armies are
organized, they are more useful in pursuing than in routing the enemy, and
are much more inferior to the foot soldier in accomplishing the things
necessary in accomplishing such (defeats).

COSIMO: But two doubts occur to me: the one, that I know that the Parthians
did not engage in war except with cavalry, yet they divided the world with
the Romans: the other, that I would like you to tell me how the (attack of)
the cavalry can be sustained by the infantry, and whence arises the virtu of
the latter and the weakness of the former?

FABRIZIO: Either I have told you, or I meant to tell you, that my discussion
on matters of war is not going beyond the limits of Europe. Since this is
so, I am not obliged to give reasons for that which is the custom in Asia.
Yet, I have this to say, that the army of Parthia was completely opposite to
that of the Romans, as the Parthians fought entirely on horseback, and in
the fighting was about confused and disrupted, and was a way of fighting
unstable and full of uncertainties. The Romans, it may be recalled, were
almost all on foot, and fought pressed closely together, and at various
times one won over the other, according as the site (of the battle) was open
or tight; for in the latter the Romans were superior, but in the former the
Parthians, who were able to make a great trial with that army with respect
to the region they had to defend, which was very open with a seacoast a
thousand miles distant, rivers two or three days (journey) apart from each
other, towns likewise, and inhabitants rare: so that a Roman army, heavy and
slow because of its arms and organization, could not pursue him without
suffering great harm, because those who defended the country were on horses
and very speedy, so that he would be in one place today, and tomorrow fifty
miles distant. Because of this, the Parthians were able to prevail with
cavalry alone, and thus resulted the ruin of the army of Crassus, and the
dangers to those of Marcantonio. But ((as I have said)) I did not intend in
this discussion of mine to speak of armies outside of Europe; and,
therefore, I want to continue on those which the Romans and Greeks had
organized in their time, and that the Germans do today.

¶ But let us come to the other question of yours, in which you desire to
know what organization or what natural virtu causes the infantry to be
superior to the cavalry. And I tell you, first, that the horses cannot go
in all the places that the infantry do, because it is necessary for them
either to turn back after they have come forward, or turning back to go
forward, or to move from a stand-still, or to stand still after moving, so
that, without doubt, the cavalry cannot do precisely thus as the infantry.
Horses cannot, after being put into disorder from some attack, return to the
order (of the ranks) except with difficulty, and even if the attack does not
occur; the infantry rarely do this. In addition to this, it often occurs
that a courageous man is mounted on a base horse, and a base man on a
courageous horse, whence it must happen that this difference in courage
causes disorders. Nor should anyone wonder that a Knot (group) of infantry
sustains every attack of the cavalry, for the horse is a sensible animal and
knows the dangers, and goes in unwillingly. And if you would think about
what forces make him (the horse) go forward and what keep him back, without
doubt you will see that those which hold him back are greater than those
which push him; for spurs make him go forward, and, on the other hand, the
sword and the pike retain him. So that from both ancient and modem
experiences, it has been seen that a small group of infantry can be very
secure from, and even actually insuperable to, the cavalry. And if you
should argue on this that the Elan with which he comes makes it more furious
in hurling himself against whoever wants to sustain his attack, and he
responds less to the pike than the spur, I say that, as soon as the horse so
disposed begins to see himself at the point of being struck by the points of
the pikes, either he will by himself check his gait, so that he will stop as
soon as he sees himself about to be pricked by them, or, being pricked by
them, he will turn to the right or left. If you want to make a test of this,
try to run a horse against a wall, and rarely will you find one that will
run into it, no matter with what Elan you attempt it. Caesar, when he had to
combat the Swiss in Gaul, dismounted and made everyone dismount to their
feet, and had the horses removed from the ranks, as they were more adept at
fleeing than fighting.

¶ But, notwithstanding these natural impediments that horses have, the
Captain who leads the infantry ought to select roads that have as many
obstacles for horses as possible, and rarely will it happen that the men
will not be able to provide for their safety from the kind of country. If
one marches among hills, the location of the march should be such that you
may be free from those attacks of which you may be apprehensive; and if you
go on the plains, rarely will you find one that does not have crops or woods
which will provide some safety for you, for every bush and embankment, even
though small, breaks up that dash, and every cultivated area where there are
vines and other trees impedes the horses. And if you come to an engagement,
the same will happen to you as when marching, because every little
impediment which the horse meets cause him to lose his fury. None the less,
I do not want to forget to tell you one thing, that although the Romans
esteemed much their own discipline and trusted very much on their arms (and
armor), that if they had to select a place, either so rough to protect
themselves from horses and where they could not be able to deploy their
forces, or one where they had more to fear from the horses but where they
were able to spread out, they would always take the latter and leave the
former.

¶ But, as it is time to pass on to the training (of the men), having armed
this infantry according to the ancient and modem usage, we shall see what
training they gave to the Romans before the infantry were led to battle.
Although they were well selected and better armed, they were trained with
the greatest attention, because without this training a soldier was never
any good. This training consisted of three parts. The first, to harden the
body and accustom it to endure hardships, to act faster, and more
dexterously. Next, to teach the use of arms: The third, to teach the
trainees the observance of orders in marching as well as fighting and
encamping. These are the three principal actions which make an army: for if
any army marches, encamps, and fights, in a regular and practical manner,
the Captain retains his honor even though the engagement should not have a
good ending. All the ancient Republics, therefore, provided such training,
and both by custom and law, no part was left out. They therefore trained
their youth so as to make them speedy in running, dextrous in jumping,
strong in driving stakes and wrestling. And these three qualities are almost
necessary in a soldier; for speed makes him adept at occupying places before
the enemy, to come upon him unexpectedly, and to pursue him when he is
routed. Dexterity makes him adept at avoiding blows, jumping a ditch and
climbing over an embankment. Strength makes him better to carry arms, hurl
himself against an enemy, and sustain an attack. And above all, to make the
body more inured to hardships, they accustom it to carry great weights. This
accustoming is necessary, for in difficult expeditions it often happens that
the soldier, in addition to his arms, must carry provisions for many days,
and if he had not been accustomed to this hard work, he would not be able to
do it, and, hence, he could neither flee from a danger nor acquire a victory
with fame.

¶ As to the teaching of the use of arms, they were trained in this way. They
had the young men put on arms (armor) which weighed more than twice that of
the real (regular) ones, and, as a sword, they gave them a leaded club which
in comparison was very heavy. They made each one of them drive a pole into
the ground so that three arm-lengths remained (above ground), and so firmly
fixed that blows would not drive it to one side or have it fall to the
ground; against this pole, the young men were trained with the shield and
the club as against an enemy, and sometime they went against it as if they
wanted to wound the head or the face, another time as if they wanted to
puncture the flank, sometimes the legs, sometime they drew back, another
time they went forward. And in this training, they had in mind making
themselves adept at covering (protecting) themselves and wounding the enemy;
and since the feigned arms were very heavy, the real ones afterwards seemed
light. The Romans wanted their soldiers to wound (the enemy) by the driving
of a point against him, rather than by cutting (slashing), as much because
such a blow was more fatal and had less defense against it, as also because
it left less uncovered (unprotected) those who were wounding, making him
more adept at repeating his attack, than by slashing. Do you not wonder that
those ancients should think of these minute details, for they reasoned that
where men had to come hand to hand (in battle), every little advantage is of
the greatest importance; and I will remind you of that, because the writers
say of this that I have taught it to you. Nor did the ancients esteem it a
more fortunate thing in a Republic than to have many of its men trained in
arms; for it is not the splendor of jewels and gold that makes the enemy
submit themselves to you, but only the fear of arms. Moreover, errors made
in other things can sometimes be corrected afterwards, but those that are
made in war, as the punishment happens immediately, cannot be corrected. In
addition to this, knowing how to fight makes men more audacious, as no one
fears to do the things which appear to him he has been taught to do. The
ancients, therefore, wanted their citizens to train in every warlike
activity; and even had them throw darts against the pole heavier than the
actual ones: which exercise, in addition to making men expert in throwing,
also makes the arm more limber and stronger. They also taught them how to
draw the bow and the sling, and placed teachers in charge of doing all these
things: so that when (men) were selected to go to war, they were already
soldiers in spirit and disposition. Nor did these remain to teach them
anything else than to go by the orders and maintain themselves in them
whether marching or combatting: which they easily taught by mixing
themselves with them, so that by knowing how to keep (obey) the orders, they
could exist longer in the army.

COSIMO: Would you have them train this way now?

FABRIZIO: Many of those which have been mentioned, like running wrestling,
making them jump, making them work hard under arms heavier than the
ordinary, making them draw the crossbow and the sling; to which I would add
the light gun, a new instrument ((as you know)), and a necessary one. And I
would accustom all the youth of my State to this training: but that part of
them whom I have enrolled to fight, I would (especially) train with greater
industry and more solicitude, and I would train them always on their free
days. I would also desire that they be taught to swim, which is a very
useful thing, because there are not always bridges at rivers, nor ships
ready: so that if your army does not know how to swim, it may be deprived of
many advantages, and many opportunities, to act well are taken away. The
Romans, therefore, arranged that the young men be trained on the field of
Mars, so that having the river Tiber nearby, they would be able after
working hard in exercises on land to refresh themselves in the water, and
also exercise them in their swimming.

¶ I would also do as the ancients and train those who fight on horseback:
which is very necessary, for in addition to knowing how to ride, they would
know how to avail themselves of the horse (in maneuvering him). And,
therefore, they arranged horses of wood on which they straddled, and jumped
over them armed and unarmed without any help and without using their hands:
which made possible that in a moment, and at a sign from the Captain, the
cavalry to become as foot soldiers, and also at another sign, for them to be
remounted. And as such exercises, both on foot and horseback, were easy at
that time, so now it should not be difficult for that Republic or that
Prince to put them in practice on their youth, as is seen from the
experience of Western Cities, where these methods similar to these
institutions are yet kept alive.

¶ They divide all their inhabitants into several parts, and assign one kind
of arms of those they use in war to each part. And as they used pikes,
halberds, bows, and light guns, they called them pikemen, halberdiers,
archers, and gunners. It therefore behooved all the inhabitants to declare
in what order they wanted to be enrolled. And as all, whether because of age
or other impediment, are not fit for war (combat), they make a selection
from each order and they call them the Giurati (Sworn Ones), who, on their
free days, are obliged to exercise themselves in those arms in which they
are enrolled: and each one is assigned his place by the public where such
exercises are to be carried on, and those who are of that order but are not
sworn, participate by (contributing) money for those expenses which are
necessary for such exercises. That which they do, therefore, we can do, but
our little prudence does not allow us to take up any good proceeding.

From these exercises, it resulted that the ancients had good infantry, and
that now those of the West have better infantry than ours, for the ancients
exercised either at home as did those Republics, or in the armies as did
those Emperors, for the reasons mentioned above. But we do not want to
exercise at home, and we cannot do so in the field because they are not our
subjects and we cannot obligate them to other exercises than they themselves
want. This reason has caused the armies to die out first, and then the
institutions, so that the Kingdoms and the Republics, especially the
Italian, exist in such a weak condition today.

¶ But let us return to our subject, and pursuing this matter of training, I
say, that it is not enough in undertaking good training to have hardened the
men, made them strong, fast and dextrous, but it is also necessary to teach
them to keep discipline, obey the signs, the sounds (of the bugle), and the
voice of the Captain; to know when to stand, to retire, to go forward, and
when to combat, to march, to maintain ranks; for without this discipline,
despite every careful diligence observed and practiced, an army is never
good. And without doubt, bold but undisciplined men are more weak than the
timid but disciplined ones; for discipline drives away fear from men, lack
of discipline makes the bold act foolishly. And so that you may better
understand what will be mentioned below, you have to know that every nation
has made its men train in the discipline of war, or rather its army as the
principal part, which, if they have varied in name, they have varied little
in the numbers of men involved, as all have comprised six to eight thousand
men. This number was called a Legion by the Romans, a Phalanx by the Greeks,
a Caterna by the Gauls. This same number, by the Swiss, who alone retain any
of that ancient military umbrage, in our times is called in their language
what in ours signifies a Battalion. It is true that each one is further
subdivided into small Battaglia (Companies), and organized according to its
purpose. It appears to me, therefore, more suitable to base our talk on this
more notable name, and then according to the ancient and modern systems,
arrange them as best as is possible. And as the Roman Legions were composed
of five or six thousand men, in ten Cohorts, I want to divide our Battalion
into ten Companies, and compose it of six thousand men on foot; and assign
four hundred fifty men to each Company, of whom four hundred are heavily
armed and fifty lightly armed: the heavily armed include three hundred with
shields and swords, and will be called Scudati (shield bearers), and a
hundred with pikes, and will be called pikemen: the lightly armed are fifty
infantry armed with light guns, cross-bows, halberds, and bucklers, and
these, from an ancient name, are called regular (ordinary) Veliti: the whole
ten Companies, therefore, come to three thousand shield bearers; a thousand
ordinary pikemen, and one hundred fifty ordinary Veliti, all of whom
comprise (a number of) four thousand five hundred infantry. And we said we
wanted to make a Battalion of six thousand men; therefore it is necessary to
add another one thousand five hundred infantry, of whom I would make a
thousand with pikes, whom I will call extraordinary pikemen, (and five
hundred light armed, whom I will call extraordinary Veliti): and thus my
infantry would come ((according as was said a little while ago)) to be
composed half of shield bearers and half among pikemen and other arms
(carriers). In every Company, I would put in charge a Constable, four
Centurions, and forty Heads of Ten, and in addition, a Head of the ordinary
Veliti with five Heads of Ten. To the thousand extraordinary pikemen, I would
assign three Constables, ten Centurions, and a hundred Heads of Ten: to the
extraordinary Veliti, two Constables, five Centurions, and fifty Heads of
Ten. I would also assign a general Head for the whole Battalion. I would
want each Constable to have a distinct flag and (bugle) sound.

¶ Summarizing, therefore, a Battalion would be composed of ten Companies, of
three thousand shield bearers, a thousand ordinary pikemen, a thousand
extraordinary pikemen, five hundred ordinary Veliti, and five hundred
extraordinary Veliti: thus they would come to be six thousand infantry,
among whom there would be one thousand five hundred Heads of Ten, and in
addition fifteen Constables, with fifteen Buglers and fifteen flags, fifty
five Centurions, ten Captains of ordinary Veliti, and one Captain for the
whole Battalion with its flag and Bugler. And I have knowingly repeated this
arrangement many times, so that then, when I show you the methods for
organizing the Companies and the armies, you will not be confounded.

¶ I say, therefore, that any King or Republic which would want to organize
its subjects in arms, would provide them with these parties and these arms,
and create as many battalions in the country as it is capable of doing: and
if it had organized it according to the division mentioned above, and
wanting to train it according to the orders, they need only to be trained
Company by Company. And although the number of men in each of them could not
be themselves provide a reasonably (sized) army, none the less, each man can
learn to do what applies to him in particular, for two orders are observed
in the armies: the one, what men ought to do in each Company: the other,
what the Company ought to do afterwards when it is with others in an army:
and those men who carry out the first, will easily observe the second: but
without the first, one can never arrive at the discipline of the second.
Each of these Companies, therefore, can by themselves learn to maintain
(discipline in) their ranks in every kind and place of action, and then to
know how to assemble, to know its (particular bugle) call, through which it
is commanded in battle; to know how to recognize by it ((as galleys do from
the whistle)) as to what they have to do, whether to stay put, or go
forward, or turn back, or the time and place to use their arms. So that
knowing how to maintain ranks well, so that neither the action nor the place
disorganizes them, they understand well the commands of the leader by means
of the (bugle) calls, and knowing how to reassemble quickly, these Companies
then can easily ((as I have said)), when many have come together, learn to
do what each body of them is obligated to do together with other Companies
in operating as a reasonably (sized) army. And as such a general practice
also is not to be esteemed little, all the Battalions can be brought
together once or twice in the years of peace, and give them a form of a
complete army, training it for several days as if it should engage in
battle, placing the front lines, the flanks, and auxiliaries in their
(proper) places.

¶ And as a Captain arranges his army for the engagement either taking into
account the enemy he sees, or for that which he does not see but is
apprehensive of, the army ought to be trained for both contingencies, and
instructed so that it can march and fight when the need arises; showing your
soldiers how they should conduct themselves if they should be assaulted by
this band or that. And when you instruct them to fight against an enemy they
can see, show them how the battle is enkindled, where they have to retire
without being repulsed, who has to take their places, what signs, what
(bugle) calls, and what voice they should obey, and to practice them so with
Companies and by mock attacks, that they have the desire for real battle.
For a courageous army is not so because the men in it are courageous, but
because the ranks are well disciplined; for if I am of the first line
fighters, and being overcome, I know where I have to retire, and who is to
take my place, I will always fight with courage seeing my succor nearby: If
I am of the second line fighters, I would not be dismayed at the first line
being pushed back and repulsed, for I would have presupposed it could happen,
and I would have desired it in order to be he who, as it was not them, would
give the victory to my patron. Such training is most necessary where a new
army is created; and where the army is old (veteran), it is also necessary
for, as the Romans show, although they knew the organization of their army
from childhood, none the less, those Captains, before they came to an
encounter with the enemy, continually exercised them in those disciplines.
And Joseph in his history says, that the continual training of the Roman
armies resulted in all the disturbance which usually goes on for gain in a
camp, was of no effect in an engagement, because everyone knew how to obey
orders and to fight by observing them. But in the armies of new men which you
have to put together to combat at the time, or that you caused to be
organized to combat in time, nothing is done without this training, as the
Companies are different as in a complete army; for as much discipline is
necessary, it must be taught with double the industry and effort to those
who do not have it, and be maintained in those who have it, as is seen from
the fact that many excellent Captains have tired themselves without any
regard to themselves.

COSIMO: And it appears to me that this discussion has somewhat carried you
away, for while you have not yet mentioned the means with which Companies
are trained, you have discussed engagements and the complete army.

FABRIZIO: You say the truth, and truly the reason is the affection I have
for these orders, and the sorrow that I feel seeing that they are not put
into action: none the less, have no fear, but I shall return to the subject.
As I have told you, of first importance in the training of the Company is to
know how to maintain ranks. To do this, it is necessary to exercise them in
those orders, which they called Chiocciole (Spiralling). And as I told you
that one of these Companies ought to consist of four hundred heavily armed
infantry, I will stand on this number. They should, therefore, be arranged
into eighty ranks (files), with five per file. Then continuing on either
strongly or slowly, grouping them and dispersing them; which, when it is
done, can be demonstrated better by deeds than by words: afterwards, it
becomes less necessary, for anyone who is practiced in these exercises knows
how this order proceeds, which is good for nothing else but to accustom the
soldiers to maintain ranks. But let us come and put together one of those
Companies.

I say that these can be formed in three ways: the first and most useful is
to make it completely massive and give it the form of two squares: the
second is to make the square with a homed front: the third is to make it
with a space in the center, which they call Piazza (plaza). The method of
putting together the first form can be in two steps. The first is to have
the files doubled, that is, that the second file enters the first, the
fourth into the third, and sixth into the fifth, and so on in succession; so
that where there were eighty files and five (men) per file, they become
forty files and ten per file. Then make them double another time in the same
manner, placing one file within the other, and thus they become twenty files
of twenty men per file. This makes almost a square, for although there are
so many men on one side (of the square) as the other, none the less, on the
side of the front, they come together so that (the side of) one man touches
the next; but on the other side (of the square) the men are distant at least
two arm lengths from each other, so that the square is longer from the front
to the back (shoulders), then from one side (flank) to the other. (So that
the rectangle thus formed is called two squares).

¶ And as we have to talk often today of the parts in front, in the rear, and
on the side of this Company, and of the complete army, you will understand
that when I will say either head or front, I mean to say the part in front;
when I say shoulder, the part behind (rear); when I say flanks, the parts on
the side.

¶ The fifty ordinary Veliti of the company are not mixed in with the other
files, but when the company is formed, they extend along its flanks.

¶ The other method of putting together (forming) the company is this; and
because it is better than the first, I want to place in front of your eyes
in detail how it ought to be organized. I believe you remember the number of
men and the heads which compose it, and with what arms it is armed. The
form, therefore, that this company ought to have is ((as I have said)) of
twenty files, twenty men per file, five files of pikemen in front, and
fifteen files of shield bearers on the shoulders (behind); two centurions
are in front and two behind in the shoulders who have the office of those
whom the ancients called Tergiduttori (Rear-leaders): The Constable, with
the flag and bugler, is in that space which is between the five files of
pikemen and the fifteen of shield-bearers: there is one of the Captains of
the Ten on every flank, so that each one is alongside his men, those who are
on the left side of his right hand, those on the right side on his left
hand. The fifty Veliti are on the flanks and shoulders (rear) of the
company. If it is desired, now, that regular infantry be employed, this
company is put together in this form, and it must organize itself thusly:
Have the infantry be brought to eighty files, five per file, as we said a
little while ago; leaving the Veliti at the head and on the tail (rear),
even though they are outside this arrangement; and it ought to be so
arranged that each Centurion has twenty files behind him on the shoulders,
and those immediately behind every Centurion are five files of pikemen, and
the remaining shield-bearers: the Constable, with his flag and bugler, is in
that space that is between the pikemen and the shield-bearers of the second
Centurion, and occupies the places of three shield-bearers: twenty of the
Heads of Ten are on the Flanks of the first Centurion on the left hand, and
twenty are on the flanks of the last Centurion on the right hand. And you
have to understand, that the Head of Ten who has to guide (lead) the pikemen
ought to have a pike, and those who guide the shield-bearers ought to have
similar arms.

¶ The files, therefore, being brought to this arrangement, and if it is
desired, by marching, to bring them into the company to form the head
(front), you have to cause the first Centurion to stop with the first file
of twenty, and the second to continue to march; and turning to the right
(hand) he goes along the flanks of the twenty stopped files, so that he
comes head-to-head with the other Centurion, where he too stops; and the
third Centurion continues to march, also turning to the right (hand), and
marches along the flanks of the stopped file so that he comes head-to-head
with the other two Centurions; and when he also stops, the other Centurion
follows with his file, also going to the right along the flanks of the
stopped file, so that he arrives at the head (front) with the others, and
then he stops; and the two Centurions who are alone quickly depart from the
front and go to the rear of the company, which becomes formed in that manner
and with those orders to the point which we showed a little while ago. The
Veliti extend themselves along its flanks, according as they were disposed
in the first method; which method is called Doubling by the straight line,
and this last (method) is called Doubling by the flanks.

The first method is easier, while this latter is better organized, and is
more adaptable, and can be better controlled by you, for it must be carried
out by the numbers, that from five you make ten, ten twenty, twenty forty:
so that by doubling at your direction, you cannot make a front of fifteen,
or twenty five or thirty or thirty five, but you must proceed to where the
number is less. And yet, every day, it happens in particular situations,
that you must make a front with six or eight hundred infantry, so that the
doubling by the straight line will disarrange you: yet this (latter) method
pleases me more, and what difficulty may exist, can be more easily overcome
by the proper exercise and practice of it.

¶ I say to you, therefore, that it is more important than anything to have
soldiers who know how to form themselves quickly, and it is necessary in
holding them in these Companies, to train them thoroughly, and have them
proceed bravely forward or backward, to pass through difficult places
without disturbing the order; for the soldiers who know how to do this well,
are experienced soldiers, and although they may have never met the enemy
face to face, they can be called seasoned soldiers; and, on the contrary,
those who do not know how to maintain this order, even if they may have been
in a thousand wars, ought always to be considered as new soldiers. This
applies in forming them when they are marching in small files: but if they
are formed, and then become broken because of some accident that results
either from the location or from the enemy, to reorganize themselves
immediately is the important and difficult thing, in which much training and
practice is needed, and in which the ancients placed much emphasis. It is
necessary, therefore, to do two things: first, to have many countersigns in
the Company: the other, always to keep this arrangement, that the same
infantry always remain in the same file. For instance, if one is commanded
to be in the second (file), he will afterwards always stay there, and not
only in this same file, but in the same position (in the file); it is to be
observed ((as I have said)) how necessary are the great number of
countersigns, so that, coming together with other companies, it may be
recognized by its own men. Secondly, that the Constable and Centurion have
tufts of feathers on their head-dress different and recognizable, and what
is more important, to arrange that the Heads of Ten be recognized. To which
the ancients paid very much attention, that nothing else would do, but that
they wrote numbers on their bucklers, calling then the first, second, third,
fourth, etc. And they were not above content with this, but each soldier had
to write on his shield the number of his file, and the number of his place
assigned him in that file. The men, therefore, being thus countersigned
(assigned), and accustomed to stay within these limits, if they should be
disorganized, it is easy to reorganize them all quickly, for the flag
staying fixed, the Centurions and Heads of Ten can judge their place by eye,
and bring the left from the right, or the right from the left, with the
usual distances between; the infantry guided by their rules and by the
difference in countersigns, can quickly take their proper places, just as,
if you were the staves of a barrel which you had first countersigned, I
would wager you would put it (the barrel) back together with great ease, but
if you had not so countersigned them (the staves), it is impossible to
reassemble (the barrel). This system, with diligence and practice, can be
taught quickly, and can be quickly learned, and once learned are forgotten
with difficulty; for new men are guided by the old, and in time, a province
which has such training, would become entirely expert in war. It is also
necessary to teach them to turn in step, and do so when he should turn from
the flanks and by the soldiers in the front, or from the front to the flanks
or shoulders (rear). This is very easy, for it is sufficient only that each
man turns his body toward the side he is commanded to, and the direction in
which they turned becomes the front. It is true that when they turn by the
flank, the ranks which turn go outside their usual area, because there is a
small space between the breast to the shoulder, while from one flank to the
other there is much space, which is all contrary to the regular formation of
the company. Hence, care should be used in employing it. But this is more
important and where more practice is needed, is when a company wants to turn
entirely, as if it was a solid body. Here, great care and practice must be
employed, for if it is desired to turn to the left, for instance, it is
necessary that the left wing be halted, and those who are closer to the
halted one, march much slower then those who are in the right wing and have
to run; otherwise everything would be in confusion.

But as it always happens when an army marches from place to place, that the
companies not situated in front, not having to combat at the front, or at
the flanks or shoulders (rear), have to move from the flank or shoulder
quickly to the front, and when such companies in such cases have the space
necessary as we indicated above, it is necessary that the pikemen they have
on that flank become the front, and the Heads of the Ten, Centurions, and
Constables belonging to it relocate to their proper places. Therefore, in
wanting to do this, when forming them it is necessary to arrange the eighty
files of five per file, placing all the pikemen in the first twenty files,
and placing five of the Heads of Ten (of it) in the front of them and five
in the rear: the other sixty files situated behind are all shield-bearers,
who total to three hundred. It should therefore be so arranged, that the
first and last file of every hundred of Heads of Ten; the Constable with his
flag and bugler be in the middle of the first hundred (century) of
shield-bearers; and the Centurions at the head of every century. Thus
arranged, when you want the pikemen to be on the left flank, you have to
double them, century by century, from the right flank: if you want them to
be on the right flank, you have to double them from the left. And thus this
company turns with the pikemen on the flank, with the Heads of Ten on the
front and rear, with the Centurions at the front of them, and the Constable
in the middle. Which formation holds when going forward; but when the enemy
comes and the time for the (companies) to move from the flanks to the front,
it cannot be done unless all the soldiers face toward the flank where the
pikemen are, and then the company is turned with its files and heads in that
manner that was described above; for the Centurions being on the outside,
and all the men in their places, the Centurions quickly enter them (the
ranks) without difficulty. But when they are marching frontwards, and have
to combat in the rear, they must arrange the files so that, in forming the
company, the pikes are situated in the rear; and to do this, no other order
has to be maintained except that where, in the formation of the company
ordinarily every Century has five files of pikemen in front, it now has them
behind, but in all the other parts, observe the order that I have mentioned.

COSIMO: You have said ((if I remember well)) that this method of training is
to enable them to form these companies into an army, and that this training
serves to enable them to be arranged within it. But if it should occur that
these four hundred fifty infantry have to operate as a separate party, how
would you arrange them?

FABRIZIO: I will now guide you in judging where he wants to place the pikes,
and who should carry them, which is not in any way contrary to the
arrangement mentioned above, for although it may be the method that is
observed when, together with other companies, it comes to an engagement,
none the less, it is a rule that serves for all those methods, in which it
should happen that you have to manage it. But in showing you the other two
methods for arranging the companies, proposed by me, I will also better
satisfy your question; for either they are never used, or they are used when
the company is above, and not in the company of others.

And to come to the method of forming it with two horns (wings), I say, that
you ought to arrange the eighty files at five per file in this way: place a
Centurion in the middle, and behind him twenty five files that have two
pikemen (each) on the left side, and three shield-bearers on the right: and
after the first five, in the next twenty, twenty Heads of Ten be placed, all
between the pikemen and shield-bearers, except that those (Heads) who carry
pikes stay with the pikemen. Behind these twenty five files thusly arranged,
another Centurion is placed who has fifteen files of shield-bearers behind
him. After these, the Constable between the flag and the bugler, who also
has behind him another fifteen files of shield-bearers. The third Centurion
is placed behind these, and he has twenty five files behind him, in each of
which are three shield-bearers on the left left side and two pikemen on the
right: and after the first five files are twenty Heads of Ten placed between
the pikemen and the shield-bearers. After these files, there is the fourth
Centurion. If it is desired, therefore, to arrange these files to form a
company with two horns (wings), the first Centurion has to be halted with
the twenty five files which are behind him. The second Centurion then has to
be moved with the fifteen shield-bearers who are on his rear, and turning to
the right, and on the right flank of the twenty five files to proceed so far
that he comes to the fifteen files, and here he halts. After, the Constable
has to be moved with the fifteen files of shield bearers who are behind, and
turning around toward the right, over by the right flank of the fifteen
files which were moved first, marches so that he comes to their front, and
here he halts. After, move the third Centurion with the twenty five files
and with the fourth Centurion who is behind them, and turning to the right,
march by the left flank of the last fifteen files of shield-bearers, and he
does not halt until he is at the head of them, but continues marching up
until the last files of twenty five are in line with the files behind. And,
having done this, the Centurion who was Head of the first fifteen files of
shield-bearers leaves the place where he was, and goes to the rear of the
left angle. And thus he will turn a company of twenty five solid files, of
twenty infantry per file, with two wings, on each side of his front, and
there will remain a space between then, as much as would (be occupied by) by
ten men side by side. The Captain will be between the two wings, and a
Centurion in each corner of the wing. There will be two files of pikemen and
twenty Heads of Ten on each flank. These two wings (serve to) hold between
them that artillery, whenever the company has any with it, and the
carriages. The Veliti have to stay along the flanks beneath the pikemen.
But, in wanting to bring this winged (formed) company into the form of the
piazza (plaza), nothing else need be done than to take eight of the fifteen
files of twenty per file and place them between the points of the two horns
(wings), which then from wings become the rear (shoulder) of the piazza
(plaza). The carriages are kept in this plaza, and the Captain and the flag
there, but not the artillery, which is put either in the front or along the
flanks. These are the methods which can be used by a company when it has to
pass by suspicious places by itself. None the less, the solid company,
without wings and without the plaza, is best. But in wanting to make safe
the disarmed ones, that winged one is necessary.

The Swiss also have many forms of companies, among which they form one in
the manner of a cross, as in the spaces between the arms, they keep their
gunners safe from the attacks of the enemy. But since such companies are
good in fighting by themselves, and my intention is to show how several
companies united together combat with the enemy, I do not belabor myself
further in describing it.

COSIMO: And it appears to me I have very well comprehended the method that
ought to be employed in training the men in these companies, but ((if I
remember well)) you said that in addition to the ten companies in a
Battalion, you add a thousand extraordinary pikemen and four hundred
extraordinary Veliti. Would you not describe how to train these?

FABRIZIO: I would, and with the greatest diligence: and I would train the
pikemen, group by group, at least in the formations of the companies, as the
others; for I would serve myself of these more than of the ordinary
companies, in all the particular actions, how to escort, to raid, and such
things. But the Veliti I would train at home without bringing them together
with the others, for as it is their office to combat brokenly (in the open,
separately), it is not as necessary that they come together with the others
or to train in common exercises, than to train them well in particular
exercises. They ought, therefore, ((as was said in the beginning, and now it
appears to me laborious to repeat it)) to train their own men in these
companies so that they know how to maintain their ranks, know their places,
return there quickly when either the evening or the location disrupts them;
for when this is caused to be done, they can easily be taught the place the
company has to hold and what its office should be in the armies. And if a
Prince or a Republic works hard and puts diligence in these formations and
in this training, it will always happen that there will be good soldiers in
that country, and they will be superior to their neighbors, and will be
those who give, and not receive, laws from other men. But ((as I have told
you)) the disorder in which one exists, causes them to disregard and not to
esteem these things, and, therefore, our training is not good: and even if
there should be some heads or members naturally of virtue, they are unable
to demonstrate it.

COSIMO: What carriages would you want each of these companies to have?

FABRIZIO: The first thing I would want is that the Centurions or the Heads
of Ten should not go on horseback: and if the Constables want to ride
mounted, I would want them to have a mule and not a horse. I would permit
them two carriages, and one to each Centurion, and two to every three Heads
of Ten, for they would quarter so many in each encampment, as we will
narrate in its proper place. So that each company would have thirty six
carriages, which I would have (them) to carry the necessary tents, cooking
utensils, hatchets, digging bars, sufficient to make the encampment, and
after that anything else of convenience.

COSIMO: I believe that Heads assigned by you in each of the companies are
necessary: none the less, I would be apprehensive that so many commanders
would be confusing.

FABRIZIO: They would be so if I would refer to one, but as I refer to many,
they make for order; actually, without those (orders), it would be
impossible to control them, for a wall which inclines on every side would
need many and frequent supports, even if they are not so strong, but if
few, they must be strong, for the virtu of only one, despite its spacing,
can remedy any ruin. And so it must be that in the armies and among every
ten men there is one of more life, of more heart, or at least of more
authority, who with his courage, with words and by example keeps the others
firm and disposed to fight. And these things mentioned by me, as the heads,
the flags, the buglers, are necessary in an army, and it is seen that we
have all these in our (present day) armies, but no one does his duty.
First, the Heads of Ten, in desiring that those things be done because they
are ordered, it is necessary ((as I have said)) for each of them to have
his men separate, lodge with them, go into action with them, stay in the
ranks with them, for when they are in their places, they are all of mind
and temperament to maintain their ranks straight and firm, and it is
impossible for them to become disrupted, or if they become disrupted, do
not quickly reform their ranks. But today, they do not serve us for
anything other than to give them more pay than the others, and to have them
do some particular thing. The same happens with the flags, for they are
kept rather to make a beautiful show, than for any military use. But the
ancients served themselves of it as a guide and to reorganize themselves,
for everyone, when the flag was standing firm, knew the place that he had
to be near his flag, and always returned there. He also knew that if it
were moving or standing still, he had to move or halt. It is necessary in
an army, therefore, that there be many bodies, and that each body have its
own flag and its own guide; for if they have this, it needs must be they
have much courage and consequently, are livelier. The infantry, therefore,
ought to march according to the flag, and the flag move according to the
bugle (call), which call, if given well, commands the army, which
proceeding in step with those, comes to serve the orders easily. Whence the
ancients having whistles (pipes), fifes, and bugles, controlled (modulated)
them perfectly; for, as he who dances proceeds in time with the music, and
keeping with it does not make a miss-step, so an army obedient in its
movement to that call (sound), will not become disorganized. And,
therefore, they varied the calls according as they wanted to enkindle or
quiet, or firm the spirits of men. And as the sounds were various, so they
named them variously. The Doric call (sound) brought on constancy, Frigio,
fury (boldness): whence they tell, that Alexander being at table, and
someone sounding the Frigio call, it so excited his spirit that he took up
arms. It would be necessary to rediscover all these methods, and if this is
difficult, it ought not at least to be (totally) put aside by those who
teach the soldier to obey; which each one can vary and arrange in his own
way, so long as with practice he accustoms the ears of his soldiers to
recognize them. But today, no benefit is gotten from these sounds in great
part, other than to make noise.

COSIMO: I would desire to learn from you, if you have ever pondered this
with yourself, whence such baseness and disorganization arises, and such
negligence of this training in our times?

FABRIZIO: I will tell you willingly what I think. You know of the men
excellent in war there have been many famed in Europe, few in Africa, and
less in Asia. This results from (the fact that) these last two parts of the
world have had a Principality or two, and few Republics; but Europe alone
has had some Kingdoms and an infinite number of Republics. And men become
excellent, and show their virtu, according as they are employed and
recognized by their Prince, Republic, or King, whichever it may be. It
happens, therefore, that where there is much power, many valiant men spring
up, where there is little, few. In Asia, there are found Ninus, Cyrus,
Artafersus, Mithradates, and very few others to accompany these. In Africa,
there are noted ((omitting those of ancient Egypt)) Maximinius, Jugurtha,
and those Captains who were raised by the Carthaginian Republic, and these
are very few compared to those of Europe; for in Europe there are excellent
men without number, and there would be many more, if there should be named
together with them those others who have been forgotten by the malignity of
the time, since the world has been more virtuous when there have been many
States which have favored virtu, either from necessity or from other human
passion. Few men, therefore, spring up in Asia, because, as that province
was entirely subject to one Kingdom, in which because of its greatness there
was indolence for the most part, it could not give rise to excellent men in
business (activity). The same happened in Africa: yet several, with respect
to the Carthaginian Republic, did arise. More excellent men come out of
Republics than from Kingdoms, because in the former virtu is honored much of
the time, in the Kingdom it is feared; whence it results that in the former,
men of virtu are raised, in the latter they are extinguished. Whoever,
therefore, considers the part of Europe, will find it to have been full of
Republics and Principalities, which from the fear one had of the other, were
constrained to keep alive their military organizations, and honor those who
greatly prevailed in them. For in Greece, in addition to the Kingdom of the
Macedonians, there were many Republics, and many most excellent men arose in
each of them. In Italy, there were the Romans, the Samnites, the Tuscans,
the Cisalpine Gauls. France and Germany were full of Republics and Princes.
Spain, the very same. And although in comparison with the Romans, very few
others were noted, it resulted from the malignity of the writers, who
pursued fortune and to whom it was often enough to honor the victors. For it
is not reasonable that among the Samnites and Tuscans, who fought fifty
years with the Roman People before they were defeated, many excellent men
should not have sprung up. And so likewise in France and Spain. But that
virtu which the writers do not commemorate in particular men, they
commemorate generally in the peoples, in which they exalt to the stars
(skies) the obstinacy which existed in them in defending their liberty. It
is true, therefore, that where there are many Empires, more valiant men
spring up, and it follows, of necessity, that those being extinguished,
little by little, virtu is extinguished, as there is less reason which
causes men to become virtuous. And as the Roman Empire afterwards kept
growing, and having extinguished all the Republics and Principalities of
Europe and Africa, and in greater part those of Asis, no other path to virtu
was left, except Rome. Whence it resulted that men of virtu began to be few
in Europe as in Asia, which virtu ultimately came to decline; for all the
virtu being brought to Rome, and as it was corrupted, so almost the whole
world came to be corrupted, and the Scythian people were able to come to
plunder that Empire, which had extinguished the virtu of others, but did not
know how to maintain its own. And although afterwards that Empire, because
of the inundation of those barbarians, became divided into several parts,
this virtu was not renewed: first, because a price is paid to recover
institutions when they are spoiled; another, because the mode of living
today, with regard to the Christian religion, does not impose that necessity
to defend it that anciently existed, in which at the time men, defeated in
war, were either put to death or remained slaves in perpetuity, where they
led lives of misery: the conquered lands were either desolated or the
inhabitants driven out, their goods taken away, and they were sent dispersed
throughout the world, so that those overcome in war suffered every last
misery. Men were terrified from the fear of this, and they kept their
military exercises alive, and honored those who were excellent in them. But
today, this fear in large part is lost, and few of the defeated are put to
death, and no one is kept prisoner long, for they are easily liberated. The
Citizens, although they should rebel a thousand times, are not destroyed,
goods are left to their people, so that the greatest evil that is feared is
a ransom; so that men do not want to subject themselves to dangers which
they little fear. Afterwards, these provinces of Europe exist under very few
Heads as compared to the past, for all of France obeys a King, all of Spain
another, and Italy exists in a few parts; so that weak Cities defend
themselves by allying themselves with the victors, and strong States, for
the reasons mentioned, do not fear an ultimate ruin.

COSIMO: And in the last twenty five years, many towns have been seen to be
pillaged, and lost their Kingdoms; which examples ought to teach others to
live and reassume some of the ancient orders.

FABRIZIO: That is what you say, but if you would note which towns are
pillaged, you would not find them to be the Heads (Chief ones) of the
States, but only members: as is seen in the sacking of Tortona and not
Milan, Capua and not Naples, Brescia and not Venice, Ravenna and not Rome.
Which examples do not cause the present thinking which governs to change,
rather it causes them to remain in that opinion of being able to recover
themselves by ransom: and because of this, they do not want to subject
themselves to the bother of military training, as it appears to them partly
unnecessary, partly a tangle they do not understand. Those others who are
slave, to whom such examples ought to cause fear, do not have the power of
remedying (their situation), and those Princes who have lost the State, are
no longer in time, and those who have (the State) do not have (military
training) and those Princes who have lost the State, are no longer in time,
and those who have (the State) do not have (military training) or want it;
for they want without any hardship to remain (in power) through fortune,
not through their own virtu, and who see that, because there is so little
virtu, fortune governs everything, and they want it to master them, not
they master it. And that that which I have discussed is true, consider
Germany, in which, because there are many Principalities and Republics,
there is much virtu, and all that is good in our present army, depends on
the example of those people, who, being completely jealous of their State
((as they fear servitude, which elsewhere is not feared)) maintain and
honor themselves all us Lords. I want this to suffice to have said in
showing the reasons for the present business according to my opinion. I do
not know if it appears the same to you, or if some other apprehension
should have risen from this discussion.

COSIMO: None, rather I am most satisfied with everything. I desire above,
returning to our principal subject, to learn from you how you would arrange
the cavalry with these companies, and how many, how captained, and how
armed.

FABRIZIO: And it, perhaps, appears to you that I have omitted these, at
which do not be surprized, for I speak little of them for two reasons: one,
because this part of the army is less corrupt than that of the infantry, for
it is not stronger than the ancient, it is on a par with it. However, a
short while before, the method of training them has been mentioned. And as
to arming them, I would arm them as is presently done, both as to the light
cavalry as to the men-at-arms. But I would want the light cavalry to be all
archers, with some light gunners among them, who, although of little use in
other actions of war, are most useful in terrifying the peasants, and place
them above a pass that is to be guarded by them, for one gunner causes more
fear to them (the enemy) than twenty other armed men. And as to numbers, I
say that departing from imitating the Roman army, I would have not less than
three hundred effective cavalry for each battalion, of which I would want
one hundred fifty to be men-at-arms, and a hundred fifty light cavalry; and
I would give a leader to each of these parts, creating among them fifteen
Heads of Ten per hand, and give each one a flag and a bugler. I would want
that every ten men-at-arms have five carriages and every ten light
cavalrymen two, which, like those of the infantry, should carry the tents,
(cooking) utensils, hitches, poles, and in addition over the others, their
tools. And do not think this is out of place seeing that men-at-arms have
four horses at their service, and that such a practice is a corrupting one;
for in Germany, it is seen that those men-at-arms are alone with their
horses, and only every twenty have a cart which carries the necessary things
behind them. The horsemen of the Romans were likewise alone: it is true that
the Triari encamped near the cavalry and were obliged to render aid to it in
the handling of the horses: this can easily be imitated by us, as will be
shown in the distribution of quarters. That, therefore, which the Romans
did, and that which the Germans do, we also can do; and in not doing it, we
make a mistake. These cavalrymen, enrolled and organized together with a
battalion, can often be assembled when the companies are assembled, and
caused to make some semblance of attack among them, which should be done
more so that they may be recognized among them than for any necessity. But I
have said enough on this subject for now, and let us descend to forming an
army which is able to offer battle to the enemy, and hope to win it; which
is the end for which an army is organized, and so much study put into it.

 ON THE ART OF WAR BY

NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
CITIZEN AND SECRETARY OF FLORENCE TO

LORENZO DI FILIPPO STROZZI,
A GENTLEMEN OF FLORENCE

THIRD BOOK

COSIMO: Since we are changing the discussion, I would like the questioner to
be changed, so that I may not be held to be presumptuous, which I have
always censured in others. I, therefore, resign the speakership, and I
surrender it to any of these friends of mine who want it.

ZANOBI: It would be most gracious of you to continue: but since you do not
want to, you ought at least to tell us which of us should succeed in your
place.

COSIMO: I would like to pass this burden on the Lord Fabrizio.

FABRIZIO: I am content to accept it, and would like to follow the Venetian
custom, that the youngest talks first; for this being an exercise for young
men, I am persuaded that young men are more adept at reasoning, than they
are quick to follow.

COSIMO: It therefore falls to you Luigi: and I am pleased with such a
successor, as long as you are satisfied with such a questioner.

FABRIZIO: I am certain that, in wanting to show how an army is well
organized for undertaking an engagement, it would be necessary to narrate
how the Greeks and the Romans arranged the ranks in their armies. None the
less, as you yourselves are able to read and consider these things, through
the medium of ancient writers, I shall omit many particulars, and will cite
only those things that appear necessary for me to imitate, in the desire in
our times to give some (part of) perfection to our army. This will be done,
and, in time, I will show how an army is arranged for an engagement, how it
faces a real battle, and how it can be trained in mock ones. The greatest
mistake that those men make who arrange an army for an engagement, is to
give it only one front, and commit it to only one onrush and one attempt
(fortune). This results from having lost the method the ancients employed of
receiving one rank into the other; for without this method, one cannot help
the rank in front, or defend them, or change them by rotation in battle,
which was practiced best by the Romans. In explaining this method,
therefore, I want to tell how the Romans divided each Legion into three
parts, namely, the Astati, the Princeps, and the Triari; of whom the Astati
were placed in the first line of the army in solid and deep ranks, (and)
behind them were the Princeps, but placed with their ranks more open: and
behind these they placed the Triari, and with ranks so sparse, as to be
able, if necessary, to receive the Princeps and the Astati between them. In
addition to these, they had slingers, bow-men (archers), and other lightly
armed, who were not in these ranks, but were situated at the head of the
army between the cavalry and the infantry. These light armed men, therefore,
enkindled the battle, and if they won ((which rarely happened)), they
pursued the victory: if they were repulsed, they retired by way of the
flanks of the army, or into the intervals (gaps) provided for such a result,
and were led back among those who were not armed: after this proceeding, the
Astati came hand to hand with the enemy, and who, if they saw themselves
being overcome, retired little by little through the open spaces in the
ranks of the Princeps, and, together with them, renewed the fight. If these
also were forced back, they all retired into the thin lines of the Triari,
and all together, en masse, recommenced the battle; and if these were
defeated, there was no other remedy, as there was no way left to reform
themselves. The cavalry were on the flanks of the army, placed like two
wings on a body, and they some times fought on horseback, and sometimes
helped the infantry, according as the need required. This method of
reforming themselves three times is almost impossible to surpass, as it is
necessary that fortune abandon you three times, and that the enemy has so
much virtu that he overcomes you three times. The Greeks, with their
Phalanxes, did not have this method of reforming themselves, and although
these had many ranks and Leaders within them, none the less, they
constituted one body, or rather, one front. So that in order to help one
another, they did not retire from one rank into the other, as the Romans,
but one man took the place of another, which they did in this way. Their
Phalanxes were (made up) of ranks, and supposing they had placed fifty men
per rank, when their front came against the enemy, only the first six ranks
of all of them were able to fight, because their lances, which they called
Sarisse, were so long, that the points of the lances of those in the sixth
rank reached past the front rank. When they fought, therefore, if any of the
first rank fell, either killed or wounded, whoever was behind him in the
second rank immediately entered into his place, and whoever was behind him
in the third rank immediately entered into the place in the second rank
which had become vacant, and thus successively all at once the ranks behind
restored the deficiencies of those in front, so that the ranks were always
remained complete, and no position of the combatants was vacant except in
the last rank, which became depleted because there was no one in its rear to
restore it. So that the injuries which the first rank suffered, depleted the
last, and the first rank always remained complete; and thus the Phalanxes,
because of their arrangement, were able rather to become depleted than
broken, since the large (size of its) body made it more immobile. The
Romans, in the beginning, also employed Phalanxes, and instructed their
Legions in a way similar to theirs. Afterwards, they were not satisfied with
this arrangement, and divided the Legion into several bodies; that is, into
Cohorts and Maniples; for they judged ((as was said a little while ago))
that that body should have more life in it (be more active) which should
have more spirit, and that it should be composed of several parts, and each
regulate itself. The Battalions of the Swiss, in these times, employed all
the methods of the Phalanxes, as much in the size and entirety of their
organization, as in the method of helping one another, and when coming to an
engagement they place the Battalions one on the flank of the other, or they
place them one behind the other. They have no way in which the first rank,
if it should retire, to be received by the second, but with this
arrangement, in order to help one another, they place one Battalion in front
and another behind it to the right, so that if the first has need of aid,
the latter can go forward and succor it. They put a third Battalion behind
these, but distant a gun shot. This they do, because if the other two are
repulsed, this (third) one can make its way forward, and the others have
room in which to retire, and avoid the onrush of the one which is going
forward; for a large multitude cannot be received (in the same way) as a
small body, and, therefore, the small and separate bodies that existed in a
Roman Legion could be so placed together as to be able to receive one another
among themselves, and help each other easily. And that this arrangement of
the Swiss is not as good as that of the ancient Romans is demonstrated by
the many examples of the Roman Legions when they engaged in battle with the
Greek Phalanxes, and the latter were always destroyed by the former, because
the kinds of arms ((as I mentioned before)) and this method of reforming
themselves, was not able to maintain the solidity of the Phalanx. With these
examples, therefore, if I had to organize an army, I would prefer to retain
the arms and the methods, partly of the Greek Phalanxes, partly of the Roman
Legions; and therefore I have mentioned wanting in a Battalion two thousand
pikes, which are the arms of the Macedonian Phalanxes, and three thousand
swords and shield, which are the arms of the Romans. I have divided the
Battalion into ten Companies, as the Romans (divided) the Legion into ten
Cohorts. I have organized the Veliti, that is the light armed, to enkindle
the battle, as they (the Romans did). And thus, as the arms are mixed, being
shared by both nations and as also the organizations are shared, I have
arranged that each company have five ranks of pikes (pikemen) in front, and
the remainder shields (swordsmen with shields), in order to be able with this
front to resist the cavalry, and easily penetrate the enemy companies on
foot, and the enemy at the first encounter would meet the pikes, which I
would hope would suffice to resist him, and then the shields (swordsmen)
would defeat him. And if you would note the virtu of this arrangement, you
will see all these arms will execute their office completely. First, because
pikes are useful against cavalry, and when they come against infantry, they
do their duty well before the battle closes in, for when they are pressed,
they become useless. Whence the Swiss, to avoid this disadvantage, after
every three ranks of pikemen place one of halberds, which, while it is not
enough, gives the pikemen room (to maneuver). Placing, therefore, our pikes
in the front and the shields (swordsmen) behind, they manage to resist the
cavalry, and in enkindling the battle, lay open and attack the infantry: but
when the battle closes in, and they become useless, the shields and swords
take their place, who are able to take care of themselves in every strait.

LUIGI: We now await with desire to learn how you would arrange the army for
battle with these arms and with these organizations.

FABRIZIO: I do not now want to show you anything else other than this. You
have to understand that in a regular Roman army, which they called a
Consular Army, there were not more than two Legions of Roman Citizens, which
consist of six hundred cavalry and about eleven thousand infantry. They also
had as many more infantry and cavalry which were sent to them by their
friends and confederates, which they divided into two parts, and they called
one the right wing, and the other the left wing, and they never permitted
this (latter) infantry to exceed the number of the infantry of the Legion.
They were well content that the cavalry should be greater in number. With
this army which consisted of twenty two thousand infantry and about two
thousand cavalry effectives, a Consul undertook every action and went on
every enterprise. And when it was necessary to face a large force, they
brought together two Consuls with two armies. You ought also to note that
ordinarily in all three of the principal activities in which armies engage,
that is, marching, camping, and fighting, they place the Legion in the
middle, because they wanted that virtu in which they should trust most
should be greater unity, as the discussion of all these three activities
will show you. Those auxiliary infantry, because of the training they had
with the infantry of the Legion, were as effective as the latter, as they
were disciplined as they were, and therefore they arranged them in a similar
way when organizing (for) and engagement. Whoever, therefore, knows how they
deployed the entire (army). Therefore, having told you how they divided a
Legion into three lines, and how one line would receive the other, I have
come to tell you how the entire army was organized for an engagement.

If I would want, therefore, to arrange (an army for) an engagement in
imitation of the Romans, just as they had two Legions, I would take two
Battalions, and these having been deployed, the disposition of an entire
Army would be known: for by adding more people, nothing else is accomplished
than to enlarge the organization. I do not believe it is necessary that I
remind you how many infantry there are in a Battalion, and that it has ten
companies, and what Leaders there are per company, and what arms they have,
and who are the ordinary (regular) pikemen and Veliti, and who the
extraordinary, because a little while I distinctly told you, and I reminded
you to commit it to memory as something necessary if you should want to
understand all the other arrangements: and, therefore, I will come to the
demonstration of the arrangement, without repeating these again. And it
appears to me that ten Companies of a Battalion should be placed on the left
flank, and the ten others of the other on the right. Those on the left
should be arranged in this way. The five companies should be placed one
alongside the other on the front, so that between one and the next there
would be a space of four arm lengths which come to occupy an area of one
hundred forty one arm lengths long, and forty wide. Behind these five
Companies I would place three others, distant in a straight line from the
first ones by forty arm lengths, two of which should come behind in a
straight line at the ends of the five, and the other should occupy the space
in the middle. Thus these three would come to occupy in length and width the
same space as the five: but where the five would have a distance of four arm
lengths between one another, this one would have thirty three. Behind these
I would place the last two companies, also in a straight line behind the
three, and distant from those three forty arm lengths, and I would place
each of them behind the ends of the three, so that the space between them
would be ninety one arm lengths. All of these companies arranged thusly
would therefore cover (an area of) one hundred forty one arm lengths long and
two hundred wide. The extraordinary pikemen I would extend along the flanks
of these companies on the left side, distant twenty arm lengths from it,
creating a hundred forty three files of seven per file, so that they should
cover the entire length of the ten companies arranged as I have previously
described; and there would remain forty files for protecting the wagons and
the unarmed people in the tail of the army, (and) assigning the Heads of Ten
and the Centurions in their (proper) places: and, of the three Constables, I
would put one at the head, another in the middle, and the third in the last
file, who should fill the office of Tergiduttore, as the ancients called the
one placed in charge of the rear of the Army. But returning to the head
(van) of the Army I say, that I would place the extraordinary Veliti
alongside the extraordinary pikemen, which, as you know, are five hundred,
and would place them at a distance of forty arm lengths. On the side of
these, also on the left hand; I would place the men-at-arms, and would
assign them a distance of a hundred fifty arm lengths away. Behind these,
the light cavalry, to whom I would assign the same space as the men-at-arms.
The ordinary Veliti I would leave around their companies, who would occupy
those spaces which I placed between one company and another, who would act
to minister to those (companies) unless I had already placed them under the
extraordinary pikemen; which I would do or not do according as it should
benefit my plans. The general Head of all the Battalions I would place in
that space that exists between the first and second order of companies, or
rather at the head, and in that space with exists between the last of the
first five companies and the extraordinary pikemen, according as it should
benefit my plans, surrounded by thirty or sixty picked men, (and) who should
know how to execute a commission prudently, and stalwartly resist an attack,
and should also be in the middle of the buglers and flag carriers. This is
the order in which I would deploy a Battalion on the left side, which would
be the deployment of half the Army, and would cover an area five hundred and
eleven arm lengths long and as much as mentioned above in width, not
including the space which that part of the extraordinary pikemen should
occupy who act as a shield for the unarmed men, which would be about one
hundred arm lengths. The other Battalions I would deploy on the right side
exactly in the same way as I deployed those on the left, having a space of
thirty arm lengths between our battalions and the other, in the head of
which space I would place some artillery pieces, behind which would be the
Captain general of the entire Army, who should have around him in addition
to the buglers and flag carriers at least two hundred picked men, the
greater portion on foot, among whom should be ten or more adept at executing
every command, and should be so provided with arms and a horse as to be able
to go on horseback or afoot as the needs requires. Ten cannon of the
artillery of the Army suffice for the reduction of towns, which should not
exceed fifty pounds per charge, of which in the field I would employ more in
the defense of the encampment than in waging a battle, and the other
artillery should all be rather often than fifteen pounds per charge. This I
would place in front of the entire army, unless the country should be such
that I could situate it on the flank in a safe place, where it should not be
able to be attacked by the enemy.

This formation of the Army thusly arranged, in combat, can maintain the
order both of the Phalanxes and of the Roman Legions, because the pikemen
are in front and all the infantry so arranged in ranks, that coming to
battle with the enemy, and resisting him, they should be able to reform the
first ranks from those behind according to the usage of the Phalanxes. On
the other hand, if they are attacked so that they are compelled to break
ranks and retire, they can enter into the spaces of the second company
behind them, and uniting with them, (and) en masse be able to resist and
combat the enemy again: and if this should not be enough, they can in the
same way retire a second time, and combat a third time, so that in this
arrangement, as to combatting, they can reform according to both the Greek
method, and the Roman. As to the strength of the Army, it cannot be arranged
any stronger, for both wings are amply provided with both leaders and arms,
and no part is left weak except that part behind which is unarmed, and even
that part has its flanks protected by the extraordinary pikemen. Nor can the
enemy assault it in any part where he will not find them organized, and the
part in the back cannot be assaulted, because there cannot be an enemy who
has so much power that he can assail every side equally, for it there is
one, you don't have to take the field with him. But if he should be a third
greater than you, and as well organized as you, if he weakens himself by
assaulting you in several places, as soon as you defeat one part, all will
go badly for him. If his cavalry should be greater than yours, be most
assured, for the ranks of pikemen that gird you will defend you from every
onrush of theirs, even if your cavalry should be repulsed. In addition to
this, the Heads are placed on the side so that they are able easily to
command and obey. And the spaces that exist between one company and the next
one, and between one rank and the next, not only serve to enable one to
receive the other, but also to provide a place for the messengers who go and
come by order of the Captain. And as I told you before, as the Romans had
about twenty thousand men in an Army, so too ought this one have: and as
other soldiers borrowed their mode of fighting and the formation of their
Army from the Legions, so too those soldiers that you assembled into your
two Battalions would have to borrow their formation and organization. Having
given an example of these things, it is an easy matter to initiate it: for
if the army is increased either by two Battalions, or by as many men as are
contained in them, nothing else has to be done than to double the
arrangements, and where ten companies are placed on the left side, twenty
are now placed, either by increasing or extending the ranks, according as
the place or the enemy should command you.

LUIGI: Truly, (my) Lord, I have so imagined this army, that I see it now,
and have a desire to see it facing us, and not for anything in the world
would I desire you to become Fabius Maximus, having thoughts of holding the
enemy at bay and delaying the engagement, for I would say worse of you, than
the Roman people said of him.

FABRIZIO: Do not be apprehensive. Do you not hear the artillery? Ours has
already fired, but harmed the enemy little; and the extraordinary Veliti
come forth from their places together with the light cavalry, and spread
out, and with as much fury and the loudest shouts of which they are capable,
assault the enemy, whose artillery has fired one time, and has passed over
the heads of our infantry without doing them an injury. And as it is not
able to fire a second time, our Veliti and cavalry have already seized it,
and to defend it, the enemy has moved forward, so that neither that of
friend or enemy can perform its office. You see with what virtu our men
fight, and with what discipline they have become accustomed because of the
training they have had, and from the confidence they have in the Army, which
you see with their stride, and with the men-at-arms alongside, in marching
order, going to rekindle the battle with the adversary. Your see our
artillery, which to make place for them, and to leave the space free, has
retired to the place from which the Veliti went forth. You see the Captain
who encourages them and points out to them certain victory. You see the
Veliti and light cavalry have spread out and returned to the flanks of the
Army, in order to see if they can cause any injury to the enemy from the
flanks. Look, the armies are facing each other: watch with what virtu they
have withstood the onrush of the enemy, and with what silence, and how the
Captain commands the men-at-arms that they should resist and not attack, and
do not detach themselves from the ranks of the infantry. You see how our
light cavalry are gone to attack a band of enemy gunners who wanted to
attach by the flank, and how the enemy cavalry have succored them, so that,
caught between the cavalry of the one and the other, they cannot fire, and
retire behind their companies. You see with what fury our pikemen attack
them, and how the infantry is already so near each other that they can no
longer manage their pikes: so that, according to the discipline taught by
us, our pikemen retire little by little among the shields (swordsmen). Watch
how in this (encounter), so great an enemy band of men-at-arms has pushed
back our men-at-arms on the left side and how ours, according to discipline,
have retired under the extraordinary pikemen, and having reformed the front
with their aid, have repulsed the adversary, and killed a good part of them.
In fact all the ordinary pikemen of the first company have hidden themselves
among the ranks of the shields (swordsmen), and having left the battle to
the swordsmen, who, look with what virtu, security, and leisure, kill the
enemy. Do you not see that, when fighting, the ranks are so straitened, that
they can handle the swords only with much effort? Look with what hurry the
enemy moves; for, armed with the pike and their swords useless ((the one
because it is too long, the other because of finding the enemy too greatly
armed)), in part they fall dead or wounded, in part they flee. See them flee
on the right side. They also flee on the left. Look, the victory is ours.
Have we not won an engagement very happily? But it would have been won with
greater felicity if I should have been allowed to put them in action. And
see that it was not necessary to avail ourselves of either the second or
third ranks, that our first line was sufficient to overcome them. In this
part, I have nothing else to tell you, except to dissolve any doubts that
should arise in you.

LUIGI: You have won this engagement with so much fury, that I am astonished,
and in fact so stupefied, that I do not believe I can well explain if there
is any doubt left in my mind. Yet, trusting in your prudence, I will take
courage to say that I intend. Tell me first, why did you not let your
artillery fire more than one time? and why did you have them quickly retire
within the army, nor afterward make any other mention of them? It seems to
me also that you pointed the enemy artillery high, and arranged it so that
it should be of much benefit to you. Yet, if it should occur ((and I believe
it happens often)) that the lines are pierced, what remedy do you provide?
And since I have commenced on artillery, I want to bring up all these
questions so as not to have to discuss it any more. I have heard many
disparage the arms and the organization of the ancient Armies, arguing that
today they could do little, or rather how useless they would be against the
fury of artillery, for these are superior to their arms and break the ranks,
so that it appears to them to be madness to create an arrangement that cannot
be held, and to endure hardship in carrying a weapon that cannot defend you.

FABRIZIO: This question of yours has need ((because it has so many items))
of a long answer. It is true that I did not have the artillery fire more
than one time, and because of it one remains in doubt. The reason is, that
it is more important to one to guard against being shot than shooting the
enemy. You must understand that, if you do not want the artillery to injure
you, it is necessary to stay where it cannot reach you, or to put yourself
behind a wall or embankment. Nothing else will stop it; but it is necessary
for them to be very strong. Those Captains who must make an engagement
cannot remain behind walls or embankments, nor can they remain where it may
reach them. They must, therefore, since they do not have a way of protecting
themselves, find one by which they are injured less; nor can they do
anything other than to undertake it quickly. The way of doing this is to go
find it quickly and directly, not slowly or en masse; for, speed does not
allow them to shoot again, and because the men are scattered, they can injure
only a few of them. A band of organized men cannot do this, because if they
march in a straight line, they become disorganized, and if they scatter,
they do not give the enemy the hard work to rout them, for they have routed
themselves. And therefore I would organize the Army so that it should be
able to do both; for having placed a thousand Veliti in its wings, I would
arrange, that after our artillery had fired, they should issue forth
together with the light cavalry to seize the enemy artillery. And therefore
I did not have my artillery fire again so as not to give the enemy time, for
you cannot give me time and take it from others. And for that, the reason I
did not have it fired a second time, was not to allow it to be fired first;
because, to render the enemy artillery useless, there is no other remedy
than to assault it; which, if the enemy abandons it, you seize it; if they
want to defend it, it is necessary that they leave it behind, so that in the
hands of the enemy or of friends, it cannot be fired. I believe that, even
without examples, this discussion should be enough for you, yet, being able
to give you some from the ancients, I will do so. Ventidius, coming to
battle with the Parthians, the virtu of whom (the latter) in great part
consisted in their bows and darts, be allowed them to come almost under his
encampments before he led the Army out, which he only did in order to be
able to seize them quickly and not give them time to fire. Caesar in Gaul
tells, that in coming to battle with the enemy, he was assaulted by them
with such fury, that his men did not have time to draw their darts according
to the Roman custom. It is seen, therefore, that, being in the field, if you
do not want something fired from a distance to injure you, there is no other
remedy than to be able to seize it as quickly as possible. Another reason
also caused me to do without firing the artillery, at which you may perhaps
laugh, yet I do not judge it is to be disparaged. And there is nothing that
causes greater confusion in an Army than to obstruct its vision, whence most
stalwart Armies have been routed for having their vision obstructed either
by dust or by the sun. There is also nothing that impedes the vision than
the smoke which the artillery makes when fired: I would think, therefore,
that it would be more prudent to let the enemy blind himself, than for you
to go blindly to find him. I would, therefore, not fire, or ((as this would
not be approved because of the reputation the artillery has)) I would put it
in the wings of the Army, so that firing it, its smoke should not blind the
front of what is most important of our forces. And that obstructing the
vision of the enemy is something useful, can be adduced from the example of
Epaminondas, who, to blind the enemy Army which was coming to engage him,
had his light cavalry run in front of the enemy so that they raised the dust
high, and which obstructed their vision, and gave him the victory in the
engagement. As to it appearing to you that I aimed the shots of artillery in
my own manner, making it pass over the heads of the infantry, I reply that
there are more times, and without comparison, that the heavy artillery does
not penetrate the infantry than it does, because the infantry lies so low,
and they (the artillery) are so difficult to fire, that any little that you
raise them, (causes) them to pass over the heads of the infantry, and if you
lower them, they damage the ground, and the shot does not reach them (the
infantry). Also, the unevenness of the ground saves them, for every little
mound or height which exists between the infantry and it (the artillery),
impedes it. And as to cavalry, and especially men-at-arms, because they are
taller and can more easily be hit, they can be kept in the rear (tail) of
the Army until the time the artillery has fired. It is true that often they
injure the smaller artillery and the gunners more that the latter (cavalry),
to which the best remedy is to come quickly to grips (hand to hand): and if
in the first assault some are killed ((as some always do die)) a good
Captain and a good Army do not have to fear an injury that is confined, but
a general one; and to imitate the Swiss, who never shun an engagement even
if terrified by artillery, but rather they punish with the capital penalty
those who because of fear of it either break ranks or by their person give
the sign of fear. I made them ((once it had been fired)) to retire into the
Army because it left the passage free to the companies. No other mention of
it was made, as something useless, once the battle was started.

You have also said in regard to the fury of this instrument that many judge
the arms and the systems of the ancients to be useless, and it appears from
your talk that the modems have found arms and systems which are useful
against the artillery. If you know this, I would be pleased for you to show
it to me, for up to now I do not know of any that have been observed, nor do
I believe any can be found. So that I would like to learn from those men for
what reasons the soldiers on foot of our times wear the breastplate or the
corselet of iron, and those on horseback go completely covered with armor,
since, condemning the ancient armor as useless with respect to artillery,
they ought also to shun these. I would also like to learn for what reason
the Swiss, in imitation of the ancient systems, for a close (pressed)
company of six or eight thousand infantry, and for what reason all the
others have imitated them, bringing the same dangers to this system because
of the artillery as the others brought which had been imitated from
antiquity. I believe that they would not know what to answer; but if you
asked the soldiers who should have some experience, they would answer, first
that they go armed because, even if that armor does not protect them from
the artillery, it does every other injury inflicted by an enemy, and they
would also answer that they go closely together as the Swiss in order to be
better able to attack the infantry, resist the cavalry, and give the enemy
more difficulty in routing them. So that it is observed that soldiers have
to fear many other things besides the artillery, from which they defend
themselves with armor and organization. From which it follows that as much
as an Army is better armed, and as much as its ranks are more serrated and
more powerful, so much more is it secure. So that whoever is of the opinion
you mentioned must be either of little prudence, or has thought very little
on this matter; for if we see the least part of the ancient way of arming in
use today, which is the pike, and the least part of those systems, which are
the battalions of the Swiss, which do us so much good, and lend so much
power to our Armies, why shouldn't we believe that the other arms and other
systems that they left us are also useful? Moreover, if we do not have any
regard for the artillery when we place ourselves close together, like the
Swiss, what other system than that can make us afraid? inasmuch as there is
no other arrangement that can make us afraid than that of being pressed
together. In addition to this, if the enemy artillery does not frighten me
when I lay siege to a town, where he may injure me with great safety to
himself, and where I am unable to capture it as it is defended from the
walls, but can stop him only with time with my artillery, so that he is able
to redouble his shots as he wishes, why do I have to be afraid of him in the
field where I am able to seize him quickly? So that I conclude this, that
the artillery, according to my opinion, does not impede anyone who is able
to use the methods of the ancients, and demonstrate the ancient virtu. And
if I had not talked another time with you concerning this instrument, I
would extend myself further, but I want to return to what I have now said.

LUIGI: We are able to have a very good understanding since you have so much
discoursed about artillery, and in sum, it seems to me you have shown that
the best remedy that one has against it when he is in the field and having
an Army in an encounter, is to capture it quickly. Upon which, a doubt rises
in me, for it seems to me the enemy can so locate it on a side of his army
from which he can injure you, and would be so protected by the other sides,
that it cannot be captured. You have ((if you will remember)) in your army's
order for battle, created intervals of four arm lengths between one company
and the next, and placed twenty of the extraordinary pikemen of the company
there. If the enemy should organize his army similarly to yours, and place
his artillery well within those intervals, I believe that from here he would
be able to injure you with the greatest safety to himself, for it would not
be possible to enter among the enemy forces to capture it.

FABRIZIO: You doubt very prudently, and I will endeavor either to resolve
the doubt, or to give you a remedy. I have told you that these companies
either when going out or when fighting are continually in motion, and by
nature always end up close together, so that if you make the intervals
small, in which you would place the artillery, in a short time, they would
be so closed up that the artillery can no longer perform its function: if
you make them large to avoid this danger, you incur a greater, so that,
because of those intervals, you not only give the enemy the opportunity to
capture your artillery, but to rout you. But you have to know that it is
impossible to keep the artillery between the ranks, especially those that
are mounted on carriages, for the artillery travel in one direction, and are
fired in the other, so that if they are desired to be fired while
travelling, it is necessary before they are fired that they be turned, and
when they are being turned they need so much space, that fifty carriages of
artillery would disrupt every Army. It is necessary, therefore, to keep them
outside the ranks where they can be operated in the manner which we showed
you a short time ago. But let us suppose they can be kept there, and that a
middle way can be found, and of a kind which, when closed together, should
not impede the artillery, yet not be so open as to provide a path for the
enemy, I say that this is easily remedied at the time of the encounter by
creating intervals in your army which give a free path for its shots, and
thus its fury will be useless. Which can be easily done, because the enemy,
if it wants its artillery to be safe, must place it in the end portions of
the intervals, so that its shots, if they should not harm its own men, must
pass in a straight line, and always in the same line, and, therefore, by
giving them room, can be easily avoided. Because this is a general rule,
that you must give way to those things which cannot be resisted, as the
ancients did to the elephants and chariots with sickles. I believe, rather I
am more than certain, that it must appear to you that I prepared and won an
engagement in my own manner; no