Niccolo Machiavelli

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Niccolo Machiavelli was born in Florence in 1469 of an old citizen family.
Little is known about his life until 1498, when he was appointed secretary and
Second Chancellor to the Florentine Republic. During his time of office, his
journeys included missions to Louis XII and to the Emperor Maximilian; he was
with Cesare Borgia in the Romagna; after watching the Papal election of 1503, he
accompanied Julius II on his first campaign of conquest. In 1507, as a
chancellor of the newly appointed Nove di Milizia, he organized an infantry
force which fought at the capture of Pisa in 1509. Three years later it was
defeated by the Holy League at Prato, the Medici returned to power in Florence,
and Machiavelli was excluded from public life. After suffering imprisonment and
torture, he retired to his farm near San Casiano, where he lived with his wife,
and six children and gave his time to study and writing. His works included The
Prince , (or The Prince) the Discourses on the First Decade of Livy; The Art of
War, and the comedy, Mandragola, a satire on seduction. In 1520, Cardinal Giulio
de'Medici secured him a commission to write a history of Florence, which he
finished in 1525. After a brief return to public life, he died in 1527.
Great Events in Niccolo Machiavelli's life:
1469 May 3, born in Florence the son of a jurist.
1494 The Medici expelled from Florence. Machiavelli Appointed clerk to Adriani
in the second chancery.
1498 Machiavelli succeeds Adriani as second chancellor and secretary.
1500 Sent to France where he meets with Louis XII and the Cardinal of Rouen.
1502 Marries Marietta Corsini. Sent to Romagna as envoy to Cesare Borgia where
he witnessed the events leading up to Borgia's murder. Machiavelli's political
philosophy was highly influenced by his study of Cesare Borgia.
1503 January, returns to Florence.
1504 Second mission to France.
1506 December, submits a plan to reorganize the military to Pierre Soderini,
Florence's gonfalonier, and it is accepted.
1508 Sent to Bolzano to the court of the Emperor Maximilian.
1510 Third and last mission to France
1512 The Medici returns with a Spanish army. Florence deposes Soderini and
welcomes the Medici. Machiavelli dismissed from office and retires to San
Casciano.
1513 Imprisoned after being accused of participation in a conspiracy and
failed coupe. Is tortured and then released upon Giovanni de Medici's election
to the papacy. Returns to San Casciano and writes The Prince.
1515 Writes La Mandragola.
1519 Consulted by the Medici on a new constitution for Florence which he
offers in his Discourses.
1520 Appearance of The Art of War and The Life of Castruccio Castracane.
Commissioned to write the History of Florence.
1526 Clement VII employs Machiavelli to inspect the fortifications at Florence
and then sends him to attend the historian Francesco Guicciardini.
1527 June 20, died, location unknown.

Quotations from the Political Philosophy of Nicolo
Wise men say, and not without reason, that whoever wished to foresee the
future might consult the past.
Of mankind we may say in general they are fickle, hypocritical, and greedy of
gain.
There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or
more uncertain in its success than to take the lead in the introduction of a
new order of things.
Ambition is so powerful a passion in the human breast, that however high we
reach we are never satisfied.
A prudent man should always follow in the footsteps of great men and imitate
those who have been outstanding. If his own prowess fails to compare with
theirs, at least it has an air of greatness about it.
One change leaves the way open for the introduction of others.
Whosoever desires constant success must change his conduct with the times.

Nicolò Machiavelli another point of view

Historian and statesman, b. at Florence, 3 May, 1469; d. there, 22 June, 1527. His family is said to have been descended from the old marquesses of Tuscany, and to have given Florence thirteen gonfaloniers of justice. His father, Bernardo, was a lawyer, and acted as treasurer of the Marches, but was far from wealthy. Of Nicolò's studies we only know that he was a pupil of Marcello Virgilio. In 1498 he was elected secretary of the Lower Chancery of the Signory, and in later years he held the same post under the Ten. Thus it chanced that for fourteen years he had charge of the home and foreign correspondence of the republic, the registration of trials, the keeping of the minutes of the councils, and the drafting of agreements with other states. Moreover he was sent in various capacities to one or other locality within the State of Tuscany, and on twenty-three occasions he acted as legate on important embassies to foreign princes, e. g. to Catherine Sforza (1499), to France (1500, 1510, 1511), to the emperor (1507, 1509), to Rome (1503, 1506), to Cæsar Borgia (1502), to Gian Paolo Baglione at Perugia, to the Petrucci at Siena, and to Piombino. On these embassies he gave evidence of wonderful keenness of observation and insight into the hidden thoughts of the men he was dealing with, rather than of any great diplomatic skill. After the defeat of France in Italy (1512) the Medici once more obtained control of Florence; the secretary was dismissed and exiled for one year from the city. On the discovery of the Capponi and Boscoli plot against Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici, Machiavelli was accused as an accomplice, and tortured, but he was set free when the cardinal became Pope Leo X. Thereupon he retired to some property he had at Strada near San Casciano, where he gave himself up to the study of the classics, especially Livy, and to the writing of his political and literary histories. Both Leo X and Clement VII sought his advice in political matters, and he was often employed on particular missions affecting matters of state, as, for in stance, when he was sent to Francesco Guiccardini, the papal leader in the Romagna and general of the army of the League, concerning the fortification of Florence. He made vain efforts to secure a public post under the Medici, being ready even to sacrifice his political opinions for the purpose. He returned home after the sack of Rome (12 May, 1527) when the power of the Medici had been once more overthrown, but his old political party turned against him as one who fawned on tyrants. He died soon afterwards.

Machiavelli's writings consist of the following works:

Historical: "Storie Fiorentine", which goes from the fall of the Empire to 1492, dedicated to Clement VII, at whose request it had been written. "Descrizione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nello ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, etc."; "Vita di Castruccio Cas- tracane"; "Discorsi sopra laprima deca di Tito Livio"; "Descrizione della peste di Firenze dell' anno 1527"; to this group belong also his letters from his embassies as well as his minor writings concerning the affairs of Pisa, Lucca, France, Germany.

Political: "Il Principe", "Discorso sopra il Riformare lo Stato di Firenze"; "Dell'arte della guerra", and other military works.

Literary: "Dialogo sulle lingue"; fIve comedies: "Mandragola"; "Clizia"; a comedy in prose; "The Andria" of Terence, a translation; a comedy in verse; "I Decennati" (a metrical history of the years 1495-1504); "Dell' Asino d'oro", writings on moral subjects; "La serenata"; "Canti Carnas cialesehi"; a novel, "Belfagor", etc.

Machiavelli's character as a man and a writer has been widely discussed, and on both heads his merits and demerits have been exaggerated, but in such a way that his demerits have preponderated to the detriment of his memory. Machiavellism has become synonymous with treachery, intrigue, subterfuge, and tyranny. It has been even said that "Old Nick", the popular name of the Devil among Anglo-Saxon races, derives its origin from that of Nicolò Machiavelli. This dubious fame he has won by his book the "Principe", and the theories therein exploited were further elaborated in his "Discorsi sopra Livio". To understand the "Principe" right it must be borne in mind that the work is not a treatise on foreign politics. It aims solely at examining how a kingdom may be best built up and established; nor is it a mere abstract discussion, but it is carried on in the light of an ideal long held by Machiavelli, that a United Italy was possible and in the last chapter of the work he exhorts the Medici of Florence (Giuliano and Lorenzo) to its realization. His aim was to point out the best way for bringing it about; he did not deal with abstract principles and arguments, but collected examples from classical antiquity and from recent events, especially from the career of Cæsar Borgia. So that the "Principe" is a political tract with a definite aim and intended for a particular locality. To gain the end in view results are to be the only criteria of the methods employed, and even the teachings of the moral law must give way to secure the end in view. Good faith, clemency, and moderation are not cast overboard, but he teaches that the interests of the state are above all individual virtues. These virtues may be useful, and when they are a prince ought to exercise them, but more often in dealing with an opponent they are a hindrance, not in themselves, but by reason of the crookedness of others.

Whosoever would prevail against the treachery, crime, and cruelty of others, must himself be beforehand in misleading and deceiving his opponent and even in getting rid of him, as Cæsar Borgia had done. While on the other hand Gian Paolo Baglione made a mistake, by omitting to imprison or put to death Julius II, in 1506, on the occasion of his unprotected entry to Perugia (Discorsi sopra Livio, I, xxvii). Again, a prince must keep clear of crime not only when it is hurtful to his interests but when it is useless. He should try to win the love of his subjects, by simulating virtue if he does not possess it; he ought to encourage trade so that his people, busied in getting rich, may have no time for politics; he ought to show concern for religion, because it is a potent means for keeping his people submissive and obedient. Such is the general teaching of the "Principe", which has been often refuted. As a theory Machiavellism may per haps be called an innovation; but as a practice it is as old as political society. It was a most immoral work, in that it cuts politics adrift from all morality, and it was rightly put on the Index in 1559. It is worth noting that the "Principe" with its glorification of absolutism is totally opposed to its author's ideas of democracy, which led to his ruin. To explain the difficulty it is not necessary to claim that the book is a satire, nor that it is evidence of how easily the writer could change his political views provided he could stand well with the Medici. Much as Machiavelli loved liberty and Florence he dreamed of a "larger Italy" of the Italians. As a practical man he saw that his dream could be realized only through a prince of character and energy who would walk in the steps of Cæsar Borgia, and he conceded that the individual good must give way to the general well-being.

As a historian Machiavelli is an excellent source when he deals with what happened under his eyes at the various embassies; but it should be remembered that he gives everything a more or less unconscious twist to bring it into conformity with his generalizations. This is more marked even in his accounts of what he had heard or read, and serves to explain the discrepancies in the letters he wrote during his embassies to Cæsar Borgia, the "Descrizione", etc., the ideal picture he drew of affairs in Germany, and his life of Castruccio Castracane, which is rather an historical romance modelled on the character of Agathocles in Plutarch. He knew nothing of historical criticism, yet he showed how events in history move in obedience to certain general laws; and this is his great merit as an historian. His natural bent was politics, but in his dealings with military matters he showed such skill as would amaze us even if we did not know he had never been a soldier. He recognized that to be strong a state must have its standing army, and he upholds this not only in the "Principe" and the "Discorsi" but in his various military writings. The broad and stable laws of military tactics he lays down in masterly fashion; yet it is curious to note that he lays no great stress on firearms.

His style is always clear and crisp and his reasoning close and orderly. What poetry he has left gives no proof of poetic talent; rather, the comedies are clever and successful as compositions and only too often bear undisguised traces of the moral laxity of the author (this is shown also in his letters to his friends) and of the age in which he lived. His "Mandragola" and "Clizia" are nothing more or less than pochades and lose no opportunity of scoring against religion. Machiavelli did not disguise his dislike for Christianity which by exalting humility, meekness, and patience had, he said, weakened the social and patriotic instincts of mankind. Hence, he mocked at Savonarola though he was the saviour of democracy, and he had a special dislike for the Holy See as a temporal power, as he saw in it the greatest obstacle to Italian unity; to use his own expression, it was too weak to control the whole peninsula, but too strong to allow of any other state bringing about unity. This explains why he has no words of praise for Julius II and his Italian policy. It was merely as an opportunist that he courted the favour of Leo X and Clement VII. On the other hand, when death came his way he remembered that he was a Christian and he died a Christian death, though his life, habits, and ideals had been pagan, and himself a typical representative of the Italian Renaissance.

Power for good..or bad?
FLORENCE, ITALY
Until Nicolo Machiavelli, writers about politics had been concerned
primarily about how government should work. Machiavelli was concerned about how
it actually does work. For 14 years Machiavelli was a bureaucrat and diplomat
for the city-state of Florence, in Italy. He organized Florence's militia and
was sent ondiplomatic missions throughout Italy and other parts of Europe.
And at every opportunity he watched great men to see how they kept and extended
their power. In 1502 he was sent to Romagna as a representative to Cesare
Borgia, whom he admired for his boldness, clever frauds and expert use of
cruelty.
But in 1512 the army of Pope Julius II took over Florence and restored the
Medici family to its position of authority, and Machiavelli, a republican,was
out of work. He retired to a farm near San Casciano to write letters pleading
for a job and suggesting ways his skills could be used. One of those pleadings
was "The Prince," a small book on political science he completed around 1513 and
dedicated to Lorenzo Medici. He hopedLorenzo would be impressed and offer him a
job. But Lorenzo ignored it -- and him.
But the world did not long ignore The Prince. It soon became an underground
classic in Florence and later was published widely.
The fascinating thing about Machiavelli's works -- particularly The Prince
and to a lesser degree his "Discourses" -- are their clear-eyed examination of
political power, how it is obtained, maintained and expanded. A reader of his
works is bound to think, "Yes, I'll bet that would work!" The troubling aspect
of his many political writings is their cold-heartedness. Machiavelli is just as
willing to help the wicked maintain and expand their power as he is the
virtuous.
For example, if you are not sure whether to rise to power by brute force or
by deceit, Machiavelli will help you decide. It is the chapter in the Discourses
entitled, "Cunning and deceit will serve a man better than force to rise from a
base condition to great fortune." Or, if you are having trouble deciding whether
to kill the people from whom you have taken political power, Machiavelli would
recommend you read the chapter in Discourses titled, "A prince cannot live
securely in astate so long as those live whom he has deprived of it."
But let's be fair to the man -- though he might not be fair to us. First,
much of what he taught is good advice. For example: Rulers should avoid being
hated by the population; they should shun flatterers; they shouldn't make laws
and then disregard them, etc. Second, during the Renaissance there was an effort
to divorce learning from religion and religiously-derived morality, and
Machiavelli -- a man of his time -- was simply applying this logic to the study
of power.
Nevertheless, it is troubling to think that such tyrants as Hitler, Lenin,
and Mussolini have found Machiavelli such valuable reading

Italy Machiavelli's Time

After the fall of the Roman empire Italy evolved into several culturally and linguistically distinct regions. Around the early 16th century family based dynasties began to take hold as a major unifying force. The extended power of a few western European dynasties changed the political face of Italy, and Europe as a whole. A prime example was the rivalry between the Habsburgs and the French Valois which a created pan-European political arena. This tended to make most wars and disputes trans-European conflicts.

During this political evolution in Europe, Italy suffered as the nexus of the dynastic disputes. Italy, in effect, became the battleground for a new style of warfare, and spoil that these new powers would battle over. These European wars between 1494 and 1540 effectively ended the renaissance in Italy and were a major theme in Machiavelli's writings. His new political philosophy and those of subsequent theoreticians were profoundly inspired by these prolonged struggles.

The disputes in Italy began with an ancient conflict: the competition between the a branch of the French royal family and the rulers of Aragon in Spain for the kingdom of Naples. In the 1490s, King Charles VIII of France had both the resources and the desire to seek conquest in that region. Machiavelli noted that Charles himself was not a great intellect, nor a particularly charismatic leader. But he fantasized of being like the conquering knights of legend. His progenitors endowed him with great wealth, and he endeavored to employ it to achieve European hegemony.

Charles' designs on Italy seemed considerably more viable when Lodovico Sforza, duke of Milan, offered to help him take Naples. The idea of a French invasion did not appeal to other Italians, since the French would have to cross their territories, with unpredictable consequences. This was precisely the sort of situation that Cosimo de' Medici or Lorenzo Magnifico, in previous years, would have tried to defuse through negotiations. The Medici family leader in Florence was Piero who lacked the political skills and courage of some of him prominent forbearers. Instead of shrewdly playing competing powers against each others he made a destructive alliance with Naples and agreed to fight the French should they invade.

But when in 1494 King Charles and Duke Lodovico began marching down Italy with an army of unprecedented size, 18,000 men and 40 cannon [Parker, 9], Piero de' Medici panicked. He rode out to meet Charles and presented him with the keys to all the important fortresses in Florentine territory. Piero's abject cowardice lost him the domination of the city. When he returned to Florence, the citizens chased him out, and reinstituted a real republic in place of the sham they had had for the previous 60 years. This was the beginning of a long series of trials and tribulations for Florence, which are of
particular importance in European history because they provided Niccolo Machiavelli with the political experience he later wrote up in his famous books,

The Prince and The Discourses. So we will look at Florentine events in more detail than we might otherwise. That Italian experience has become the background for a lot of the European tradition of European thought.
The new Florentine government of 1494 had no more chance of resisting Charles VIII than Piero had, so they admitted him. Florence, never a great military power, was in no position to offer serious resistance. It had to hope that
cooperation with the French would eventually lead to the restoration of its own territory. Charles's great army had a similar effect elsewhere. But the whole expedition ended in a laughable anti-climax. Charles found
himself trapped in the boot of Italy with all the states save Florence ranged against him. He successfully fought his way home, but had to abandon Naples to Ferrante, and died as soon as he got to France. It seemed that Italy was left
in much the same state as it had been before. Certainly it was left alone for the next five years.

Those same years were a time of turmoil for Florence. The expulsion of the Medici had left the city without a real constitution, and there was debate about how the government would work. After years of tyranny in disguise, there was
wide support for a popular government, one that would give decision-making power to all the respectable citizens. There were important elements who opposed this: not only Medici partisans, but also other members of wealthy, established
families who hoped for an oligarchy. The question was decided in an unexpected way: by the intervention of a revivalist preacher, the Dominican friar Girolamo Savonarola.

Savonarola had been working in Florence for some years, since the days of Lorenzo Magnifico, denouncing everything that people like Lorenzo valued: the wealth, sophistication and sensuous beauty of the city. Savonarola thought that
Florence typified what was wrong with his times, and warned that such worldliness would bring punishment down from heaven. Savonarola's prophecies seemed to have come true with Charles VIII's invasion. Here was the scourge of God, and perhaps the champion who might clean up the mess in Rome. After the fall of the Medici, Savonarola became the most influential political figure in the city; and when he spoke for an popular government, he won the day.
For four years, from 1494-98, Savonarola, who was not a Florentine citizen and never held office, was nevertheless its effective ruler. Savonarola, like old Cosimo de' Medici, appealed to the poorer citizens against the rich and
influential. His message was civic revival through Christian virtue, a turning against worldliness and corruption. He had enough followers that sinners abandoned the streets: Youths and children formed volunteer brigades that, in
the understated words of an older historian, who knew nothing of modern Iran, "roam[ed] the streets..[and] induced gamblers to hand over the tools of their trade and women too fashionably dressed to renounce their scandalous display ."

Savonarola's regime had plenty of opposition. For one thing, continued attachment to the French alliance had not gained the return of Florentine fortresses and towns. There were lots of people, influential ones, who despised
the popular party and Savonarola's crew and called them indifferently the Piagnoni, "the Snivellers." Further, Pope Alexander VI, the Borgia pope, was irritated by Savonarola's preaching against corruption at Rome and on the Papal throne itself, though Savonarola named no names. In 1497, Alexander got angry enough to excommunicate
Savonarola. The city continued to support the friar, but he was in a dangerous position if even one of the frequent city elections should go against him. In March of 1498, this happened: a group of civic officials gained office who were
determined to get rid of Savonarola.

Quickly thereafter, a dispute over whether Savonarola was a true prophet led to civic unrest. Anti-Sniveller mobs roamed the streets until Savonarola, to avoid civil war, let himself be arrested. The government then tortured him into
admitting he was a fake and condemned him to death as a heretic. The confession, though it was coerced, broke most of the remaining belief in Savonarola's mission. They expected, unrealistically, an innocent prophet to be
able to withstand any abuse.

Savonarola's fall and execution did not destroy the popular government. It regrouped under a president for life named Piero Soderini, whose chief secretary was Niccolo Machiavelli. Under Soderini, Machiavelli became Florence's chief
diplomat, and travelled to all the capitals of Italy and to France, meeting the leaders of the time face to face. Machiavelli also got the chance to try out his pet military theories. Machiavelli believed that Florence, like other Italian states, was weak because it citizens no longer fought. It depended on mercenary troops. If a citizen militia could be re-established, Florence's independence would be secure. Machiavelli raised a militia -- out of rural
draftees, not citizens -- but on one occasion it did what it was supposed to. Pisa fell to Florence's army in 1509.

But despite this victory, the situation of small Italian powers like Florence was getting worse. Back in 1499, Charles VIII's successor on the French throne, Louis XII, had invaded Italy again, aiming not just at Naples, but at Milan as
well. In 1500, Louis made a fateful alliance with Ferdinand, king of Aragon. The French king and the Aragonese one would dispossess Ferrante of Naples and divide his kingdom. Soon after Naples was occupied, Aragon and France fell out.
In the next thirty years, French troops in Lombardy and Spanish ones in Naples would act as millstones to crush the rest of Italy

The popes might have united Italy against these foreigners. Instead, they acted venally and mundanely. Most of their efforts were aimed at securing property for their sons and nephews, or in moments of high duty, the narrow advantage of the papal states. Alexander VI made a deal early on with Louis XII to gain French aid for his son, the infamous Cesare Borgia. Alexander hoped that Cesare could carve out a central Italian principality. Cesare was a ruthless man (when he wasn't murdering his sister's husbands) and he terrified other Italian rulers until, mercifully, he died young. Alexander's successor
Julius II was just as terrifying as Cesare, taking the field in person against whoever had crossed him most recently.

It was Julius who ended the Florentine Republic. When Florence stuck with the French, Julius had his Spanish allies take the city and hand it over to the leading Medici, a cardinal who soon after became Pope Leo X, and thus ruled both
Rome and Florence. This was the end, by the way, of Machiavelli's political career, and the beginning of his career as a writer, to which we will eventually return. Like previous popes, Leo was most intent on preserving his independence and
building up the family fortune: in his case this meant securing Medici rule in the city his grandfather Lorenzo Magnifico had once led. But he and his cousin, who succeeded him as Clement VII, had a hard time of it. Each turn of events
merely emphasized how strong France and Aragon were compared to any Italian combination; every attempt to play the superpowers off against each other sharpened the rivalry between them. The wars became even fiercer after 1519,
when Ferdinand of Aragon was succeeded by his grandson Charles V, who inherited all of Spain, Burgundy, and the Habsburg lands. The French king, now Francis I, was not willing to let such a powerful monarch have Italy too.

The Medici popes continued to manoeuvre, but in 1527, Pope Clement's plotting with France infuriated Charles, who was now on top in the peninsula, and his undisciplined unpaid army marched on Rome. When they got there, they put the
city to a horrible sack; Clement himself was obliged to surrender to the emperor, and was kept a virtual prisoner for two years. It was the end of the devil-may-care Renaissance papacy, and almost the end of the papacy as an
independent political power.

The Sack of Rome gave Florence one last chance at republicanism. The Medici were tossed out, and the city prepared to fight for its freedom.But Florence found out in 1530 what the pope had found out three years earlier. No matter
how brave they were -- and they were much braver now than in Machiavelli's time -- Spain was too much for them. When Charles cut Florence's supply routes, the city surrendered -- to be handed back to the Medici, who were now in Charles's
good books again. Clement set up a relative as duke, and the family held the title, under Habsburg protection, until the time of Napoleon. For the Spanish hegemony established by Charles V lasted a very long time.

For some historians, the sack of Rome marks the end of the Renaissance; for others, the fall of the Florentine Republic. As Italy became a Spanish satellite, and was subjected to a repressive religious reform, the springs of
innovation dried up. Italy was becoming less central in the world, as even trade took different routes. But the Italian wars themselves produced a noteworthy contribution to the culture of Europe -- a distinctive criticism of history and politics associated with Niccolo Machiavelli and his friend, the diplomat Francesco Guicciardini. These two men were in their professional lives put through an amazing political roller-coaster ride in which everything that might happen had, at least once. In particular, Italy had suffered every possible disaster save a Turkish invasion. Perhaps not surprisingly, they took a pessimistic view of politics; in particular, they were skeptical of the value of reason or morality in
political life.

Machiavelli was actually the less pessimistic of the two. Machiavelli continued to believe that politics was the only
life for a man. Politics was dangerous and unpredictable, and fortune might strike you down at any point, but the struggle was worth it. The secret was virtu or virtue; not Christian virtue as preached by Savonarola and all medieval
writers on politics, or classical virtues as praised by earlier humanists.

Virtu meant "the strength and vigor necessary to construct a politically necessary society" [Koenigsberger and Mosse, 109]. The successful prince or republican society was not good, it was strong and pragmatic; ruthless or
merciful or generous, as circumstances and advantage, not morality, demanded. Machiavelli specifically rejected the claims of Christianity to set the tone of public life. To quote Koenigsberger: Machiavelli's ideal society was not one of justice...

but a republic in which all citizens were united by virtu, generating the strength and power of will which could cope with ever-present change and survive. [What was new about Machiavelli was not the idea that effective
politics and morality might conflict]; it was the exaltation of [such pragmatism] into a way of life essential to the construction of the golden age.

Guicciardini, Machiavelli's lesser known friend, was more pessimistic. He saw no route whatever into the golden age. Guicciardini's contribution to political thought was not his theoretical prescriptions, but his disillusioned, detailed
historical description of how Italy was enslaved by foreign rulers and betrayed by its own. Guicciardini's history paralleled Machiavelli because he saw politics as nothing but self-interest, disguised sometimes perhaps by proclamations of duty or right, but self-interest nonetheless. Guicciardini thus dedicated himself to charting the course of
self-interested power politics, something that he did more diligently than any historian since pagan times.
Together these witnesses to the Italian wars added something interesting to learned European thought: the idea that Christianity might be irrelevant to the public man and public life, to the political thinker or the historian. It was
not an idea that would be taken up quickly; the Reformation was already underway well before either died. But it was there, to be picked up and elaborated later.

Machiavelli and Love

Something of a historical villain, Niccolo Machiavelli is one of history’s most
enduring characters. A staple in high school history books and a standard
question on the European History Advanced Placement exam, Machiavelli is forever
remembered for his political commentary, The Prince, and its amoral philosophy
that “the ends justifies the means”. Modern scholarship has done little – if
anything – to refute Machiavelli’s reputation as a Renaissance bad boy. For
instance, in the index to his book Machiavelli’s Virtue, Harvey Mansfield
indexes the word “Machiavellism” as “See also evil” . Furthermore, in his
text Mansfield tries to explain that Machiavelli never actually wrote the exact
phrase “the ends justifies the means” by instead writing, “…he said worse: that
the end makes the means honorable, and that moral men believe this” .
While it’s useless to refute Machiavelli’s amoral attitude in The Prince, it’s
not fair to judge Machiavelli, the man, as merely sinister and heartless. In
fact, to call him heartless would indeed be a grave error, for just as much as
he was a critic and anticleric, Machiavelli was an experienced and passionate
lover.
Consider this sonnet written to Francesco Vettori in January 1515:
Many times the young Archer
had already tried to wound my breast
with his arrows, because he takes pleasure
in showing contempt for and inflicting injury on others;
and although those arrows were sharp and fierce,
so much so that a diamond couldn’t have withstood the blow,
nonetheless they found such a resistant target
that he had little regard for all their power.
So he, full of indignation and fury,
In order to give proof of his exalted excellence,
Changed quiver, changed arrow and bow;
and he fired one with such violence
that I still grieve over my wounds,
and I confess and acknowledge his power.

Whether or not this is a specific reference to a single love of his own, by
writing this poem Machiavelli is acknowledging the overwhelming power of Cupid’s
arrow. Love’s power over Machiavelli and his dependence on it is evident time
and time again throughout many of his writings – most notably his personal
letters. This paper will attempt to dissect five various love relationships of
Machiavelli’s, namely that between Machiavelli and his wife, Marietta;
Machiavelli and his courtesans; Machiavelli and his male family members,
Machiavelli and his friends, and, finally, Machiavelli and Italy. Ultimately
ideas will emerge to answer the questions who did Machiavelli love, why did he
love them, and how did he benefit from this love.

Marietta
Given the widely held notion that love precedes marriage, it seems a
logical place to being understanding Machiavelli and love is through his
relationship with his wife, Marietta Corsini. However, as Sebastian De Grazia
describes in his book Machiavelli in Hell, love before marriage is a relatively
modern idea. Marriages in the Renaissance were usually arranged by a marriage
broker who matched couples on the basis of family status and dowry. No doubt
Machiavelli and Marietta’s marriage was no exception. Machiavelli married
Marietta in 1501 when he was 32, and, although his parents were dead, De Grazia
writes “we may be sure that the dowry and other arrangements were negotiated by
members and agents of the Machiavegli and Corsini families” .
Very little detail is known about the relationship between Machiavelli and
Marietta. Of the more than 300 letters collected and translated in the volume
Machiavelli and His Friends, there are no letters written from Machiavelli to
Marietta and only one survives from Marietta to Machiavelli. In this particular
letter from 1503 Marietta writes that she misses her husband and expresses
concern over his health. She describes their new son as looking like.
Machiavelli and writes that “Since he looks like you, he seems beautiful to me”
Marietta says she wishes had more letters from Machiavelli and
that she plans to write more herself. She ends her letter, “Remember to come
home”
Marietta’s concern for Machiavelli’s health, her requests for more letters, and
her comments about her baby reminding her of him, all denote an obvious
affection for Machiavelli. Nevertheless, her letters raise a lot of questions
about how Machiavelli felt about his wife. For instance, what kind of wife has
to ask for her husband to “remember to come home”? If love is so powerful that
it “wounds” Machiavelli, why isn’t he voluntarily going home to see his wife

It will be noted later that he went out of his way to see his
mistresses. Another question that arises after reading Marietta’s letter is, “Why didn’t
Machiavelli write her more often?” It’s obvious that Marietta wanted more
letters from her husband, so why didn’t she get them? One possibility is that
Machiavelli did eventually write more letters, it is just that they don’t exist
anymore. Also, in his chapter about Renaissance Epistolary, John Najemy notes
that extensive correspondence between husbands and wives was unusual (20-1).
Thus, the lack of letters does not necessarily mean lack of love. In fact,
there are several other letters from family members that suggest Machiavelli
cared for Marietta. For instance, in a 1527 letter to his son Guido,
Machiavelli writes:
Greet Madonna Marietta for me and tell her I have been expecting-and still do-to
leave here any day; I have never longed so much to return to Florence as I do
now, but there is nothing else I can do. Simply tell her that, whatever she
hears, she should be of good cheer, since I shall be there before any danger
comes.
Although this letter is not directly to his wife, Machiavelli still acknowledges
Marietta and her concerns for his safety.
Having quickly exhausted all obvious sources of information about the
relationship between Machiavelli and Marietta, perhaps more information about
Machiavelli’s views on his marriage and marriage in general can be found through
a close examination of the marriages in his plays Mandragola and Clizia.
Interestingly enough, both plays depict dysfunctional marriages void of romantic
love and lust.
First, in Mandragola, Callimaco, a young Florentine, masterminds a plan to sleep
with the most beautiful women in Italy, Lucrezia, who happens to already be
married to a lawyer. However, sly gentleman that he is, Callimaco successfully
manipulates Lucrezia’s husband, Nicia, to devising a plan to sleep with Lucrezia
for one night. Callimaco not only fulfills his goal, but Lucrezia in turn falls
in love with Callimaco and invites him stay in the same house as she and her
husband .
In Clizia, Nicamaco, who has fallen in love with his adopted daughter, Clizia,
attempts to marry her off to a dunderhead and have them live next door so he can
sleep with his daughter as he pleases. Although the plan is ultimately thwarted
by the arrival of Clizia’s real father, Nicamaco had wanted to tamper with two
marriages: his own and his daughter’s .
Neither one of these plays describes what could be called a wholesome passionate
marriage. The characters have to look outside their marriage to find love. Given
that Machiavelli uses this situation twice, one can more seriously question if
Machiavelli also had no love in his marriage and looked for it elsewhere.
Another interesting aspect of these plays is the language in which husbands
refer –or are thought to supposed to refer- to their wives in. It is at once
overbearing and pretentious. For instance, in Mandragola, Callimaco tells
Nicia, “But I should not pretend to the name of husband if I couldn’t make my
wife so as I wanted” . In Clizia, Nicomaco constantly refers to his
wife, Sofronia, as mad and irrational . Once again, perhaps this is
how Machiavelli felt relationships should be between men and women. Maybe in
his marriage he made the rules and Marietta simply stayed at home waiting for
Machiavelli to tell her what to do next. In De Grazia’s words, in the
Renaissance, “Women are the domesticators of men” (230) Perhaps Machiavelli
loved Marietta only for the home stability she provided him with. When he lost
his job, she was always there as the passive wife hanging on the husband’s every
word. Maybe Machiavelli only loved Marietta for her constant companionship and
domestic upkeep.
One caveat before moving on: While these plays may hold Machiavelli’s true
views about marriage, one must be careful not to infer too much. Consider what
Machiavelli tell’s readers in his preface to Clizia:

Comedies are written to please and delight the spectators…You have, therefore,
to present characters who are ludicrous, slanderous or in love, and the plays
that have plenty of these three sort of dialogue will raise plenty of laughs.
Those that have none won’t find a smile in the house. (Hale 68)

While there is little evidence that Marietta and Machiavelli had a passionate
love affair, there is also not much evidence to prove that they didn’t. Yes,
Machiavelli did not brag to his friends about his beautiful wife as he did other
women, and, yes, he wrote plays about finding love outside of marriage – but is
this enough to assume that Machiavelli did not love Marietta at all?
Sebastian De Gazia suggests that there was love in the marriage, but
it was more of a fraternal love-perhaps like that between brothers. Obviously
Machiavelli had some interest in the marriage because he fathered five children
by Marietta. Also, Machiavelli tried his best to provide for his family before
and after died he died. In his will he left Marietta, “his dear spouse”, a
farm, a farmhouse, and two houses (De Grazia 125). If Machiavelli had truly
loved another woman, he could have given her something in the will because he
would already be dead and Marietta couldn’t kill him for it. It seems that even
if Machiavelli found love outside his marriage-which his plays and the next
section suggests-he still could have loved Marietta, even if it was only for the
constancy and domestication she offered him.

The Mistresses
In a 1523 letter Francesco Vettori writes Machiavelli, “You would
never have married if you had really known yourself.”. What
Vettori is no doubt referring to is Machiavelli’s weakness for women other than
his wife. Unlike with his marriage, Machiavelli’s personal correspondence is
just littered with references to various mistresses and affairs.
The first of Machiavelli’s affairs we know about took place in 1510. Giovanni
Girolami writes Machiavelli that “Jeanne in Lyons is devoted to you” (Atkinson
207). The next letter in the collection Machiavelli and His Friends mentions
Jeanne again and yet another courtesan named La Riccia.
La Riccia’s name appears in at least six letters. It seems that
Machiavelli went to see her on numerous occasions. De Grazia reports that as
Secretary, Machiavelli was accused before the Eight of committing an act of
sodomy with La Riccia (140). Incidentally, the incident did no harm to
Machiavelli’s career and he kept visiting La Riccia-so much so that he writes
that she calls him a “House Pest” .
Again, in August 1514, Machiavelli writes Vettori, “I have met a creature so
gracious, so refined, so noble-both in nature and in circumstance-that never
could either my praise or my love for her be as much as she deserves.” (Atkinson
292-3). At the present time, Machiavelli is living in Florence with his family.
This unnamed mistress “may have been a friend’s sister whose husband had
deserted her to live in Rome.” .
Finally, the last and by far the most significant of Machiavelli’s
extramarital loves was the actress Barbera Raffacani Salutati. It was for
Barbera that Machiavelli penned both Clizia and Mandragola. While there are no
letters to or from Barbera in his personal letters, much information about
Barbera can be gathered from letters between Machiavelli and his friends – most
notably Vettori and Guicciardini.
Machiavelli has an overwhelmingly obvious desire for Barbera. For example, he
writes Guicciardini that “Barbera is there in Rome; if you can do her any
service, I commend her to you, for she gives me far more concern than does the
emperor” (Atkinson ). This is an important statement because politics seemed
really to be Machiavelli’s passion. Shortly after being expelled from Florence,
Machiavelli laments “… I have to talk about politics. I need to either take a
vow of silence or to discuss this” .
Barbera’s feelings for Machiavelli are also evident in letters to Machiavelli
from his friends. Guicciardini writes Machiavelli in 1525 that Barbera “would
season an entire city for you.”. In a particularly fascinating
letter, Jacopo di Filippo Falconetti writes Machiavelli, “she did some
occasional discourtesies to see if you love her.” It seems as if Barbera was
testing Machiavelli’s devotion to her by trying to make him jealous. Given that
Machiavelli wrote plays for her, visited when he could and sent friends to check
on her, it can be assumed that Machiavelli was indeed devoted.
Having briefly described some of Machiavelli’s steamier
relationships, a good question to explore is, was this lust or love? After all,
casual sex was not unusual in Renaissance Florence. Francesco
Vettori, a married man, often preached of the necessity of lust to Machiavelli.
In 1515, explaining his boredom, he writes, “..of necessity one must endeavor to
think of pleasant things, but I know of nothing that give me more delight to
think about and to do than fucking.” (Atkinson 311). Did Machiavelli also view
sex as merely a non-emotional extracurricular sport?
There are several indications that Machiavelli also liked to sleep around for
pleasure. In a most famous letter describing his isolation outside Florence,
Machiavelli writes “...I have neither slept nor fooled around” (Atkinson 265).
This suggests that “fooling around” was a practice he was used to doing. Also,
it is worth noting a 1509 letter that Machiavelli wrote to Guicciardini
describing an incident he had with an old woman. Suffering from “conjugal
famine” Machiavelli is tricked into having sex with a disgusting looking hag.
Machiavelli takes great care in describing the woman’s vulgar appearance and
concludes,“I’ll be damned if I think I shall get horny again” (Atkinson 190-1).
While the truthfulness of this letter has been questioned, it really doesn’t
matter. The point is, Machiavelli probably did have casual sex without love.
Nevertheless, as will next be discussed, Machiavelli most certainly did love
some women. The biggest indicators of this love are Machiavelli’s letters on
love to Vettori.
Machiavelli and Vettori had a unique relationship. What started a political
union spread to friendship, and arguably love itself. In addition to carrying
on a political dialogue, Vettori fairly consistently wrote Machiavelli asking
for advice about a certain woman he had fallen in love with. Machiavelli, being
the good friend that he was, advised this married man to follow his own example
and let go of his heart and follow love. In February 1514 Machiavelli writes:
And since my own precedent causes you dismay, remembering what Love’s arrows
have done to me, I am obliged to tell you how I have handled myself with him.
As a matter of fact, I have let him do as he please and I have followed him
through hill and dale, woods and plains; I have discovered that he has granted
me more charms than if I had tormented him. So the, take off the saddlepacks,
remove the bridle, close your eyes, and say “Go ahead, Love, be my guide, my
leader; if things turn out well, may the praise be yours, if they turn out
badly, may the blame be yours-I am your slave”.

As suggested by this quote, Machiavelli sought after love with the reckless
abandonment of Nicamaco in Clizia and Callimaco in Mandragola.
Machiavelli’s passionate writing about love sharply contrasts his persuasive
letters about politics. In a political context, Machiavelli uses fact, logic,
and history to support his opinion. When writing about love, Machiavelli refers
to authors like Ovid and uses a more abstract tone. Examine this 1514 letter
written to Vettori:
I ought to tell you, as you did me, how this love began, how Love ensnared me
with his nets, where he spread them, and what they were like; you would realize
that, spread among the flowers, these were nets of gold woven by Venus, so soft
and gentle that even though an insensitive heart could have severed them,
nevertheless I declined to do so..
In their respective books, both John Najemy and Sebastian De Grazia attempt to
make some link between Machiavelli’s love of politics and love of women. This
is an important link because, as suggested earlier, politics was supposedly
Machiavelli’s life. De Grazia contends Machiavelli thought “Love of woman seems
to be a force withdrawing men from politics; if interfered with, it becomes a
danger to civil life” (132). De Grazia comes to this conclusion based on the
chapter in the Discourses called How a State is Ruined Because of Women.
Interestingly enough, if this is true, Machiavelli didn’t follow his own advice.
He obviously showed no restraint in his affairs and gave love free reign.
Machiavelli’s country love in particular muted his love for politics. Of this
woman Machiavelli wrote, “No longer to I delight in reading about the deeds of
the ancients or in discussing those of the moderns; everything has been
transformed into tender thoughts, for which I thank Venus and all of Cyprus”
(Atkinson 293). In this quote, love appears to be such a powerful influence that
it has overtaken the importance of politics in Machiavelli’s life.
Najemy writes that Machiavelli equates politics and love by strategizing about
them both in the same way. Of the quote used earlier giving Machiavelli’s
advice to Vettori, Najemy writes it “assumes the necessity of strategy and
negotiation in confronting the power of desire.” (298). Najemy explains that
the desire of a Prince to maintain control of his land parallels the struggle
men have against love. Najemy writes on man and love that “only by
relinquishing all attempts at control could he establish limits on Love’s
ability to harm him.” ; but he continues that “Similarly, if the desire and the
will to control (love) are often self-defeating (either because the object of
desire will not let itself be possessed, or because, if possessed, it reduces
the possessor to submission), conversely submission might actually be the source
of power.” (169). Substituting the word Fortune for love in this sentence
reveals a sentence similar to one found in chapter XXV, On Fortune’s Role in
Human Affairs and How She can be Dealt With, in The Prince (269). He concludes,
“that since Fortune changes and men remain set in their ways, men will succeed
when the two are in harmony and fail when they are not in accord.” (162). Again
though, Machiavelli did not follow his own advice. He was defeated by love.
Accentuating this contradiction is Machiavelli’s closing words in the chapter.
I am certainly convinced of this: that it is better to be impetuous than
cautious, because Fortune is a woman, and it is necessary, in order to keep her
down, to beat her and to struggle with her. (Bondanella 162)

Apparently love was too strong for Machiavelli because he let love overtake him.
If Machiavelli can’t heed his own advice, then is it possible that really love
was more important to him than even politics?
There is no denying that love was a powerful force for Machiavelli. He
continually surrendered himself to his passions for women throughout his life.
But how is his love for his mistresses different than his love for Marietta?
Machiavelli used ripe and luxurious language to explain his affairs to his
friends where as he rarely made mention of his wife. Furthermore, Machiavelli’s
correspondence expressed a certain kind of hopeless and inability to resist
love. In the case of his mistresses, if love was a power relationship, love had
the power-perhaps a greater power than politics. Contrastingly, in
Machiavelli’s views on marriage, the husband had the power. Machiavelli
obviously loved his mistresses in a different way than Marietta. To Marietta,
Machiavelli, the husband, was acting out a social norm. In the case of his
mistresses, Machiavelli was a slave to love and unable to take the advice he
gives to Princes.

Discourses on Livy: Book 1

DISCOURSES OF NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

ON THE FIRST TEN (BOOKS) OF TITUS LIVIUS

TO ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI AND COSIMO RUCELLAI

FIRST BOOK

When I consider how much honor is attributed to antiquity, and how many times,

not to mention many other examples, a fragment of an antique statue has been

bought at a great price in order to have it near to one, honoring his house,

being able to have it imitated by those who delight in those arts, and how they

then strive with all industry to present them in all their work: and when I see,

on the other hand, the works of greatest virtu which Historians indicate have

been accomplished by ancient Kingdoms and Republics, by Kings, Captains,

Citizens, Lawgivers, and others who have worked themselves hard for their

country, to be more readily admired than imitated, or rather so much neglected

by everyone in every respect that no sign of that ancient virtu remains, I

cannot otherwise than wonder and at the same time be sad: and so much more when

I see in the civil differences that arise between Citizens, or in the maladies

which men incur, they always have recourses to those judgments or to those

remedies that have been judged or instituted by the ancients. For the civil laws

are nothing else but the decisions given by the ancient Jurisconsults, which

reduced to a system presently teach our Jurisconsults to judge and also what is

medicine if not the experience had by the ancient Doctors, (and) on which the

present Doctors base their judgments? None the less in the instituting of

Republics, in maintaining of States, in the governing of Kingdoms, in organizing

an army and conducting a war, in (giving) judgment for Subjects, in expanding

the Empire, there will not be found either Prince, or Republic, or Captain, or

Citizen, who has recourse to the examples of the ancients. Which I am persuaded

arises not so much from the weakness to which the present education has brought

the world, or from that evil which an ambitious indolence has created in many

Christian Provinces and Cities, than from not having a real understanding of

history, and from not drawing that (real) sense from its reading, or benefiting

from the spirit which is contained in it. whence it arises that they who read

take infinitely more pleasure in knowing the variety of incidents that are

contained in them, without ever thinking of imitating them, believing the

imitation not only difficult, but impossible: as if heaven, the sun, the

elements, and men should have changed the order of their motions and power, from

what they were anciently. Wanting, therefore, to draw men from this error, I

have judged it necessary to write upon all those books of Titus Livy which,

because of the malignity of the times, have been prevented (from coming to us),

in order that I might judge by comparing ancient and modern events what is

necessary for their better understanding, so that those who may read these

Discourses of mine may be able to derive that usefulness for which the

understanding of History ought to be sought. And although this enterprise may be

difficult, none the less, aided by those who have advised me to begin carrying

this load, I believe I can carry it so that there will remain for others a short

way to bring it to its destined place (end).

CHAPTER I

WHAT HAVE GENERALLY BEEN THE BEGINNINGS OF SOME CITIES, AND WHAT WAS THAT OF

ROME

Those who read what the beginning of the City of Rome was, and of her Law-givers

and how it was organized, do not wonder that so much virtu had been maintained

for so many centuries in that City, and that afterward there should have been

born that Empire to which that Republic was joined. And wanting first to discuss

its birth, I say that all Cities are built either by men born in the place where

they build it or by foreigners. The first case occurs when it appears to the

inhabitants that they do not live securely when dispersed into many and small

parties, each unable by himself both because of the location and the small

number to resist attacks of those who should assault them, and they are not in

time ((the enemy coming)) in waiting for their defense: or if they should be,

they must abandon many of their refuges, and thus they would quickly become the

prey of their enemies: so much that in order to avoid these dangers, moved

either by themselves or by some one among them of greater authority, they

restrict themselves to live together in a place selected by them, more

convenient to live in and more easy to defend. Of these, among others, have been

Athens and Venice: the first under the authority of Theseus was built by the

dispersed inhabitants for like reasons: the other built by many people (who) had

come to certain small islands situated at the head of the Adriatic Sea, in order

to escape those wars which every day were arising in Italy because of the coming

of new barbarians after the decline of that Roman Empire, began among

themselves, without any particular Prince who should organize them, to live

under those laws which appeared to them best suited in maintaining it (their new

state). In this they succeeded happily because of the long peace which the site

gave to them (for) that sea not having issue, where those people who were

afflicting Italy, not having ships with which they could invest them; so that

from a small beginning they were enabled to come to that greatness which they

now have.

The second case, when a city is built by foreign forces, is caused by free men

and by men who depend on others, such as the Colonies sent either by a Republic

or by a Prince to relieve their towns of (excessive) inhabitants or for the

defense of that country which they have newly acquired (and) want to maintain

securely and without expense; (thy Roman people built many cities, throughout

all their Empire) or they are built by a Prince, not to live there but for his

own glory, as was the City of Alexandria built by Alexander. And because these

cities at their origin do not have their freedom, it rarely happens that they

make great progress and are able to be numbered among the chief Kingdoms. Such

was the building of Florence, for (it was built either by the soldiers of Sulla,

or perhaps by the inhabitants of the Mountains of Fiesole, who trusting in that

long peace which prevailed in the world under Octavian were led to live in the

plain along the Arno) it was built under the Roman Empire, and could not in its

beginning have any other growth that those which were conceded to her through

the courtesy of the Prince.

The builders of Cities are free when any people either under a Prince or by

themselves are constrained either by pestilence or by famine or by war to

abandon their native country, and seek new homes: These either inhabit the

cities that they find in the countries they acquire, as Moses did, or they build

new ones, as Eneas did. This is a case where the virtu and fortune of the

builder of the edifice is recognized, which is of greater or less wonder

according as that man who was the beginner was of greater or less virtu. The

virtu of whom is recognized in two ways: the first is in the selection of the

site, the other in the establishment of the laws. And because men work either

from necessity or from choice: and because it is seen here that virtu is greater

where choice has less authority (results from necessity), it is (something) to

be considered whether it would be better for the building of a city to select

sterile places, so that men constrained to be industrious and less occupied with

idleness, should live more united, where, because of the poverty of the site,

they should have less cause for discord, as happened at Ragusa and in many other

cities built in similar places; which selection would without doubt be more wise

and more useful if men would be content to live of their own (possessions), and

not want to seek to command that of others.

However, as men are not able to make themselves secure except through power, it

is necessary to avoid this sterility of country and locate it in very fertile

places, where because of the fertility of the site, it can grow, can defend

itself from whoever should assault it, and suppress whoever should oppose its

aggrandizement. And as to that idleness which the site should encourage, it

ought to be arranged that in that necessity the laws should constrain them (to

work) where the site does not constrain them (does not do so), and to imitate

those who have been wise and have lived in most amenable and most fertile

countries, which are apt to making men idle and unable to exercise any virtu:

that to obviate those which the amenity of the country may cause through

idleness, they imposed the necessity of exercise on those who were to be

soldiers: of a kind that, because of such orders, they became better soldiers

than (men) in those countries where nature has been harsh and sterile: among

which was the Kingdom of Egypt, which notwithstanding that the country was most

amenable, that necessity ordained by the laws was so great, that most excellent

men resulted therefrom: and if their names had not been extinguished by

antiquity, it would be seen that they would have merited more praise than

Alexander the Great, and many others of whom memory is still fresh. And whoever

had considered the Kingdom of Soldan and the order of the Mamelukes, and of

their military (organization) before it was destroyed by Selim the Grand Turk,

would have seen there how much the soldiers exercised, and in fact would have

known how much they feared that idleness to which the benignity of the country

could lead them if they had not obviated it by the strongest laws. I say

therefore that the selection of a fertile location in establishing (a city) is

more prudent when (the results) of that fertility can be restricted within given

limits by laws.

Alexander the Great, wishing to build a city for his glory, Dinocrates, the

Architect came to him and showed him how he could do so upon the mountain Athos,

which place in addition to being strong, could be arranged in a way that the

City would be given human form, which would be a marvelous and rare thing and

worthy of his greatness: and Alexander asking him on what the inhabitants would

live, he replied that he had not thought of it: at which he laughed, and leaving

that mountain as it was, he built Alexandria, where the inhabitants would stay

willingly because of the richness of the country and the convenience to the sea

and of the Nile.

Whoever should examine, therefore, the building of Rome if he should take Eneas

for its first ancestor, will know that that City was built by foreigners: (but)

if Romulus, it would have been built by men native to the place, and in any case

it would be seen to have been free from the beginning without depending on

anyone: it will also be seen (as it will be said below) to what necessity the

laws made by Romulus, Numa, and the others had constrained them; so much so that

the fertility of the site, the convenience of the sea, the frequent victories,

the greatness of the Empire, could not corrupt her for many centuries, and they

maintained her full of so much virtu than any other republic has ever been

adorned. And because the things achieved by them and that are made notable by

Titus Livius, have taken place either through public Councils or private

(individuals) either inside or outside the City, I shall begin to discourse upon

those things which occured inside; and as for the public Council, which is

worthy of greater annotation, I shall judge, adding all that is dependent on

them; with which discourses this fast book, or rather this fast part will be

ended.

CHAPTER II

OF THE KINDS OF REPUBLICS THERE ARE, AND OF WHICH WAS THE ROMAN REPUBLIC

I want to place aside the discussion of those cities that had their beginning

subject to others, and I will talk of those which have had their beginning far

removed from any external servitude, but which (were) initially governed

themselves through their own will, either as Republics or as Principalities;

which have had (as diverse origins) diverse laws and institutions. For to some,

at the beginning or very soon after, their laws were given to them by one (man)

and all at one time, as those which were given to the Spartans by Lycurgus: Some

have received them by chance, and at several times, according to events, as Rome

did. So that a Republic can be called fortunate which by chance has a man so

prudent, who gives her laws so ordered that without having need of correcting

them, she can live securely under them. And it is seen that Sparta observed hers

(laws) for more than eight hundred years without changing them and without any

dangerous disturbance: and on the contrary that City has some degree of

unhappiness which (not having fallen to a prudent lawmaker) is compelled to

reorganize her laws by herself. And she also is more unhappy which has diverged

more from her institutions; and that (Republic) is even further from them whose

laws lead her away from perfect and true ends entirely outside of the right

path; for to those who are in that condition it is almost impossible that by

some incident they be set aright. Those others which do not have a perfect

constitution, but had made a good beginning, are capable of becoming better, and

can become perfect through the occurrence of events. It is very true, however,

that they have never been reformed without danger, for the greater number of men

never agree to a new law which contemplates a new order for the City, unless the

necessity that needs be accomplished is shown to them: and as this necessity

cannot arise without some peril, it is an easy thing for the Republic to be

ruined before it can be brought to a more perfect constitution. The Republic of

Florence gives a proof of this, which because of the incident of Arezzo in (the

year) one thousand five hundred and two (1502) was reorganized, (and) it was

disorganized by that of Prato in (the year) one thousand five hundred and twelve

(1512).

Wanting therefore to discourse on what were the institutions of the City of Rome

and what events brought her to her perfection, I say, that some who have written

of Republics say there are (one of) three States (governments) in them called by

them Principality (Monarchy), of the Best (Aristocracy), and Popular

(Democracy), and that those men who institute (laws) in a City ought to turn to

one of these, according as it seems fit to them. Some others (and wiser

according to the opinion of many) believe there are six kinds of Governments, of

which those are very bad, and those are good in themselves, but may be so easily

corrupted that they also become pernicious. Those that are good are three

mentioned above: those that are bad, are three others which derive from those

(first three), and each is so similar to them that they easily jump from one to

the other, for the Principality easily becomes a tyranny, autocracy easily

become State of the Few (oligarchies), and the Popular (Democracy) without

difficulty is converted into a licentious one (anarchy). So much so that an

organizer of a Republic institutes one of those three States (governments) in a

City, he institutes it for only a short time, because there is no remedy which

can prevent them from degenerating into their opposite kind, because of the

resemblance that virtu and vice have in this instance.

These variations in government among men are born by chance, for at the

beginning of the world the inhabitants were few, (and) lived for a time

dispersed and like beasts: later as the generations multiplied they gathered

together, and in order to be able better to defend themselves they began to seek

among themselves the one who was most robust and of greater courage, and made

him their head and obeyed him. From this there arose the knowledge of honest and

good things; differentiating them from the pernicious and evil; for seeing one

man harm his benefactor there arose hate and compassion between men, censuring

the ingrates and honoring those who were grateful, and believing also that these

same injuries could be done to them, to avoid like evils they were led to make

laws, and institute punishments for those who should contravene them; whence

came the cognition of justice. Which thing later caused them to select a Prince,

not seeking the most stalwart but he who was more prudent and more just. But

afterwards when they began to make the Prince by succession and not by election,

the heirs quickly degenerated from their fathers, and leaving off from works of

virtu they believed that Princes should have nothing else to do than surpass

others in sumptuousness and lasciviousness and in every other kind of delight.

So that the Prince began to be hated, and because of this hate he began to fear,

and passing therefore from fear to injury, a tyranny quickly arose. From this

there arose the beginnings of the ruin and conspiracies; and these conspiracies

against the Prince were not made by weak and timid men, but by those who because

of their generosity, greatness of spirit, riches, and nobility above the others,

could not endure the dishonest life of that prince.

The multitude therefore following the authority of these powerful ones armed

itself against the Prince, and having destroyed him, they obeyed them as their

liberators. And these holding the name of chief in hatred, constituted a

government by themselves, and in the beginning (having in mind the past tyranny)

governed themselves according to the laws instituted by them, preferring every

common usefulness to their conveniences, and governed and preserved private and

public affairs with the greatest diligence. This administration later was handed

down to their children, who not knowing the changeability of fortune (for) never

having experienced bad (fortune), and not wanting to remain content with civil

equality, they turned to avarice, ambition, violation of women, caused that

aristocratic government (of the Best) to become an oligarchic government (of the

Few) regardless of all civil rights: so that in a short time the same thing

happened to them as it did to the Tyrant, for the multitude disgusted with their

government, placed itself under the orders of whoever would in any way plan to

attack those Governors, and thus there arose some one who, with the aid of the

multitude, destroyed them. And the memory of the Prince and the injuries

received from him being yet fresh (and) having destroyed the oligarchic state

(of the Few), and not wanting to restore that of the Prince, the (people) turned

to the Popular state (Democracy) and they organized that in such a way, that

neither the powerful Few nor a Prince should have any authority. And because all

States in the beginning receive some reverence, this Popular State maintained

itself for a short time, but not for long, especially when that generation that

had organized it was extinguished, for they quickly came to that license where

neither private men or public men were feared: this was such that every one

living in his own way, a thousand injuries were inflicted every day: so that

constrained by necessity either through the suggestion of some good man, or to

escape from such license, they once again turn to a Principality; and from this

step by step they return to that license both in the manner and for the causes

mentioned (previously).

And this is the circle in which all the Republics are governed and will

eventually be governed; but rarely do they return to the same (original)

governments: for almost no Republic can have so long a life as to be able often

to pass through these changes and remain on its feet. But it may well happen

that in the troubles besetting a Republic always lacking counsel and strength,

it will become subject to a neighboring state which may be better organized than

itself: but assuming this does not happen, a Republic would be apt to revolve

indefinitely among these governments. I say therefore that all the (previously)

mentioned forms are inferior because of the brevity of the existence of those

three that are good, and of the malignity of those three that are bad. So that

those who make laws prudently having recognized the defects of each, (and)

avoiding every one of these forms by itself alone, they selected one (form) that

should partake of all, they judging it to be more firm and stable, because when

there is in the same City (government) a Principality, an Aristocracy, and a

Popular Government (Democracy), one watches the other.[1]

Among those who have merited more praise for having similar constitutions is

Lycurgus, who so established his laws in Sparta, that in giving parts to the

King, the Aristocracy, and the People, made a state that endured more than eight

hundred years, with great praise to himself and tranquillity to that City. The

contrary happened to Solon who established the laws in Athens, (and) who by

establishing only the Popular (Democratic) state, he gave it such a brief

existence that before he died he saw arise the tyranny of Pisistratus: and

although after forty years his (the tyrants) heirs were driven out and liberty

returned to Athens, for the Popular state was restored according to the

ordinances of Solon, it did not last more than a hundred years, yet in order

that it be maintained many conventions were made by which the insolence of the

nobles and the general licentiousness were suppressed, which had not been

considered by Solon: none the less because he did not mix it (Popular state)

with the power of the Principate and with that of the Aristocracy, Athens lived

a very short time as compared to Sparta.

But let us come to Rome, which, notwithstanding that it did not have a Lycurgus

who so established it in the beginning that she was not able to exist free for a

long time, none the less so many were the incidents that arose in that City

because of the disunion that existed between the Plebs and the Senate, so that

what the legislator did not do, chance did. For, if Rome did not attain top

fortune, it attained the second; if the first institutions were defective, none

the less they did not deviate from the straight path which would lead them to

perfection, for Romulus and all the other Kings made many and good laws, all

conforming to a free existence. But because their objective was to found a

Kingdom and not a Republic, when that City became free she lacked many things

that were necessary to be established in favor of liberty, which had not been

established by those Kings. And although those Kings lost their Empire for the

reasons and in the manner discussed, none the less those who drove them out

quickly instituted two Consuls who should be in the place of the King, (and) so

it happened that while the name (of King) was driven from Rome, the royal power

was not; so that the Consuls and the Senate existed in forms mentioned above,

that is the Principate and the Aristocracy. There remained only to make a place

for Popular government for the reasons to be mentioned below, the people rose

against them: so that in order not to lose everything, (the Nobility) was

constrained to concede a part of its power to them, and on the other hand the

Senate and the Consuls remained with so much authority that they were able to

keep their rank in that Republic. And thus was born (the creation) of the

Tribunes of the plebs,[2] after which creation the government of that Republic

came to be more stable, having a part of all those forms of government. And so

favorable was fortune to them that although they passed from a Monarchial

government and from an Aristocracy to one of the People (Democracy), by those

same degrees and for the same reasons that were discussed above, none the less

the Royal form was never entirely taken away to give authority to the

Aristocracy, nor was all the authority of the Aristocrats diminished in order to

give it to the People, but it remained shared (between the three) it made the

Republic perfect: which perfection resulted from the disunion of the Plebs and

the Senate, as we shall discuss at length in the next following chapters.

CHAPTER III

WHAT EVENTS CAUSED THE CREATION OF THE TRIBUNES OF THE PLEBS IN ROME, WHICH MADE

THE REPUBLIC MORE PERFECT

As all those have shown who have discussed civil institutions, and as every

history is full of examples, it is necessary to whoever arranges to found a

Republic and establish laws in it, to presuppose that all men are bad and that

they will use their malignity of mind every time they have the opportunity; and

if such malignity is hidden for a time, it proceeds from the unknown reason that

would not be known because the experience of the contrary had not been seen, but

time, which is said to be the father of every truth, will cause it to be

discovered. It seemed that in Rome there was a very great harmony between the

Plebs and the Senate (the Tarquins having been driven out), and that the nobles

had laid aside their haughtiness and had become of a popular spirit, and

supportable to everyone even to the lowest. This deception was hidden, nor was

the cause seen while the Tarquins lived, whom the nobility feared, and having

fear that the maltreated plebs might not side with them (the nobles) they

behaved themselves humanely toward them: but as soon as the Tarquins were dead,

and that fear left the Nobles, they begun to vent upon the plebs that poison

which they had kept within their breasts, and in every way they could they

offended them: which thing gives testimony to that which was said above that men

never act well except through necessity: but where choice abounds and where

license may be used, everything is quickly filled with confusion and disorder.

It is said therefore that Hunger and Poverty make men industrious, and Laws make

them good. And where something by itself works well without law, the law is not

necessary: but when that good custom is lacking, the law immediately becomes

necessary. Thus the Tarquins being dead through fear of whom the Nobles were

kept in restraint, it behooved them (the Nobles) to think of a new order, which

would cause the same effect which the Tarquins had caused when they were alive.

And therefore after many confusions, tumults, and dangers of troubles, which

arose between the Plebs and the Nobility, they came for the security of the

Plebs to the creation of the Tribunes, and they were given so much preeminence

and so much reputation, that they then should always be able to be in the middle

between the Plebs and the Senate, and obviate the insolence of the Nobles.

CHAPTER IV

THAT DISUNION OF THE PLEBS AND THE ROMAN SENATE MADE THAT REPUBLIC FREE AND

POWERFUL

I do not want to miss discoursing on these tumults that occurred in Rome from

the death of the Tarquins to the creation of the Tribunes; and afterwards I will

discourse on some things contrary to the opinions of many who say that Rome was

a tumultuous Republic and full of so much confusion, that if good fortune and

military virtu had not supplied her defects, she would have been inferior to

every other Republic.

I cannot deny that fortune and the military were the causes of the Roman Empire;

but it indeed seems to me that this would not happen except when military

discipline is good, it happens that where order is good, (and) only rarely there

may not be good fortune accompanying. But let us come to the other particulars

of that City. I say that those who condemn the tumults between the nobles and

the plebs, appear to me to blame those things that were the chief causes for

keeping Rome free, and that they paid more attention to the noises and shouts

that arose in those tumults than to the good effects they brought forth, and

that they did not consider that in every Republic there are two different

viewpoints, that of the People and that of the Nobles; and that all the laws

that are made in favor of liberty result from their disunion, as may easily be

seen to have happened in Rome, for from Tarquin to the Gracchi which was more

than three hundred years, the tumults of Rome rarely brought forth exiles, and

more rarely blood. Nor is it possible therefore to judge these tumults harmful,

nor divisive to a Republic, which in so great a time sent into exile no more

than eight or ten of its citizens because of its differences, and put to death

only a few, and condemned in money (fined) not very many: nor can a Republic in

any way with reason be called disordered where there are so many examples of

virtu, for good examples result from good education, good education from good

laws, and good laws from those tumults which many inconsiderately condemn; for

he who examines well the result of these, will not find that they have brought

forth any exile or violence prejudicial to the common good, but laws and

institutions in benefit of public liberty. And if anyone should say the means

were extraordinary and almost savage, he will see the People together shouting

against the Senate, The Senate against the People, running tumultuously

throughout the streets, locking their stores, all the Plebs departing from Rome,

all of which (things) alarm only those who read of them; I say, that every City

ought to have their own means with which its People can give vent to their

ambitions, and especially those Cities which in important matters, want to avail

themselves of the People; among which the City of Rome had this method, that

when those people wanted to obtain a law, either they did some of the things

mentioned before or they would not enroll their names to go to war, so that to

placate them it was necessary (for the Senate) in some part to satisfy them: and

the desires of a free people rarely are pernicious to liberty, because they

arise either from being oppressed or from the suspicion of going to be

oppressed. And it these opinions should be false, there is the remedy of

haranguing (public assembly), where some upright man springs up who through

oratory shows them that they deceive themselves; and the people (as Tullius

Cicero says) although they are ignorant, are capable of (appreciating) the

truth, and easily give in when the truth is given to them by a trustworthy man.

One ought therefore to be more sparing in blaming the Roman government, and to

consider that so many good effects which came from that Republic, were not

caused except for the best of reasons: And if the tumults were the cause of

creation of Tribunes, they merit the highest praise, for in addition to giving

the people a part in administration, they were established for guarding Roman

liberty, as will be shown in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V

WHERE THE GUARDING OF LIBERTY IS MORE SECURELY PLACED, EITHER IN THE PEOPLE OR

IN THE NOBLES; AND WHICH HAVE THE GREATER REASON TO BECOME TUMULTUOUS EITHER HE

WHO WANTS TO ACQUIRE OR HE WHO WANTS TO MAINTAIN

Among the more necessary things instituted by those who have prudently

established a Republic, was to establish a guard to liberty, and according as

this was well or badly place, that freedom endured a greater or less (period of

time). And because in every Republic there exists the Nobles and the Populace,

it may be a matter of doubt in whose hands the guard is better placed. And the

Lacedemonians, and in our times the Venetians, placed it in the hands of the

Nobles, but that of Rome was placed in the hands of the Plebs. It is necessary

therefore to examine which of the Republics had made the better selection. And

if we go past the causes and examine every part, and if their results should be

examined, the side of the Nobles would be preferred since the liberty of Sparta

and Venice had a much longer life than that of Rome: And to come to the reasons,

I say (taking up first the part of the Romans) that thing (liberty) which is to

be guarded ought to be done by those who have the least desire of usurping it.

And without doubt, if the object of the Nobles and of the Ignobles (populace) is

considered, it will be seen that the former have a great desire to dominate, and

the latter a desire not to be dominated and consequently a greater desire to

live free, being less hopeful of usurping it (liberty) than are the Nobles: so

that the People placed in charge to guard the liberty of anyone, reasonably will

take better care of it; for not being able to take it away themselves, they do

not permit others to take it away.

On the other hand, he who defends the Spartan and Venetian arrangement, says

that those who placed that guardianship in the hands of the Powerful (Nobles),

made two good points: The one, that they satisfy more the ambitions of those who

playing a greater part in the Republic, (and) having this club in their hands,

have more reason to be content; the other, that they take away a kind of

authority from the restless spirit of the People which is the cause of infinite

discussions and troubles in a Republic, and apt to bring the Nobility to some

(act of) desperation which in times may result in some bad effects. And they

give for an example this selfsame Rome, where the Tribunes of the Plebs having

this authority in their hands, (and) the having of one Consul from the Plebs was

not enough for them (the People), but that they wanted to have both (the Consuls

from the Plebs). From this they afterward wanted the Censure, the Praetorship,

and all the other ranks of the Empire (Government) of the Republic. Nor was this

enough for them, but urged on by the same fury they began in time to idolize

those men whom they saw adept at beating down the Nobility: whence arose the

power of Marius and the ruin of Rome.

And truly whoever should discuss well both of these things could be in doubt as

to what kind of men may be more harmful to the Republic, either those who desire

to acquire that which they do not have, or those who desire to maintain the

honors already acquired. And in the end whoever examines everything skillfully

will come to this conclusion: The discussion is either of a Republic which wants

to create an Empire, as Rome, or of one which is satisfied to maintain itself.

In the first case it is necessary for it to do everything as Rome did; in the

second, it can imitate Venice and Sparta, for those reasons why and how as will

be described in the succeeding chapter.

But to return to the discussion as to which men are more harmful in a Republic,

either those who desire to acquire, or those who fear to lose that which they

have acquired, I say that when Marcus Menenius had been made Dictator, and

Marcus Fulvius Master of the cavalry, both plebeians, in order to investigate

certain conspiracies that had been formed in Capua against Rome, they were also

given authority by the people to be able to search out who in Rome from ambition

and by extraordinary means should endeavor to attain the Consulate and other

houses (offices) of the City. And it appearing to the Nobility that such

authority given to the Dictator was directed against them, they spread the word

throughout Rome that it was not the Nobles who were seeking the honors for

ambition, or by extraordinary means, but the Ignobles (Plebeians) who, trusting

neither to their blood (birth) nor in their own virtu, sought to attain those

dignities, and they particularly accused the Dictator: And so powerful was this

accusation, that Menenius having made a harangue (speech) and complaining of the

calumnies spread against him by the Nobles, he deposed the Dictatorship, and

submitted himself to that judgement (of himself) which should be made by the

People: And then the cause having been pleaded, he was absolved; at which time

there was much discussion as to who was the more ambitious, he who wanted to

maintain (his power) or he who wanted to acquire it, since the desires of either

the one or the other could be the cause of the greatest tumults. But none the

less more frequently they are caused by those who possess (power), for the fear

of losing it generates in them the same desires that are in those who want to

acquire it, because it does not seem to men to possess securely that which they

have, unless they acquire more from others. And, moreover, those who possess

much, can make changes with greater power and facility. And what is yet worse,

is that their breaking out and ambitious conduct arouses in the breasts of those

who do not possess (power) the desire to possess it, either to avenge themselves

against them (the former) by despoiling them, or in order to make it possible

also for them to partake of those riches and honors which they see are so badly

used by the others.

CHAPTER VI

WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT IN ROME WHICH COULD ELIMINATE

THE ENMITY BETWEEN THE POPULACE AND THE SENATE

We have discussed above the effects which were caused by the controversies

between the People and the Senate. Now these having continued up to the time of

the Gracchi, where they were the cause of the loss of liberty, some might wish

that Rome had done the great things that she did without there being that enmity

within her. It seems to me therefore a thing worthy of consideration to see

whether in Rome there could have been a government (state) established that

could have eliminated the aforementioned controversies. And to desire to examine

this it is necessary to have recourse to those Republics which have had their

liberty for a long time without such enmities and tumults, and to see what

(form) of government theirs was, and if it could have been introduced in Rome.

For example, there is Sparta among the ancients, Venice among the modern, (both)

having been previously mentioned by me. Sparta created a King with a small

Senate which should govern her. Venice did not divide its government by these

distinctions, but gave all those who could have a part in the administration (of

its government) the name of Gentlemen: In this manner, chance more than prudence

gave them (the Venetians) the laws (form of Government), for having taken refuge

on those rocks where the City now is, for the reasons mentioned above many of

the inhabitants, as they had increased to so great a number, with the desire to

live together, so that needing to make laws for themselves, they established a

government, (and) came together often in councils to discuss the affairs of the

City; when it appeared to them that they had become numerous enough for existing

as a commonwealth, they closed the path to all the others who should newly come

to live there to take part in their government: And in time finding in that

place many inhabitants outside the government, in order to give reputation to

those who were governing, they called them Gentlemen, and the others Popolari.

This form (of Government) could establish and maintain itself without tumult,

because when it was born, whoever then lived in Venice participated in that

government, with which no one could complain: Those who came to live there

later, finding the State firm and established did not have cause or opportunity

to create a tumult. The cause was not there because nothing had been taken from

them. The opportunity was not there because those who ruled kept them in check

and did not employ them in affairs where they could pick up authority. In

addition to this, those who came to inhabit Venice later were not very many, or

of such a great number that these would be a disproportion between those who

governed and those who were governed, for the number of Gentlemen were either

equal to or greater than the others: so that for these reasons Venice could

establish that State and maintain it united.

Sparta, as I have said, being governed by a King and limited Senate could thus

maintain itself for a long time because there being few inhabitants in Sparta,

and the path having been closed to those who should want to live there, and the

laws of Lycurgus having acquired such reputation that their observance removed

all the causes for tumults. They were able to live united for a long time, for

Lycurgus had established in Sparta more equality of substance and less equality

in rank, because equal poverty existed here and the Plebs were lacking ambitious

men, as the offices of the City were extended to few Citizens, and were kept

distant from the Plebs, nor did the Nobles by not treating them badly ever

create in them the desire to want them. This resulted from the Spartan Kings,

who, being placed in that Principate and living in the midst of that Nobility,

did not have may better means of maintaining their office, than to keep the

Plebs defended from every injury: which caused the Plebs neither to fear nor to

desire authority, and not having the dominion, nor fear of it, there was

eliminated the competition which they might have had with the Nobility, and the

cause of tumults, and thus they could live united for a long time. But two

things principally caused this union: The one, the inhabitants of Sparta were

few, and because of this were able to be governed by a few: The other, that not

accepting outsiders in their Republic, they did not have the opportunity either

of becoming corrupt or of increasing so much that they should become

unsupportable to those few who governed her.

Considering all these things, therefore, it is seen that it was necessary that

the legislators of Rome do one of two things in desiring that Rome be as quiet

as the above mentioned Republic, either not to employ the Plebs in war like the

Venetians, or not to open the door to outsiders like the Spartans, But they did

the one and the other, which gave the Plebs strength and increased power and

infinite opportunities for tumults. And if the Roman State had come to be more

tranquil, it would have resulted that she would have become even more feeble,

because there would have been cut off from her the means of being able to attain

that greatness which she achieved. So that Rome wanting to remove the causes for

tumults, would also take away the causes for expansion. And as in all human

affairs, those who examine them will indeed see that it is never possible to

avoid one inconvenience but that another one will spring up. If therefore, you

want to make a people numerous and armed in order to create a great Empire, you

will make it of a kind that you are not able afterward to manage it in your own

way: if you keep them either small or disarmed in order to be able to manage

them, (and), if you acquire other dominion, you will not be able to hold them,

or you will become so mean that you will become prey to whoever assaults you.

And therefore, in every one of our decisions, there ought to be considered where

the inconveniences are less, and then take up the better proceeding, for there

will never be formed anything entirely clear of suspicion. Rome could therefore,

like Sparta, have created a Prince for life, and established a limited Senate;

but desiring to build a great Empire, she could not, like Sparta, limit the

number of her Citizens: which, in creating a King for life and a small number in

the Senate, would have been of little benefit in connection with her unity. If

anyone therefore should want to establish a new Republic, he should have to

consider if he should want it to expand in dominion and power as did Rome, or

whether it should remain within narrow limits. In the first case, it is

necessary to establish it as Rome, and to give place to tumults and general

dissensions as best he can; for without a great number of men, and (those) well

armed, no Republic can ever increase, or if it did increase, to maintain itself.

In thy second case he may establish her as Sparta and Venice: but because

expansion is the poison of such Republics, he ought in every way he can prevent

her from making acquisitions, for such acquisitions, based on a weak Republic,

are entirely their ruin, as happened to Sparta and Venice, the first of which

having subjected almost all of Greece, showed the weakness of its foundation

with the slightest accident; for when there ensued the rebellion of Thebes

caused by Pelopidas, the other cities also rebelling, ruined that Republic

entirely.

Similarly Venice having occupied a great part of Italy, and the greater part

(obtained) not by war but by money and astuteness, when it came to make a test

of her strength everything was lost in one engagement. I believe then that to

create a Republic which should endure a long time, the better way would be to

organize internally like Sparta, or like Venice locate it in a strong place, and

of such power that no one should believe he could quickly oppress her: and on

the other hand, it should not be so powerful that she should be formidable to

her neighbors, and thus she could enjoy its state (independence) for a long

time. For there are two reasons why war is made against a Republic: The one, to

become lord over her: the other, the fear of being occupied by her. These two

means in the above mentioned manner almost entirely removed (the reasons for

war), for it is difficult to destroy her, being well organized for her defense,

as I presuppose, it will rarely or never happen that one can design to conquer

her. If she remains within her limits, and from experience it is seen that there

is no ambition in her, it will never happen that someone for fear of her will

make war against her: and this would be so much more so if there should be in

her constitution or laws (restrictions) that should prohibit her expansion. And

without doubt I believe that things could be kept balanced in this way, that

there would be the best political existence, and real tranquillity to a City.

But all affairs of men being (continually) in motion and never being able to

remain stable, it happens that (States) either remain stable or decline: and

necessity leads you to do many things which reason will not lead you to do; so

that having established a Republic adept at maintaining itself without

expanding, and necessity should induce her to expand, her foundations would be

taken away and her ruin accomplished more readily. Thus, on the other hand, if

Heaven should be so kind that she would never have to make war, the languidness

that should arise would make her either effeminate or divided: which two

together, or each one by itself, would be cause of her ruin. Not being able,

therefore, (as I believe) to balance these things, and to maintain this middle

course, it is necessary in organizing a Republic to think of the more honorable

side, and organize her in a way that if necessity should induce her to expand,

she may be able to preserve that which she should have acquired. And to return

to the first discussion, I believe it is necessary to follow the Roman order and

not that of any other Republic (because I do not believe it is possible to find

a middle way between one and the other) and to tolerate that enmity that should

arise between the People and the Senate, accepting it as an inconvenient

necessity in attaining the Roman greatness. Because in addition to the other

reasons alleged, where the authority of the Tribunes is shown to be necessary

for the guarding of liberty, it is easy to consider the benefit that will come

to the Republic from this authority of accusing (judiciary), which among others

was committed to the Tribunes, as will be discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER VII

HOW MUCH THE FACULTY OF ACCUSING (JUDICIARY) IS NECESSARY FOR A REPUBLIC FOR THE

MAINTENANCE OF LIBERTY

No more useful and necessary authority can be given to those who are appointed

in a City to guard its liberty, as is that of being able to accuse the citizen

to the People or to any Magistrate or Council, if he should in any way

transgress against the free state. This arrangement makes for two most useful

effects for a Republic. The first is, that for fear of being accused, the

citizens do not attempt anything against the state, and if they should (make an)

attempt they are punished immediately and without regard (to person). The other

is, that it provides a way for giving vent to those moods which in whatever way

and against whatever citizens may arise in the City. And when these moods do not

provide a means by which they may be vented, they ordinarily have recourse to

extra ordinary means that cause the complete ruin of a Republic. And there is

nothing which makes a Republic so stable and firm, as organizing it in such a

way that changes in the moods which may agitate it have a way prescribed by law

for venting themselves. This can be demonstrated by many examples, and

especially by that of Coriolanus, which Titus Livius refers to, where he says

that the Roman Nobility being irritated against the Plebs, because it seemed to

them the Plebs had too much authority concerning the creation of the Tribunes

who defended them, and Rome (as happened) experiencing a great scarcity of

provisions, and the Senate having sent to Sicily for grain, Coriolanus, enemy of

the popular faction, counselled that the time had come (to be able) to castigate

the Plebs and take away authority which they had acquired and assumed to the

prejudice of the Nobility, by keeping them famished and not distributing the

grain: which proposition coming to the ears of the people, caused so great an

indignation against Coriolanus, that on coming out of the Senate he would have

been killed in a tumultuary way if the Tribunes had not summoned him to appear

and defend his cause. From this incident there is to be noted that which was

mentioned above, that it is useful and necessary for a Republic with its laws to

provide a means of venting that ire which is generally conceived against a

citizen, for if these ordinary means do not exist, they will have recourse to

extraordinary ones, and without doubt these produce much worse effects that do

the others. For ordinarily when a citizen is oppressed, even if he has received

an injustice, little or no disorder ensues in the Republic, because its

execution is done by neither private nor foreign forces which are those that

ruin public liberty, but is done by public force and arrangement which have

their own particular limits, and do not transcend to things that ruin the

Republic.

And to corroborate this opinion with examples, among the ancient ones I want

this one of Coriolanus to be enough, on which anyone should consider how much

evil would have resulted to the Roman Republic if he had been killed in the

tumults, for there would have arisen an offense by a private (citizen) against a

private (citizen); which offense generates fear, fear seeks defense, for this

defense partisans are procured, from the partisans factions arise in the City,

(and) the factions cause their ruin. But the matter being controlled by those

who had authority, all those evils which could arise if it were governed by

private authority were avoided. We have seen in our time that troubles happened

to the Republic of Florence because the multitude was able to give vent to their

spirit in an ordinary way against one of her citizens, as befell in the time of

Francesco Valori, who was as a Prince in that City (and) who being judged

ambitious by many, and a man who wanted by his audacity and animosity to

transcend the civil authority, and there being no way in the Republic of being

able to resist him except by a faction contrary to his, there resulted that he

(Valori) having no fear except from some extraordinary happening, began to

enlist supporters who should defend him: On the other hand, those who opposed

him not having any regular way or repressing him, thought of extraordinary ways,

so that it came to arms. And where (if it were possible to oppose him, Valori,

by regular means) his authority would have been extinguished with injury to

himself only, but having to extinguish it by extraordinary means, there ensued

harm not only to himself, but to many other noble citizens. We could also city

in support of the above mentioned conclusion the incident which ensued in

Florence in connection with Piero Soderini, which resulted entirely because

there was not in that Republic (means of making) accusations against the

ambitions of powerful citizens: for the accusing of a powerful one before eight

judges in a Republic is not enough; it is necessary that the judges be many

because the few always judge in favor of the few. So that if such a means had

been in existence, they would have accused him (Soderini) of evil while yet

alive, and through such means without having the Spanish army (called) to come

in, they would have given vent to their feelings; or if he had not done evil

they would not have had the audacity to move against him, for fear that they

would be accused by him: and thus both sides would have ceased having that

desire which was the cause of the trouble.

So that this can be concluded, that whenever it is seen that external forces are

called in by a party of men who live in a City, it can be judged to result from

its bad organization because there did not exist within that circle of

arrangements, a way to be able without extraordinary means to give vent to the

malignant moods that arise in men, which can be completely provided by

instituting accusations before many judges and giving them reputation

(authority). These things were so well organized in Rome that in so many

discussions between the Plebs and the Senate, neither the Senate nor the Plebs

nor any particular citizen, ever attempted to avail (himself) of external force,

for having the remedy at home it was not necessary to go outside for it. And

although the above examples are amply sufficient to prove this, none the less I

want to refer to another recital by Titus Livius in his history, which refers to

there having been in Chiusi (Clusium), at that time a most noble City of

Tuscany, one Lucumones who had violated a sister of Aruntes, and Aruntes not

being able to avenge himself because of the power of the violator, went to seek

out the French (Gauls) who then ruled in that place which today is called

Lombardy, and urged them to come to Chiusi with arms in hand, pointing out to

them how they could avenge the injury he had received with advantage to

themselves: but if Aruntes could have seen how he could have avenged himself by

the provisions of the City, he would not have sought the barbarian forces. But

just as these accusations are useful in a Republic, so also are calumnies

useless and harmful, as we shall discuss in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VIII

AS MUCH AS ACCUSATIONS ARE USEFUL TO A REPUBLIC, SO MUCH SO ARE CALUMNIES

PERNICIOUS

Notwithstanding that the virtu of Furius Camillus when he was liberating (Rome)

from the oppression of the French (Gauls) had caused the Roman citizens to yield

him (top honors) without appearing to them to have lost reputation or rank, none

the less Manlius Capitolinus was not able to endure that so much honor and glory

should be bestowed on him; for it seemed to him he had done as much for the

welfare of Rome by having saved the Campidoglio (Capitol), he had merited as

much as Camillus, and as for other warlike praises he was not inferior to him.

So that filled with envy, he was not able to sow discord among the Fathers

(Senators) he turned to the Plebs, sowing various sinister opinions among them.

And among other things he said was, that the treasure which had been collected

(together) to be given to the French (Gauls), and then was not given to them,

had been usurped by private citizens: and if its should be recovered it could be

converted to public usefulness, alleviating the plebs from tribute or from some

private debt. These words greatly impressed the Plebs, so that Manlius begun to

have concourse with them and at his instigation (created) many tumults in the

City: This thing displeased the Senate and they deeming it of moment and

perilous, created a Dictator who should take cognizance of the case and restrain

the rashness of (Manlius); whereupon the Dictator had him summoned, and they met

face to face in public, the Dictator in the midst of the Nobles and Manlius in

the midst of the Plebs. Manlius was asked what he had to say concerning who

obtained the treasure that he spoke about, for the Senate was as desirous of

knowing about it as the Plebs: to which Manlius made no particular reply, but

going on in an evasive manner he said, that it was not necessary to tell them

that which they already knew, so that the Dictator had him put in prison. And it

is to be noted by this text how detestable calumnies are in free Cities and in

every other form of government, and that in order to repress them no arrangement

made for such a proposition ought to be neglected. Nor can there be a better

arrangement to putting an end to these (calumnies) than to open the way for

accusations, for accusations are as beneficial to Republics as calumnies are

harmful: and on the other hand there is this difference, that calumnies do not

need witnesses nor any other particular confrontation to prove them so that

anyone can be calumniated by anyone else, but cannot now be accused, as the

accuser has need of positive proof and circumstances that would show the truth

of the accusation. Men must make the accusations before the Magistrates, the

People, or the Councils: calumnies (are spread) throughout the plaza and

lodgings (private dwellings). These calumnies are practiced more where

accusations are used less and where Cities are less constituted to receive them.

An establisher of a Republic therefore ought so to organize it that it is

possible to accuse every citizen without any fear and without any suspicion: and

this being done, and well carried out, he should severely punish the

calumniators, who cannot complain if they are punished, they having places open

to them to hear the accusations of those who had caluminated them in private.

And where this part is not well organized great disorders always follow, for

calumnies irritate but do not castigate citizens, and those who have been

irritated think of strengthening themselves, easily hating more than fearing the

things that are said against them.

¶ This part (as has been said) was well organized in Rome, and has always been

poorly organized in our City of Florence. And as in Rome this institution did

much good, at Florence this poor order did much evil. And whoever reads the

history of this City, will see how many calumnies have been perpetrated in every

time against those citizens who occupied themselves in its important affairs. Of

one, they said he had robbed money from the Community; of another, that he had

not succeeded in an enterprise because of having been corrupted; and of yet

another, because of his ambitions had caused such and such inconvenience. Of the

things that resulted there sprung up hate on every side, whence it came to

divisions, from divisions to Factions (Sects), (and), from Factions to ruin. If

in Florence there had been some arrangement for the accusation of citizens and

punishment of calumniators, there would not have occurred the infinite troubles

that have ensued, for those Citizens who had been either condemned or absolved,

could not have harmed the City, and there would have been a much less number

accused than there had been calumniated, as it could not have been (as I have

said) as easy to accuse as to calumniate any one. And among the other things

that some citizens might employ to achieve greatness have been these calumnies,

which employed against powerful citizens who opposed his ambition, did much for

them; for by taking up the past of the people, and confirming them the opinion

which they had of them (the nobles), he made them his friends.

And although we could refer to many examples, I want to be content with only

one. The Florentine army which was besieging Lucca was commanded by Messer

Giovanni Guicciardini, their Commissioner. It was due either to his bad

management or his bad fortune, that the fall of that City did not ensue. But

whatever the case may have been, Messer Giovanni was blamed, alleging he had

been corrupted by the Lucchesi: which calumny, being favored by his enemies,

brought Messer Giovanni almost to the last desperation. And although, to justify

himself because there was no way in that Republic of being able to do so. From

which there arose great indignation among the friends of Messer Giovanni, who

constituted the greater part of the nobility, and (also) among those who desired

to make changes in Florence. This affair, both for this and other similar

reasons, grew so, that there resulted the ruin of the Republic.

Manlius Capitolinus was therefore a calumniator and not an accuser; and the

Romans showed in this case in point how the calumniators ought to be punished.

For they ought to be made to become accusers, and if the accusation proves true

either to reward them or not punish them; but if it does not prove true, to

punish them as Manlius was punished.

CHAPTER IX

HOW IT IS NECESSARY FOR ONE MAN ALONE IN DESIRING TO ORGANIZE A NEW REPUBLIC TO